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I. INTRODUCTION
Involuntary bankruptcy, at one time a tautology,1 languished dur-
ing the eighty years or so when bankruptcy law in the United States
was governed by the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.2 Specifically
targeted for reform in the project that culminated in the promulgation
of the current Bankruptcy Code,3 the slumbering remedy of involun-
1. Under the earliest bankruptcy law in the United States (Bankruptcy Act of 1800,
2 Stat. 19, repealed, 2 Stat. 2248 (1803)), bankruptcy was exclusively a creditor's
remedy; it provided no mechanism for voluntary filing or discharge of debts. This
followed the English practice prevailing at the time which also provided only for
involuntary petitions. See Vern A. Countryman, A History of American Bank-
ruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226 (1976); Stephen A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of
Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401 (1947). In fact, voluntary filings
did not become a part of bankruptcy law until 1841 in the United States and 1844
in England. See STEPHAN A. IESENFED, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORs'
PROTEcTION 456-457 (1986). The relatively recent origins of voluntary bank-
ruptcy, and the historical circumstances which gave rise to its adoption in 19th
Century bankruptcy legislation, are insightfully chronicled in John C. McCoid, II,
The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 361 (1988). See also
Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Am.
BANaI. L.J. 325 (1991). For a more in-depth study of the development of federal
bankruptcy law in the last century the leading work is undoubtedly CHARLES
WARREN, BANKRUPTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Act or
Act]. The Act was amended on several occasions before its repeal in 1979, includ-
ing, most importantly, the Chandler Act, ch. 575,52 Stat. 840 (1938) which, among
other new provisions providing for debtor rehabilitation, introduced the modern
concept of corporate reorganizations into the bankruptcy law by revising and in-
corporating into a new Chapter X various provisions of former section 77B, itself
enacted as an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act by Act of June 7, 1934, 48 Stat.
911.
3. In 1970, Congress established the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Commission] to "study, analyze, evaluate and
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tary bankruptcy was infused with new life and vitality upon the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.4 Eligibility to file was
expanded,5 procedures were streamlined, 6 and standards governing
entitlement to relief were relaxed.7 All in all, the prospects for reha-
bilitation, preservation of assets, and maximization of value-the at-
tributes typically regarded as favorably distinguishing federal
recommend changes to [existing bankruptcy law]." Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The work of the Bankruptcy Commission, set forth in its
1973 report, became the foundation for several reform bills including the bill
(H.R. 8200) that was eventually enacted into law. See COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTOY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, HR. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1973). The Report was issued in two parts: Part I contained findings and recom-
mendations, and Part HI was an actual reform bill [Part I of this report is herein-
after referred to as the BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT]. For review of the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code,
see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), % 1.03 (1991); RIESENFELD, supra note 1,
at 459-460. See also J. Ronald Trost & Lawrence P. King, Congress and Bank-
ruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAw. 489, 489-95 (1978)(published approxi-
mately nine months before a final bill was passed).
4. Act of November 6,1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter the Reform
Act]. Title I of the Reform Act was codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 &
Supp. U 1990). All references in this Article to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code" are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended through January 1,
1991 unless otherwise indicated.
5. Under § 59b of the Bankruptcy Act, only creditors holding "provable," non-con-
tingent, and unliquidated claims against the debtor were eligible to initiate an
involuntary case. The concept of provability of claims under the Act determined
whether a creditor was entitled to participate at all in the bankruptcy case. A
claim was regarded as provable if it fell within one of the nine specified categories
of debts enumerated in Bankruptcy Act § 63a. The Reform Act abandoned the
concept of provable claims and eliminated all restrictions on the ability of the
holders of unliquidated claims to effectively join in an involuntary petition. How-
ever, the aggregate amount of unsecured claims required to be held by the peti-
tioning creditors was increased from the $500 level set forth in § 59b to $5,000. 11
U.S.C. § 303(b)(1982). Section 303(b) was amended in 1984 to exclude disputed
claims.
6. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1013(a), for example, provides that "[tihe court shall deter-
mine the issues of a contested [involuntary] petition at the earliest practicable
time and forthwith enter an order for relief, dismiss the petition, or enter other
appropriate orders." The procedure governing the disposition of involuntary pe-
titions under the Code is detailed in STEPHEN SNYDER & LAWRENCE PONOROFF,
CotnmEciAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION §§ 5.12-5.13 (1991).
7. Of primary import, the Reform Act eliminated the much-criticized provision of
the Bankruptcy Act which required that the petition be filed within four months
after the commission of an "act of bankruptcy". See Bankruptcy Act § 3b. Not
only did this requirement impose what was effectively a lightning-quick statute
of limitations, but the six acts of bankruptcy, enumerated in § 3a, were often diffi-
cult to detect and arduous to prove. For more detailed discussion of the reasons
for the general dissatisfaction with the Act's standards pertaining to involuntary
bankruptcy, see JAMES A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANK-
RUPTCY 56-56 (1956). See also Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 3, at




bankruptcy from its less efficient state law analogueS-were greatly
enhanced, or so it seemed, as creditors were handed a powerful tool to
prevent the wasteful dissolution of valuable earning capacity.
And yet the drafters of the Code, looking down on all they had
wrought that was good, also saw a dark side to what they had con-
ceived. A new concern arose now that involuntary bankruptcy was no
longer burdened by technical and difficult requirements of proof. The
concern was that unprincipled creditors would use or threaten use of
involuntary bankruptcy, not when its invocation would increase value
for the benefit of the common weal, but to serve a purpose or end
unrelated to (or even at odds with) core bankruptcy policy.9 For ex-
ample, an unscrupulous creditor intoxicated by the easy availability of
involuntary bankruptcy might seek its seductive company to lever
payment of a legitimately disputed obligation, satisfy a personal
grudge, or secure a business advantage by eliminating competition. 10
Therefore, to deter those who might otherwise seek to take advantage
of the Reform Act's liberalized rules governing access to involuntary
relief, the drafters incorporated into section 303 a provision that had
8. Although there is a growing division in bankruptcy scholarship over the breadth
and scope of bankruptcy policy, see infra text accompanying notes 156-193, no-
body seriously questions that the federal bankruptcy system exists as a more ef-
fective and efficient alternative to state debt collection schemes for liquidating
the debtor's assets and, when appropriate, preserving going concern value. By
contrast, state collection law, often referred to as "grab law" because of its first-
come-first-served orientation, makes no provision for rehabilitation of a finan-
cially beleaguered business. See generally LYNN M. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR
REPRESENTING CREDITORS IN BANKRUprcY PROCEEDINGS 10-21 (1985 & Supp.
1990). See also BANKRUpTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 61-83 (setting
forth a "Philosophical Basis for a Federal Bankruptcy Act").
9. The Bankruptcy Commission observed that the only substantial arguments
against changing the standards for involuntary relief so as to permit creditors
easier and earlier access were: "(1) possible misuse or abuse by a creditor, i.e., the
filing of an involuntary petition for an improper purpose, such as to embarrass
competition or harass an enemy, and (2) the possibility that temporary financial
embarrassment might result in an expensive and unnecessary federal proceed-
ing." BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 189.
10. The concern was particularly acute for commercial debtors whose businesses
might be effectively destroyed before the proper steps could be taken to have the
petition adjudicated as without merit and dismissed. Under the Act, the filing of
the petition itself was enough to cause the debtor's business to grind to a halt
because of the lack of meaningful protection for those parties who might other-
wise have elected to continue to deal with the debtor unless and until an adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 21g, 71a, and 71d. The Reform Act
effected major changes in these practices by explicitly permitting the debtor to
operate its business during the gap period between filing of the petition and entry
of an order for relief, 11 U.S.C. § 303 (f)(1982), and affording substantial protec-
tion and comfort for customer, suppliers, lenders, and others willing to transact
business with the debtor in the gap period. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(f), 507(a)(2),
549(a)(2) and (b). For additional discussion of special issues arising during the
gap period, see generally, SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 6, at § 5.11.
[Vol. 71:209
BAD FAITH IN BANKRUPTCY
no direct counterpart under the former Bankruptcy Act.11 Specifi-
cally, the drafters called upon that old war-horse of the legal lexicon:
bad faith. They provided in what became codified as section 303(i)(2)
that the bankruptcy court might assess both actual and punitive dam-
ages against any petitioning creditor found to have filed in bad faith.12
Moreover, even in the absence of bad faith, section 303(i)(1) was
drafted to allow the court discretion to award the alleged debtor both
costs and a reasonable attorney's fee upon dismissal of a petition other
than on consent of all the parties.13
11. See In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126,135 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd
646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981). In reviewing the Reform Act's more relaxed attitude
to involuntary bankruptcy, the court observed that the drafters of the Code
adopted the new provisions of § 303(i), which did not appear in the Bankruptcy
Act, in order to discourage the bringing of frivolous petitions.
12. Section 303(i)(2) reads in its entirety as follows:
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on con-
sent of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive
the right to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judg-
ment... (2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith,
for-(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or (B) punitive
damages.
The legislative history makes clear that under this provision damages may
include, without limitation, items such as loss of business during and after the
pendency of the case. Also, the "or" connecting subparagraphs (A) and (B) is not
exclusive. H. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AmiN. NEWs, 5963, 6280; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 35, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEws, 5787, 5820.
Ordinarily, proof of actual damages will not be a prerequisite to an award of
punitive damages in an appropriate case. See In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc.,
46 B.R. 700, 706 (D. Colo. 1984); In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687, 694 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1987)(the amount of punitive damages is not limited by or necessarily
even related to actual damages), citing, American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Ha-
worth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1986). But see Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 318 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). However, given the deliber-
ate use of the permissive term "may" in the prefatory language to § 303(i)(2), it is
also clear that an award of any damages under this provision is discretionary with
the court. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nord-
brock), 772 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 B.R. 361
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1987). See also authorities cited infra note 92.
Actually, § 303(i)(2) was not entirely new. Section 69b Bankruptcy Act also
made provision for an award of damages upon dismissal or withdrawal of an in-
voluntary petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy. However, compensable
damages under this provision were generally regarded as limited to those losses
resulting from the seizure, taking or detention of the debtor's property. See Fin-
klestein v. Keith Fabrics, Inc., 278 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1960). Such damages, along
with counsel fees and other expenses, were to be paid by the obligor on the surety
bond posted by the petitioners, and their award was mandatory. Bankruptcy Act
§ 69a,d.
13. As originally drafted, § 303(i)(1) also conferred discretion on the court to enter
judgment for "any damages proximately caused by the taking of the possession of
the debtor's property by a trustee appointed under subsection (g) of this section
... ." 11 U.S.C. § 303 (i)(1)(C)(1982). That provision was struck by § 204 of the
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
1992]
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Congress, however, was apparently not satisfied with the original
balance struck in 1978 for facilitating access to involuntary bankruptcy
on the one hand, while discouraging improper and abusive uses on the
other. Therefore, in 1984 Congress amended section 303 as part of the
revisions to the Code accomplished by the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.14 Of principal significance, debts
subject to "bona fide dispute" were explicitly excluded from the deter-
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 [hereinafter the 1986 Act]. However,
the effectiveness of this amendment was delayed by § 302(d)(3) of the 1986 Act to
coincide with the gradual phase-in of the nationwide U.S. trustee system, with
two states, Alabama and North Carolina, having until 1992 to opt into the system.
The deadline for these two states was subsequently extended until 2002, thereby
potentially delaying the effectiveness of the amendment to § 303(i)(1) in those
jurisdictions until that date. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation
Act of 1990, § 317, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104, 5113, 5115. The effective
repeal of former § 303(i)(1)(C) suggests that damages occasioned by the seizure of
the debtor's property may now only be recovered under § 303(i)(2) upon a show-
ing of bad faith. Nevertheless, FED. R. BANKR. P. 2001(b), separate from the pro-
visions of section 303(e), continues to require the posting of a bond as a condition
to appointment of a trustee under § 303(g).
The term "or," each time it is used in § 303(i)(1), is also to be construed as non-
exclusive. See supra note 12 for citation to pertinent legislative history. There-
fore, when bad faith is determined to exist, the remedies set forth within subsec-
tions (1) and (2) may be awarded alternatively, cumulatively, and in any
combination. See, e.g., In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 966
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr. D.
Haw. 1987); In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd, Cam-
elot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Ramsden, 17 B.R. 59
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). However, an award of fees and costs is not automatic
upon dismissal of an involuntary petition. Like the decision whether to award
damages upon a determination of bad faith under section 303(i)(2), the decision
regarding entry of judgment under section 303(i)(1) is within the discretion of the
bankruptcy court. See In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (award of costs and attorneys' fees, even if involuntary petition is dismissed,
is not mandatory); In re Allen Rogers and Co., 34 B.R. 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983);
In re Camelot, 25 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). Cf. infra note 92 for discus-
sion of the view that, although not technically required, a showing of bad faith is
ordinarily a prerequisite to an award of costs and fees under section 303(i)(1).
14. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 [hereinafter the 1984 Act].
That the rationale for the amendment of section 303 was to protect debtors from
abusive filings is made quite clear in a brief floor statement from the sponsor of
the amendment who, in conclusion, observed:
I believe this amendment, although a simply [sic] one, is necessary to
protect the rights of debtors and to prevent a misuse of the bankruptcy
system as a tool of coercion. I also believe it corrects a judicial misinter-
pretation of existing law and congressional intent as to the proper basis
for granting involuntary relief.
130 CONG. REc. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984)(statement of Sen. Baucus). This
sentiment, which represents the only extant piece of legislative history to the
1984 Act's amendment of § 303, is open to some question given the absence of any
study or other corroborating evidence to show that the abuses which formed the
justification for the amendment actually existed. In fact, from all appearances,
the reformed scheme for involuntary bankruptcy put in place in 1979 seemed to
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mination of both who has standing to be a petitioner in an involuntary
case1 5 and whether grounds for relief exist with respect to a petition
filed by parties with proper standing.'6
Unquestionably, these amendments signaled a retreat from the
bold initiative undertaken in 1978 to breathe new life into involuntary
bankruptcy relief.17 At the same time, section 303(i), originally
crafted to serve as a counterweight to the more liberal rules on invol-
untary bankruptcy, remained unaltered by the 1984 Act.' 8 Hence, the
requirements for involuntary bankruptcy were stiffened, but the pen-
alties that might be suffered for an unsuccessful attempt stayed the
same. The net effect, as I have suggested in another context,' 9 has
been to undermine the effort to reform involuntary bankruptcy and,
in the process, to make the remedy a less important tool within the
overall framework of debtor/creditor relations.
Whether one regards that as a good thing or a bad thing depends on
one's perspective and perhaps one's normative judgment about the
role of bankruptcy. However, it is not the purpose of this Article to
plead my case for legislative reform in the area. Instead, I would like
to draw attention to a construction and application of the statute as
be working precisely in the manner that the drafters of the Reform Act had
hoped that it would.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1988), amended by § 426(b) of the 1984 Act. Prior to the
amendment, courts had generally held that holders of disputed claims had stand-
ing to join in an involuntary petition. E.g., In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R.
126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), qff'd 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981)(a claim is not
rendered contingent for purposes of § 303(b) because a dispute as to liability
arises after it is incurred). See also In re Dill, 30 B.R. 546, 549 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1983), aff'd, Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1984)(following All
Media).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)(1988), amended by § 426(b) of the 1984 Act. In contrast
to the consensus that had developed regarding the treatment of disputed debts for
jurisdictional purposes under § 303(b), there was a split in the pre-1984 case law
as to whether disputed debts should be included in the § 303(h)(1) analysis of
whether, at the time of filing the debtor had generally been paying its current
obligations as they came due. Compare In re All Media, 5 B.R. 126, 144 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1980) aff'd 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981)(debts subject to legitimate dis-
pute should not be considered a debt which has not been paid as it became due)
with In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1981)(wholesale exclusion of dis-
puted debts would undermine an important goal of the new Code, namely to al-
low creditors a prompt determination of the involuntary petition).
17. Recall that the primary objective in overhauling the law of involuntary bank-
ruptcy as it had existed under the Act had been to free the system of the "com-
plex, litigation-producing constraints" which had accounted for widespread
"creditor dissatisfaction and lack of interest in the bankruptcy system." BANK-
RUP'rCY COMNMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 186-88. See also In re Covey, 650
F.2d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 1981).
18. As discussed supra note 13, § 303(i) was, however, amended two years later by
deleting subparagraph (C) from § 303(i)(1).
19. Lawrence Ponoroff, Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Bona Fides of a Bona Fide
Dispute, 65 IND. L.J. 315 (1990).
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written which I believe is not only erroneous, but which has unneces-
sarily contributed to the decline of involuntary bankruptcy from a
lesser but still significant counterpart of voluntary bankruptcy to, at
least statistically speaking, an afterthought.20 Specifically, I believe
that the bankruptcy courts, probably distracted by the recent empha-
sis placed on controlling frivolous filings in federal litigation prac-
tice,2 1 have subsumed into a single inquiry what are really two
separate and discrete questions: should the petition be dismissed, and
if so, was the petition filed in bad faith for section 303(i)(2) purposes?
In turn, I think this confusion stems from a fundamental misunder-
standing of the purposes served by good faith requirements and bad
faith penalties not only in this context, but throughout the Code and,
even more generally, throughout the fabric of the law.
In this Article, I begin by tracing the development of "bad faith"
analysis in involuntary bankruptcy under the Code. I suggest reasons
for its present state of evolution based on broader concerns over abu-
sive litigation tactics and related applications of a good faith doctrine
in any bankruptcy filing.2 2 This requires consideration of the differ-
ent conceptualizations of the good faith doctrine in modern commer-
cial law that have been developed in the commentary to date. I
conclude this survey by observing that, when invoked, the good faith
obligation entails an expected level of performance which exceeds the
more general obligation to comply with positive law duty, and that,
therefore, there may well be conduct which does not satisfy the mini-
mum requirements for good faith but which nevertheless will pass in
20. According to statistics maintained and made available through the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, of the 679,980 bankruptcy petitions filed
during calendar year 1989 only 1,585 (0.23%) were involuntary petitions. ADMIN.
OFF. U.S. CTs., TABLES OF BANcR. STATISTICS DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PE-
RIOD ENDED DEC. 31,1989 (Table F2B). For the two prior fiscal years the number
and percent of involuntary cases were equally low: 1,620 (0.29%) and 1,409
(0.23%), respectively. Id. Table F2B for the years ended June 30, 1987 and 1988.
Prior to the 1984 Act, involuntary filings had consistently averaged between
0.35% and 0.45% of total filings. See Tables F2A and F2B 1981-1986; U.S. CTS.
DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. ANN. REP. 1981 at 548; id 1982, at 396.
21. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
22. The Code expressly requires good faith in a variety of instances, including plan
confirmation under Chapters 11, 12, and 13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3),
and 1325(a)(3)(1988). Additionally, courts have treated lack of good faith as
"cause" under: i) 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) for granting relief from the automatic stay;
and ii) 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) for converting or dismissing a Chapter 11 case. See
generally Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little
Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071-73 (5th Cir. 1986); Robert L. Ordin, The
"Good Faith" Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAw. 1795
(1983). Finally, as discussed in more detail infra notes 140-47 and accompanying
text, several courts have implied a good faith requirement as a condition to the
filing of all bankruptcy petitions.
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the trade. That is to say, conduct which does not reach the depths of
bad faith.
If bad faith cannot be explained as merely the absence of good
faith, its meaning in this context must be sought by reference to other
goals and ideals. It has been suggested that the relevant goals can be
found in the essential purposes of the bankruptcy system itself.
Therefore, in an attempt to locate and assign a role for section
303(i)(2) distinct from the objectives served by other bankruptcy rules
requiring good faith, I turn next to an examination of the emerging
scholarly discourse on the theoretical foundations of bankruptcy, and
endorse the view that regards bankruptcy purposes to be several and
dynamic. This perspective on the role of bankruptcy suggests intrigu-
ing possibilities for expanding the availability of involuntary bank-
ruptcy relief to members of non-creditor groups. However, I conclude
it does not alone provide an acceptable, independent standard for as-
certaining the existence of bad faith in involuntary filings.
From the notion of modern bankruptcy as a more eclectic institu-
tion than the leading scholarship in the field has given it credit for
being, I proffer an approach for considering the bad faith question in
involuntary bankruptcy that involves a different type of purposive
analysis than has traditionally been put forth. Specifically, I propose a
perspective which abandons as unwise the attempt to create a unitary
standard of bad faith measured either by the laudable but lofty aspira-
tions of a good faith requirement, or by any single object theory of
bankruptcy. Instead, I argue that the focus should be shifted to the
more pointed question of whether the filing was undertaken with a
willful intent to harm the alleged debtor and, only in the process, the
system at large. I contend that this approach, borne of the conviction
that there is an essential linkage between bad faith under section
303(i)(2) and the existing common law elements of the tort of mali-
cious prosecution, is consistent with the broader good faith principle in
bankruptcy. I also believe that this approach to the bad faith question
restores involuntary bankruptcy, if not to its "rightful" role in the
scheme of the federal bankruptcy law,2 3 then at least to a role conso-
23. Since it is impossible of course to define a truly "rightful" role - involuntary
bankruptcy inevitably conforming to the role assigned it under the prevailing
statutory scheme - this statement admittedly reflects a personal bias that invol-
untary bankruptcy should loom as a more important factor in commercial debtor-
creditor relations than it has been in recent years. Certainly, the benefits to be
derived from an effective system of involuntary bankruptcy were recognized in
studies which preceded adoption of the Code. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 186-87 (citing to SoLIcrrOR GENERAL THATCHER'S REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE BANKRUPTCY AcT AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1932)). See also MAcLACHLAN, supra note 7, at
57 ("The main effect of the present array of acts of bankruptcy [under the 1898
Act] is a weakening of the bankruptcy law in relation to its important function of
doing equity between creditors."). I appreciate, however, that the question of the
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nant with the basic policy aims long recognized as best achieved
through the mechanism of an involuntary proceeding.24
II. THE CONNECTION TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9011
There has always existed an almost irresistible nexus between sec-
tion 303(i)(2) and Bankruptcy Rule 9011.25 Rule 9011 invests the
bankruptcy court with authority to sanction those persons who sign
and submit pleadings, motions, and other court papers (including spe-
cifically, petitions) which either constitute frivolous filings (ie., are
without a reasonable basis in fact) or involve use of judicial procedures
for an improper purpose (e.g., to delay, harass, or increase the cost of
litigation).26 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 was adapted from Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 and in construing Rule 9011 bank-
proper scope of involuntary bankruptcy (and, for that matter, voluntary bank-
ruptcy as well) must ultimately be resolved in the give and take of the political
arena. I can accept, therefore, that a contrary opinion about how difficult it
should be to force a debtor into bankruptcy might be legitimately taken. I simply
believe that, as a matter of preferred policy, credit and the availability of credit
are facilitated by a vigorous system of involuntary bankruptcy.
24. The objectives traditionally regarded as being achieved through involuntary
bankruptcy are reviewed in SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 6, at § 5.06. See also
John C. McCoid, The Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 Am. Bankr. L.J.
195 (1987).
25. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. Actually, section 303(i) predates the promulgation of
Rule 9011 by almost four years. However, the Reform Act provided that upon
enactment of the new Cede, the then-present Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure (11
U.S.C. app. (1978)) would continue in effect to the extent not inconsistent with
the changes made by the Reform Act until such time as new Rules were adopted.
See Reform Act, Title IV, § 405(d). Among the existing Bankruptcy Rules was
Rule 911 regarding the Signing and Verification of Pleadings and Other Papers.
The precursor to Rule 9011, Rule 911 basically tracked FED. R. CIV. P. 11 as then
formulated. The new Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, including Rule 9011, were
promulgated in 1983. Numerous amendments to the Rules, including minor
amendments to Rule 9011, became effective on August 1, 1987, and again on Au-
gust 1, 1991. The differences between old rule 911 and Rule 9011 basically reflect
the changes to Federal Rule 11 which became effective on the same date in 1983
as the new Bankruptcy Rules. The amendment of Rule 11 is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 77-84. See also Thomas M. Byrne, Sanctions for Wrongful
Bankruptcy Litigation, 62 Am. BANKI. L.J. 109 (1988).
26. See generally Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990)("the
central purpose of [Federal] Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings.. ." and thereby
streamline the administration of cases in the federal courts). For further elabora-
tion on the distinction between the "two prongs" which comprise Federal Rule 11
and, therefore, Bankruptcy Rule 9011, see In re TCI Limited, 769 F.2d 441 (7th
Cir. 1985); infra note 266.
27. See Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir. 1985)(Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 tracks Federal Rule 11 with only such modifications as are ap-
propriate for bankruptcy matters); Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Amalgamated
Trust and Sav. Bank (In re Memorial Estates, Inc.), 116 B.R. 108, 111 (N.D. Ill.
1990)(Rule 9011 is the bankruptcy equivalent of Federal Rule 11). See also Brown
v. Mitchell (In re Arkansas Communities, Inc.), 827 F.2d 1219, 121-22 (8th Cir.
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ruptcy courts routinely look to case law under Federal Rule 11. 28
In Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,
Inc.,29 the Supreme Court held that Rule 11 prescribes the same stan-
dard both for the attorney who files the offending document and, if
also a signatory, the represented party.30 The case involved the "frivo-
lous filing" branch of Rule 11 since the accuracy of representations
contained in the plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining or-
der triggered the inquiry into whether Rule 11 sanctions were appro-
priate.31 Holding that the standard of conduct under Rule 11 is one of
objective reasonableness,32 the district court had awarded the defend-
1987), wherein the court rejected the appellant's argument that only Article I
courts, not bankruptcy courts, have jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees as a sanc-
tion for violation of Rule 9011.
28. See, eg., Featherston v. Goldman (In re D.C. Sullivan Co.), 843 F.2d 596, 598 (1st
Cir. 1988)(the jurisprudence of Rule 11 is "largely transferable" to bankruptcy
cases in which sanctions are sought under Rule 9011); In re the Grand Hotel Ltd.
Partnership, 121 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)(case law under Rule 11
equally applicable to Rule 9011); Wolf v. Kupetz (In re Wolf & Vine, Inc.), 118
B.R. 761, 767 (bankruptcy courts look to authorities under Federal Rule 31 in
applying Bankruptcy Rule 9011).
29. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
30. 1d. at 929-33. The Court rejected drawing a dichotomy between represented and
unrepresented parties on the basis suggested by Justice Kennedy's dissent, that a
represented party has delegated to counsel responsibility for ascertaining the ve-
racity of matters contained in court papers. See id. at 935, 936 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). The majority observed that it is often the client who is in the better
position to investigate the facts supporting a pleading. Id. at 932. The majority
also claimed its holding in this case, involving the sanctioning of a corporate party
based on the signature of its employee-agent, was not inconsistent with the
Court's earlier holding in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120,124 (1989), that the person signing the pleading for Rule 11 purposes was
the individual attorney, not the law firm. Id at 931.
31. The plaintiff charged that the defendant copied listings from the plaintiff's pub-
lished directories in violation of, inter alia, the copyright laws. In its application
for a temporary restraining order, the plaintiff cited as examples ten listings it
maintained had been copied by the defendant. In nine of those cases, the claim
was without foundation even though, in the opinion of the magistrate who heard
the evidence, a proper inquiry would have revealed the lack of substance. I& at
925-26.
32. The issue of the appropriate standard of conduct to be applied under Rule 11 has
been a subject of great interest and some disagreement since 1983. See generally
Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1986); Christopher A.
Considine, Note, Rule 11: Conflicting Appellate Standards of Review and a Pro-
posed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 727 (1990); Kim M. Rubin, Note,
Has a Kajkaesque Dream Come True? Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 11: Time
for Another Amendment?, 67 B.U.L. REV. 1019 (1987). The amendment of Rule
11 in 1983 which purportedly shifted the standard from one of subjective bad faith
to one of objective reasonableness is discussed infra notes 77-84 and accompany-
ing text. For further background, see also Robert L. Carter & John F. Cannon,
The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 4 (1985); Martin B.
Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation; A Golden Anniver-
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ant $13,865 in sanctions.33 The court based the award on its finding
that the plaintiff and its counsel had failed to conduct reasonable in-
quiry into the truth of matters contained in the TRO application, par-
ticularly after they had been made aware of several inaccuracies.3 4
Both the Ninth Circuit35 and the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's holding that the plaintiff was subject to an objective
standard of reasonable inquiry as to the factual basis for all allegations
contained in papers submitted to the court, even though the plaintiff
sary View of Pleading, Summary Judgmen and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1023 (1989).
33. This amount represented the defendant's legal expenses and out-of-pocket costs
in defending the plaintiff's lawsuit. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commu-
nications Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 922, 927 (1991). Although Rule 11 grants the dis-
trict courts broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction, it is clear that
in amending the Rule in 1983 increased emphasis was given to some cost-shifting
as a basis for effectively controlling abusive litigation practices. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 11, Advisory Committee Note, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),
reprinted in, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983)[hereinafter Advisory Committee Note].
The Supreme Court is on record that Rule 11 is not a "fee-shifting statute,"
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2247,2462 (1990). However, one study
undertaken just two years after the amendment of Rule 11 showed that in 96% of
the cases reviewed in which sanctions were imposed the courts awarded costs and
attorneys' fees to the party opposing the sanctioned pleading. Melissa A. Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1333 (1986). See also
SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTrONs 32 (Federal Judi-
cial Center 1985)(suggesting that a judge's view of whether the primary purpose
of Rule 11 is compensation or punishment tends to influence the judge's willing-
ness to impose sanctions).
In Business Guides the Court noted approvingly the district court's refusal to
include consequential damages as part of the sanctions awarded on the basis that
such compensation is not within the purview of Rule 11. 111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991).
The Court also deflected the criticism that the sanction imposed constituted im-
permissible fee-shifting by pointing out that Rule 11 sanctions only shift the cost
of a "discrete event," not the entire cost of litigation. Id. at 924. The dissent
found this explanation of little comfort, observing that the majority's "discrete
event" distinction breaks down when the "event" is the filing of the lawsuit.
Thus, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for effectively authorizing the re-
distribution of litigation costs when the sanctioned party is guilty only of negli-
gence, not bad faith. Id. at 940-41. Cf. Louis, supra note 32, at 1052-61 (arguing for
greater use of attorney fee shifting under Rule 11).
34. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 119 F.R.D. 685, 688-
89 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Ultimately, sanctions were assessed only against the plaintiff.
The defendant's motion against plaintiff's counsel, Finley, Kumble, Wagner,
Heine, Unterberg, Manley, Meyerson, and Casey, was later withdrawn without
prejudice because of that firm's intervening and much-publicized bankruptcy fil-
ing. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct.
922, 927 (1991).
35. 892 F.2d 802 (1989), reviewed in Peter Ramels, Note, Factual Frivolity: Sanction-
ing Clients Under Rule 11-Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct 3235 (1990), 65
WASH. L. REV. 939 (1990).
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was represented by counsel.36 In other words, the Court refused to
draw a distinction between represented and unrepresented parties in
terms of the level of care that must be taken by any party who signs
papers to be filed with the court.37 Pointing to the concerns which
precipitated amendment of Rule 11 in 1983,38 the Court also brushed
aside as misdirected the plaintiff's contention that subjective bad
faith, not the failure to act with reasonable care, should be the pre-
dominant consideration in imposing sanctions on represented par-
ties. 3 9 In so doing, the Court at least implicitly acquiesced in the
district court's view that a failure to act with objective reasonableness
is not itself tantamount to bad faith; put another way, that Rule 11 is
more than simply a good faith directive.40
36. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933
(1991)(Rule 1 imposes an "affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the facts and law before filing, and... the applicable standard is one of reasona-
bleness under the circumstances.").
37. Id. at 929-931 (to construe the term "party" as used in Rule 11 to mean "unrepre-
sented party" flies in the face of both the plain language of the Rule and the
commentary contained in the Advisory Committee Note).
38. Id. at 932. The amendment of Rule 11 in 1983 was a response to what at the time
was perceived to be an unprecedented increase in the volume of frivolous law-
suits and exploitive litigation practices, coupled with the general consensus that
Rule U as originally drafted had been ineffective in curbing litigation abuses. For
example, in Lepukl v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985), the court de-
scribed how easy access to the courthouse had accounted for a "deluge of frivo-
lous and vexatious claims" which was slowly causing the machinery of justice to
come to a grinding halt. See also Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System, Di-
nosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1984)(pointing out the social cost of
society's preoccupation with private litigation as the solution of choice for an in-
creasing range of life's problems); David J. Webster, Note, Rule 11: Has the Objec-
tive Standard Transgressed the Adversary System?, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 279,
280 ('The impetus for this amendment was a heightened societal concern that
frivolous lawsuits, discovery abuse, and unfair litigation tactics were exploiting
and manipulating the adversary system to the point where the basic tenets that
the system once rested upon had become paralyzed."); Nelken, supra note 33, at
1317 (the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules were designed to make lawyers
more accountable for their actions and to give judges greater control in managing
their caseloads and dockets).
39. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922,932-33
(1991). The plaintiff also contended that imposing sanctions against a repre-
sented party violated the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which provides
that Court prescribed rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right." The majority observed, however, that an incidental interference of a liti-
gant's substantive right would be tolerated under the Rules Enabling Act "if rea-
sonably necessary to maintain the integrity of the system of federal practice and
procedure ....." Id. at 933-34.
40. In its decision, the district court found only that the plaintiff and its counsel had
acted unreasonably in not conducting further inquiry into the factual allegations
contained in the application for a temporary restraining order. The court made
no finding that either of these parties had acted with intent to deceive the court
or otherwise with knowledge of the falsity of the matters contained in the appli-
cation, rejecting the view that amended Rule 11 had anything to do any longer
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III. THE INFLUENCE OF BANKRUPTCY RULE 9011 ON THE
BAD FAITH QUESTION IN INVOLUNTARY CASES
Early on in the development of standards to measure bad faith
under section 303(i)(2) two approaches emerged. Under the first, or
so-called "objective," approach, bad faith was found to exist if the
court concluded that a reasonable person in the position of the peti-
tioning creditor would not have initiated the involuntary proceeding.41
This lack of reasonable care or failure to make reasonable inquiry ap-
proach shares obvious similarities with the "frivolous filing" prong of
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. It also exemplifies the tendency to confuse the
question of whether the petition should be dismissed because proper
grounds for relief do not exist with the question of whether the peti-
tion was filed in bad faith-inquiries which are best treated separately
since they examine different phenomena.42 However, under an objec-
tive approach the two questions become blurred; the differences be-
tween them being only differences of degree.43
The second approach, as opposed to focusing on the petitioners'
conduct in filing, emphasized their subjective, underlying purpose.
Under this method for defining bad faith, the alleged debtor was re-
quired to demonstrate that the filing of the petition was motivated by
spite, malice, vengeance, or a desire to harass or embarrass the
debtor.44 Of course, this type of conduct is also proscribed by the sec-
with subjective bad faith. 119 F.R.D. 685, 688-89. For discussion of the standards
which emerged under the pre-amended version of the Rule, see infra text accom-
panying notes 72-76.
41. See, eg., In re McDonald Trucking Co., 74 B.R. 474, 478 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1987)(measuring bad faith by an objective standard); In re Grecian Heights Own-
ers' Ass'n., 27 B.R. 172, 173-72 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982)(determining bad faith on the
basis of whether a reasonable person in the position of the petitioning creditor
would have filed the involuntary petition). See also Jaffe v. Wavelength, Inc. (In
re Wavelength, Inc.), 61 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986)(measuring bad faith
by an "objective" standard); In re Alta Title Co., 55 B.R. 133, 140-41 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1985)(failing to make inquiry into either facts or law could support a finding
of bad faith); In re Godroy Wholesale Co., 37 Bankr. 496, 500 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1984)(creditor who failed to take "affirmative steps" to insure that its suspicions
were true acted in bad faith).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100, 256-259. There are numerous exam-
ples in the case law where § 303(i)(1) and Rule 9011 also have been applied inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Stock v. Exchange Network Corp. (In re Exchange
Network Corp.), 92 B.R. 479, 480-81 (D. Colo. 1988)(attorneys' fees might be
awarded against counsel for petitioners under either § 303(i)(1) or Rule 9011); In
re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 711-12 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)(alleged debtors enti-
tled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees under either § 303(i)(1) or Rule 9011).
43. For an example of a case where the two questions seemingly have been merged
into a single inquiry, see In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). See
also authorities cited infra note 61.
44. See In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd, Camelot, Inc.
v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Howard, Neilsen & Rush, Inc., 2
Bankr. 451 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979). Although many decisions speak in terms of
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ond branch of Rule 9011. Therefore, this attention to improper pur-
pose under section 303(i)(2) might likewise seem redundant, perhaps
raising serious doubt whether either of the early approaches for defin-
ing bad faith under section 303(i)(2) established any field of operation
beyond the existing strictures of Bankruptcy Rule 9011. However, as
will be shown, that view ignores key differences between the two pro-
visions, the existence of which make the question of improper purpose
relevant to, but not alone dispositive of, the issue of bad faith in invol-
untary bankruptcy filings. 45
The district court's decision in Basin Electric Power Cooperative v.
Midwest Processing Co.46 arguably represented the first attempt to
carefully analyze the bad faith question in involuntary bankruptcy;
however, its legacy is not by any means an altogether happy one.47 In
that case, the court accepted an expanded improper purpose approach
a sharp distinction between the objective and subjective approaches for measur-
ing bad faith (eg., In re Molen Drilling Co., 68 B.R. 840, 843-44 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1987), in reality the dichotomy was far less pronounced since, as a practical mat-
ter, ordinarily the only way to prove bad motive is by inferences drawn from
objective conduct. Under either test, courts have agreed that bad faith in an in-
voluntary proceeding is a factual issue. See In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46
B.& 700, 704 (D. Colo. 1984); In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 923 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1989); In re Molen Drilling Co., 68 B.R. 840, 843 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
45. It is ultimately my contention that subjective bad faith, not the failure to observe
reasonable standards of conduct, is at the heart of § 303(i)(2). See infra text ac-
companying notes 257-263 and 286-293. Although the second prong of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 is phrased in similar terms, it would be a mistake to
conceptualize bad faith for § 303(i) purposes according to the same standard. As
will be discussed, this derives principally from the fact that interpretations gov-
erning application of the improper purpose branch of Rule 9011 reflect the partic-
ular role and function of the Rule within the overall scheme of the federal
bankruptcy law. It will be argued that this role and function differ qualitatively
from the role and function of the bad faith injunction in § 303(i)(2). See infra
notes 71-109 and accompanying text. Courts which have simply demurred to the
standards developed under Rule 9011 overlook this point in their analysis. See In
re Kearney, 121 B.R. at 642, 645-46 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), wherein the court
states that in defining bad faith in involuntary filings it is necessary to apply the
standards for imposing sanctions under Rule 9011, but then refuses to award pu-
nitive damages absent proof of actual knowledge by the petitioners that the
debtor had more than twelve creditors.
46. 47 B.R. 903 (D.N.D. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1083 (1986).
47. This is not necessarily to fault the court in Basin Electric. The confusion stems
from the fact that subsequent decisions have routinely cited Basin Electric as of-
fering a view of bad faith for § 303(i)(2) purposes. See authorities cited infra
notes 64 & 236. In point of fact, Basin Electric was not a § 303(i) case at all; rather
it involved the issue of whether the petition was subject to dismissal for failure to
comply with the implied good faith filing requirement. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 231-239. At worst, therefore, the Basin Electric court can be faulted
for failing to overtly distinguish the dual uses of the term "bad faith." In the final
analysis the real blame lies with inexact subsequent readings and interpretations
of the holding in the case.
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for defining bad faith. It reversed the bankruptcy court's determina-
tion that the single petitioning creditor 48 was not guilty of bad faith
because a reasonable person in the position of such creditor might
have sought relief under section 303.49 Specifically, the district court
ruled that the bankruptcy court had erred by not considering the peti-
tioning creditor's subjective motives for filing as well as its conduct.5 0
However, in describing what it considered improper subjective motive,
the court departed from the thrust of earlier authority under section
303(i)(2). Specifically, the court included within the scope of inquiry
the relationship between the petitioning creditor's underlying purpose
in filing the petition and the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.5 1 In
other words, the court focused on not just the acceptability of the peti-
tioner's purpose as an absolute matter, but also on whether the peti-
tioner's desired end for the involuntary bankruptcy case was the
proper subject of and occasion for a bankruptcy proceeding. 52
48. Under § 303(b), a single creditor may invoke the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction if
the debtor has less than eleven other creditors who would be eligible to join in an
involuntary petition, excluding certain categories of "friendly" creditors. 11
U.S.C. § 303(b)(2)(1988). Otherwise, the petition must be signed by at least three
qualified creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)(1988). See also FED. R. BANKR. P.
1003(b) which directs the court to allow a reasonable opportunity for joinder of
additional creditors when, based on the debtor's answer to the petition, it appears
that there are more than twelve creditors.
49. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 908-09 (D.N.D. 1984),
aff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986). In evaluating
the petitioning creditor's conduct, the bankruptcy court has applied a purely ob-
jective standard.
50. Id. at 909. ("This Court is convinced that the Bankruptcy Court should have con-
sidered Basin's subjective motivations together with its conduct in reaching a de-
termination on the question of bad faith.").
51. Id. Basin Electric was not the first case in analyzing bad faith in an involuntary
filing to focus on whether the petitioning creditors' purpose in filing, although
perhaps not itself unlawful or improper, was consistent with the perceived pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Allen Rogers & Co., 34 B.R. 631, 633
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)(debtor could not recover damages where the petitioning
creditors did not make inappropriate use of the bankruptcy process as a substi-
tute for customary collection procedures); In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13
B.R. 99, 100 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)(petitioners who used "involuntary proceeding
as a substitute for customary collection procedures" acted in bad faith). However,
Basin Electric was the first decision to put the discussion of consistency with
bankruptcy purposes into the context of the objective-subjective approaches to
bad faith which had evolved under § 303(i)(2). Thus, equally if not more so than
earlier case law, Basin Electric has come to be viewed as the authority for the
proposition that "improper use" as well as "improper purpose" may form the ba-
sis for a judgment under § 303(i)(2). See, e.g., In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405,
410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). This in itself is ironic indeed when it is recalled that
the court in Basin Electric was not faced with an application of § 303(i). See infra
text accompanying note 237.
52. The first of these two questions can be analogized to a malicious prosecution -
initiation of legal process without probable cause motivated by an improper pur-
pose - whereas the latter is more akin to the traditional elements of the tort of
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Applying its newly-ordained test of bad faith, the district court in
Basin Electric concluded that the petitioning creditor had acted in bad
faith since its motive for filing was to secure an advantage in a pending
contract dispute with the alleged debtor.53 The petition was thus ad-
judged defective, and the petitioning creditor denied the opportunity
to cure the defect, not because the petitioning creditor's purpose was
itself unlawful or improper, but because that purpose did not justify
using the involuntary bankruptcy remedy.5 4 In essence, the court re-
garded the matter as involving a private, two-party dispute and, as
such, inconsistent with the basic objectives of an involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceeding.5 5
The district court's decision in Basin Electric did not address di-
abuse of process - lawful invocation of the process for a purpose other than a
purpose for which the process was intended. While I believe that the first anal-
ogy may be profitably pursued in analyzing bad faith in involuntary proceedings,
the presence of an abuse of process, although certainly relevant to whether the
case should go forward, should not alone be enough to establish bad faith. See
infra text accompanying notes 282 - 286.
53. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 BR. 903, 909-10 (D.N.D.
1984), qff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986). How-
ever, the authority cited by the court in reaching that conclusion consisted of
cases involving the implied good faith filing requirement (eg., In re Nancant, Inc.,
8 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)), not cases applying the terms of § 303.
54. This distinction between "improper purpose" and "improper use" was made ex-
press by the court in In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.1 405, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989). See infra note 94. Thus, to the extent that subsequent cases have inter-
preted the holding in Basin Electric as applying to § 303(i)(2)(see infra notes 236-
37 and accompanying text), it would not be unfair to treat Basin Electric as postu-
lating a third approach for defining bad faith conduct.
55. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 903, 908-09 (D.N.D.
1984), 'ff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986). While
the court made clear that favorably affecting the outcome in a private contract
dispute is not consistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, it never
actually articulated the proper uses of the bankruptcy process. Presumably, the
court had in mind traditional notions of collectivized debt collection procedure,
but never reached the question of whether proper grounds for relief were
presented since it concluded that the petition should have been dismissed for fail-
ure to satisfy the three-creditor requirement of § 303(b). Nevertheless, the court
exhibited some skepticism that the debtor in fact had not been paying its current
obligations as they became due. Id- at 908 (involuntary bankruptcy did not appear
to be in the best interests of the debtor or the other creditors).
It also bears mentioning that since the court found that the petitioner clearly
knew that the debtor had in excess of twelve creditors, id., the finding of bad
faith easily could have been justified on grounds of improper motive rather than
improper use of the bankruptcy process; both elements were obviously present.
Had the court done so, an unnecessary expansion of the definition of bad faith
and a great deal of subsequent confusion might have been avoided. Again, how-
ever, to be fair to the court in Basin Electric, the issue as framed by the court was
whether to dismiss the petition for want of good faith, not whether entry of judg-
ment under § 303(i)(2) was appropriate. Therefore, perhaps the true blame lies
in the failure of later cases to properly identify the scope of the holding in Basin
Electric and limit its precedential effect accordingly.
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rectly the issue of damages or other relief under section 303(i). How-
ever, its holding, to the effect that both conduct and motive were
relevant in the inquiry into "bad faith" in involuntary cases, led to the
adoption by some courts of a dual subjective/objective standard for de-
fining bad faith under section 303(i)(2).56 This practice, it was main-
tained, permitted the bankruptcy courts to ensure that their
jurisdiction had not been invoked to further non-bankruptcy pur-
poses. 57 To these courts, then, evidence of both unreasonable conduct
in the filing of the petition and improper motivation would be re-
quired to overcome the presumption of good faith in favor of the peti-
tioning creditors,5 8 thereby establishing grounds for dismissal and,
potentially, an award of damages under section 303(i)(2).59 Moreover,
56. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58
B.R. 1008, 1011 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)('"Tis court agrees [with Basin Electric] that the
better practice is for bankruptcy courts to inquire into both the creditor's conduct
as well as into its motives for filing the petition."); In re Molen Drilling Co., 68
B.R. 840, 843 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1897)(agreeing with United States Fidelity and
Basin Electric that the court should apply a dual objective/subjective test in mea-
suring the existence of bad faith). See also In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687, 693
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)(bad faith found where the filing was ill-advised, for a non-
bankruptcy purpose, and perhaps based on a contrivance).
57. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R.
1008, 1011 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). This follows logically from the holding in Basin Elec-
tric since it is the function of the implied good faith filing requirement to protect
the integrity of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text. As will be argued later, however, this is not the function of the bad faith
injunction in § 303(i)(2). Infra text accompanying notes 147, 220-25.
58. Although the courts never made the precise relationship between the objective
and subjective standards entirely clear, it is apparent from the flow and structure
of the court's argument in USF&G that the court considered both aspects of the
test must be satisfied in order to establish bad faith. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008, 1012 (N.D.N.Y.
1986)("IT]he proper way for a bankruptcy court to make a determination of bad
faith is to consider both an objective and a subjective standard."). The bank-
ruptcy court's failure to examine the petitioning creditor's motive for filing con-
stituted reversible error even though the bankruptcy court had concluded bad
faith existed using an objective standard. However, the court equivocated even
on this point when, as an alternative argument, it stated: "[E]ven if the objective
standard alone was sufficient, the Bankruptcy Court did not properly apply that
standard."). Id. at 1013. See also In re Caucus Distribs., 106 B.R. 890, 923-28
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)(although on an objective level debtors established bad
faith, the petitioner's decision to file would not be condemned as constituting bad
faith where the motivation for filing was a belief that bankruptcy was the appro-
priate forum within which to resolve the debtor's problems).
It is "axiomatic" that a presumption of good faith attends the filing of an in-
voluntary proceeding and that the debtor has the burden of establishing bad faith
by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Amburgey, 68 B.R. 768, 774 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987); In re
CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Cf. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 Bankr. 1008, 1012 (N.D.N.Y.
1986)(debtor has a "heavy" burden of proof on the issue of bad faith).
59. Recall that, even when the petitioners are found to have acted in bad faith, the
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in one of the leading cases decided at this point in the development of
standards under section 303(i)(2), the court held that a showing of
"nearly unconscionable behavior" would be required before finding
bad faith.60
After the two early approaches for determining bad faith were
brought together into a single test, the analogy to Bankruptcy Rule
9011 became too great for most courts to resist. Beginning around
1987, reported decisions involving section 303(i)(2) began to explicitly
look to and follow the same standards developed and applied under
Rule 9011 and, concomitantly, Federal Rule 11.61 In In re Fox Island
Square Partnership,62 for example, the court expressed its conviction
that "bad faith, pursuant to Section 303(i)(2) should be measured by
the objective and subjective standards required under Bankruptcy
Rule 9011."63 In analyzing the question of subjective motive, however,
these courts have failed to observe any meaningful distinction be-
decision to award damages under § 303(i)(2) remains discretionary with the court.
In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700,705 (D. Colo. 1984)(award of proxi-
mate or punitive damages does not follow automatically from a finding of bad
faith; it is discretionary with the court); In re Better Care , Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 410
(Bankr. N.D. M. 1989)(the award of damages is committed to the sound discretion
of the court). See also supra note 12. This is an important difference from Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 where sanctions are mandatory once a violation is deemed to
have occurred. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
60. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R.
1008, 1011 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), citing In re Trans High Corp., 3 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)(to determine whether
petition was filed in bad faith court must apply the standard for imposing sanc-
tions under Rule 9011); In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 197-80 (Bankr. D. Me.
1992)(Rule 9011's model provides the most comprehensive guide for assessing bad
faith under § 303(i)(2)); In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)(bad
faith under § 303(i)(2) should be measured by the same standards contained in
Bankruptcy Rule 9011); In re McDonald Trucking Co., 76 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1987). See also In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd., 78 B.R. 738, 743 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987)(petitioning creditors in an involuntary case should be held to the
standard created by Bankruptcy Rule 9011); In re Alta Title Co., 55 B.R. 131, 140(Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (suggesting that the good faith test for purposes of a single
creditor petition is analogous to the duty imposed by Rule 9011). Although
neither court acknowledged any distinction, note that the latter two cases in-
volved the question of whether the petition should be dismissed because of the
lack of good faith, not whether damages should be awarded under § 303(i)(2). See
infra notes 64 & 236 for further elaboration on this point.
62. 106 B.R. 962 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1989).
63. Id at 968. The court then concluded that the petition had been filed in subjective
and objective bad faith, leaving unclear the issue of whether the petitioning credi-
tors, who in this instance were less than all of the general partners of the partner-
ship debtor, might have been exculpated from liability in the absence of one or
the other. Ultimately, the court assessed $500 in punitive damages against the
petitioning creditors under § 303(i)(2) and $28,650.54 for attorneys' fees and costs
against the petitioners and their counsel under § 303(i)(1), Bankruptcy Rule 9011
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
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tween an improper purpose and a proper purpose pursued in an im-
proper manner. In turn, this failure has created by implication the
impression that in this context either of these are sufficient to satisfy
the second prong of Rule 9011.64 Put another way, although a filing
motivated by a non-bankruptcy but otherwise lawful purpose would
not constitute a violation of Rule 9011, Basin Electric remains alive
and well as authority for the proposition that a filing involving an im-
proper use of the Bankruptcy Code may lead to a judgment under sec-
tion 303(i)(2).65
The problem, moreover, is not limited just to this anomalous ex-
pansion of improper subjective motive as it relates to when judgment
may be authorized under section 303(i)(2). In addition, because Rule
9011 requires both a reasonable pre-filing investigation and a proper
purpose, several courts that have adopted the Rule 9011 standards
have assumed that the absence of either is sufficient to establish bad
faith.66 By doing so, they have abandoned entirely the original pur-
64. In Fox Island, for example, the court cited Basin Electric for applying a subjective
standard for ascertaining bad faith pursuant to § 303(i)(2). Id. at 967. See also In
re McDonald Trucking, 76 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)(the court must
consider both the level of pre-filing inquiry and the purpose of the filing). In In
re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987), the court cited the
Eighth Circuit's decision on appeal in Basin Electric in connection with the analy-
sis of bad faith under § 303(i) after dismissal of the petition, rather than in the
context of whether in fact the petition should be dismissed. Compare In re
Centennial Ins. Assocs., 119 B.R. 543, 545-46 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) and In re
Caucus Distribs., 106 B.R. 890. 924 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)(both relying on Basin
Electric in the context of a motion to dismiss the involuntary petition) with Fox
Island and Laclede. See also infra note 106 (dismissal is a condition precedent to
a bad faith action under § 303(i)(2)). Certainly it is possible, even likely, that an
involuntary petition might be dismissed under a Basin Electric-type analysis for
lack of good faith and that judgment might also later enter under § 303(i)(2); ana-
lytically, however, the issues are distinct and there is no necessary connection
between the two. See, e.g., In re Eberhardt Moving and Storage, Ltd., 120 B.R. 121
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1990)(dismissing the petition for having been filed in bad faith,
and reserving for subsequent hearing the debtor's request for damages under
§ 303(i)).
65. See, e.g., In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)(judgment
entered under § 303(i)(2) where petitioner determined to have used involuntary
proceeding as a substitute for customary collection procedures) (citing In re SBA
Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)). See also In re Better
Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405,410-11 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1989), wherein the court endorsed
the view that use of the involuntary bankruptcy remedy for a non-bankruptcy
purpose might form a basis for an award of damages under § 303(i)(2) even
though recognizing that the so-called subjective standard of Basin Electric is
broader than the conduct proscribed under the second prong of rule 9011.
66. See, e.g., In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)(finding of bad
faith could be supported by applying either the subjective or objective standard of
Bankruptcy Rule 9011); In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)(bad
faith may be established by the objective test or the absence of a proper purpose);
In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd., 78 B.R. 738, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)(petitioning
creditors who sign an involuntary petition should be held to the same standard
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pose for joining the objective and subjective approaches into a single
test.67 The net effect, then, of these various interpretive leaps of faith
is plain to see. It means that courts, their rhetoric to the contrary
notwithstanding, have in reality come to impose what amounts to con-
siderably stricter standards of bad faith in involuntary cases than the
standards for measuring compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 9011.
Putting aside momentarily the lack of consistency in the actual ap-
plication of standards under the two provisions, it is important not to
lose sight of the equally troubling fact that the apparent unity be-
tween Rule 9011 and section 303(i)(2) has become complete with virtu-
ally no appreciation for the fact that the two provisions might address
somewhat different concerns and that, consequently, the required
standards of compliance might not be wholly coincident.68 If true, this
means that the bankruptcy courts that have deferred to Rule 9011
have not only inaccurately described the standard they are applying
under section 303(i)(2), they have abdicated as well their responsibility
for faithfully executing the commands of the legislature or articulat-
ing some principled justification for their failure to do so. In the pro-
cess, and more to the point, they have provided alleged debtors in
involuntary cases, already well-armed by the Code to do battle,69 with
created by Rule 9011). Even in In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1988) the court observed, in connection with its analysis under
§ 303(i)(2), that the petitioning creditor had a duty to investigate and research the
facts and law.
67. Recall that in United States Fidelity the district court concluded that the bank-
ruptcy court had erred by finding bad faith using only an objective test and failing
to consider the petitioning creditor's subjective motivation for filing. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text.
68. In fairness, there are a few exceptions to this charge. Certainly, the court in In re
Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405,410-11 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1989), appreciated a differ-
ence in the scope of the two provisions. See supra note 65. Similarly, in In re
K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 180 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992), the court recognized that
"[e]mploying Rule 9011 in this context neither restricts nor expands the statutory
remedy." Finally, In re International Mobile Advertising Corp., 117 B.R. 154,158-
59 n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), the court observed that sanctions assessed under
Rule 9011 might be different and of a lesser financial impact than damages
awarded under § 303(i), aff'd, No. 90-634a, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11294 (E.D. Pa.
1991). See also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
69. While not trying to gloss over or make light of the potential damage and disrup-
tion to a debtor which might well be caused simply by the filing of a frivolous
petition, in the original drafting of the Bankruptcy Code a thoughtful and sincere
attempt was made to fairly balance the interests of debtors (in being free of
groundless petitions) and the interests of creditors in an efficient and effective
system of involuntary bankruptcy. In addition to the provisions of § 303(i) and
former Bankruptcy Rule 911 (later 9011), § 303(f) leaves the debtor in complete
and sole control of its business and financial affairs unless and until an order for
relief enters or cause for appointment of an interim trustee can be established. 11
U.S.C. § 303(f)(1988). Moreover, to encourage suppliers, customers, and other
creditors to continue to deal with the debtor in the gap period, the Code provides
that any gap claims arising in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and
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yet another weapon that might be used to avoid (or, often just as effec-
tive, delay)70 having their property administered through a court-su-
pervised bankruptcy proceeding.
What then should the test of liability be under section 303(i)(2),
how does it differ from the Rule 9011 standards, and what is the pur-
posive basis for such a distinction which, to this point, has been so
roundly ignored by the courts? I believe answers to these questions
begin to reveal themselves upon identifying and contrasting the pur-
poses behind the respective provisions in question; therefore, it is to
that endeavor that attention is directed next.
IV. BANKRUPTCY RULE 9011 AND SECTION 303(i)(2): A
PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS
A. Rule 9011
As earlier noted, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is patterned on Federal
Rule 11, as amended.71 Originally promulgated in 1938, Rule 11 con-
ferred authority on the district courts to strike pleadings that were
baseless or were interposed merely for purposes of delay.72 However,
under this earlier version of the Rule, courts could not sanction an
attorney for violation of the Rule unless the violation was found to be
willful.73 In addition, sanctions were almost never imposed against
financial affairs are to be allowed as if they had risen prior to the filing of the
petition and are to be accorded a second overall priority in a bankruptcy adminis-
tration should it ensue. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(f), 507(a)(2)(1988). Section 303(e) makes
provision for the posting of a bond to secure amounts later determined to be due
the debtor under § 303(i) upon a showing of cause. Also, posting of bond is a
mandatory condition to the appointment of an interim trustee. FED. R. BANKR. P.
2001(b). Finally, as a consequence of the amendments made under the 1984 Act,
creditors no longer have standing to bring an involuntary case when their claims
are disputed in good faith. All such legitimately disputed debts are to be ex-
cluded from the analysis under § 303(h)(1) of whether the debtor had generally
failed to pay its current debts when due at the time the petition was filed. See
supra notes 15-19.
70. It bears reiterating that one of the principal criticisms of involuntary bankruptcy
under the former Bankruptcy Act was the inability of creditors to compel the
administration of the debtor's assets in a bankruptcy proceeding before the
debtor's financial situation had deteriorated beyond the point of no return. See
supra note 7.
71. See supra text accompanying note 27.
72. See Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), for a rare example of a
case where the district court struck the plaintiff's complaint as a sham under pre-
amended Rule 11.
73. In pertinent part, Rule 11 as originally drafted provided: "For a willful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. (1982). Although not expressly defined, an "appropri-
ate disciplinary action" was generally construed to empower the court to shift the
cost of suit to the offending party. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir.
1980); Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 504-05. However, sanctions were rarely im-
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the client.74 Finally, to establish a violation of the Rule, the challeng-
ing party was required to prove subjective bad faith.75 In this context,
the test for subjective bad faith was generally formulated with refer-
ence to the litigant's motive for filing, not its expectation in terms of
actual outcome. Thus, for the most part, bad faith was equated with
claims entirely devoid of any colorable basis, or claims asserted solely
to harass, delay, or attrite the other side into submission.76
Because, at least in part,77 of the complexities and difficulties asso-
ciated with establishing a litigant's state of mind, pre-amended Rule 11
was infrequently invoked and, even when invoked, infrequently used
as a basis for imposing sanctions against attorneys who filed false or
groundless pleadings.7 8 This malaise caused many commentators to
posed under former Rule 11. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and
its Enforcement Some "Striking" Problems With Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-37 (1976), indicating that between 1938 and 1976
Rule 11 motions had only been filed in nineteen reported decisions, and that
among those cases violations had been found in eleven instances with sanctions
imposed against the violating attorneys in only three cases. See also KAssIN
supra note 33, at 2 (suggesting that three years later the number of cases where
counsel was disciplined under Rule 11 had only gone up by one). Of course, then
as now, an attorney who is found to have multiplied "the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously" might also be required to absorb the costs of suit,
including attorneys fees, attributable to such conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
74. On the other hand, as Nelken, supra note 33, at 1315, has pointed out, since the
sanction most frequently invoked for violating Rule 11 was to strike the pleading
as a sham, paradoxically it was the client who effectively would be penalized for
the excessiveness or perfidy of counsel.
75. See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348-50 (2d Cir. 1980)(to support sanctions
under Rule 11, subjective bad faith must be shown); Badillo v. Central Steel &
Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160,1167 (7th Cir. 1983)(sanctions denied because of the 'lack
of any showing of subjective bad faith"). Generally, subjective bad faith has also
been required before sanctions will be imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as well.
See United States v. Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887, 891 (1st Cir. 1984).
76. See, ag., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088 (2d Cir. 1977) (the test of bad faith is whether there is clear evidence that the
claims in question are "entirely without color ... asserted wantonly, for purposes
of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons").
77. Clearly another part of the problem was the reluctance of courts to impose sanc-
tions on other members of the Bar even when faced with a patent violation of the
Rule. See KASSIN, supra note 33, at 3-4 (judges' general reluctance to impose
sanctions coupled with confusion over the standard of inquiry lawyers were ex-
pected to satisfy both contributed to the ineffectiveness of original Rule 11); Wil-
liam W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 183-84 (1985)(detailing four reasons why judges might be chary
about imposing sanctions against lawyers).
78. See supra note 20 for statistics pointing up the relative paucity of Rule 11 cases
before 1983. See also Nelken, supra note 33, at 1315-16 (discussing reasons behind
former Rule 11s "relative invisibility and disuse"); Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 33, at 198 (confusion over the proper standard of conduct expected of
attorneys together with concern over striking legitimate claims accounted for the
ineffectiveness of original Rule 11 in deterring abuses) (citing 6 CHARLES ALAN
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complain that Rule 11 was not even feebly serving its intended func-
tions of deterring abusive litigation practices and protecting the integ-
rity of pleadings filed in the federal courts.7 9 Recognition of the
ineffectiveness of the original rule in curbing misuses of the judicial
process, coupled with a growing societal concern over frivolous and
vexatious lawsuits,80 resulted in the 1983 amendment of Rule 11. The
thrust of the amendment was to substitute the objective standard of
reasonableness discussed by the Supreme Court in Business Guidessl
for the subjective bad faith standard that had prevailed under the
Rule as originally enacted.8 2
The Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 11 specifically
states that Rule 11 is intended to discourage dilatory and abusive liti-
gation tactics, and that the mechanism for accomplishing that end is
greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses
and a willingness to impose sanctions anytime such conduct is deter-
WRIGHT & ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL, § 1334 (1971)).
79. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Arthur R. Miller & Di-
ana G. Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure,
NAT'L L.J. Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Risinger, supra note 73; Schwarzer, supra
note 77; Debbie A. Wilson, Note, The Intended Application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11: An End to the "Empty Head, Pure Heart" Defense and Rein-
forcement of Ethical Standards, 41 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1982). See generally Advi-
sory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 198; Georgine M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 70 F.R.D. 189, 190-91 (1988).
80. One of the principal spokesman in the fight to control the volume of frivolous
litigation in the federal courts was Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. See Address
by Justice Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation,
NAT'L CONF. ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE (April 7-9, 1976)(Conference commemorating Roscoe
Pound's address to the American Bar Association 1906 annual meeting), re-
printed in, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976). See also ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER, THE AUGUST
1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EF-
FECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial
Center 1984). Assertion of baseless claims and defenses, discovery abuses, and
other forms of harassment were all viewed as contributing to already over-
crowded dockets and obstructing justice. See generally supra note 38; Miller,
supra note 38, at 2-12 (citing the changes in the legal profession and in the legal
and social order which he believed accounted for the breakdown in the machin-
ery of justice). While these concerns may or may not have been well-founded (for
example, one observer focused on the positive attributes of, and offered neutral
explanations for, the perceived litigation explosion, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, To-
TAL JUSTICE 76 (1985)) they were unquestionably very real.
81. See supra note 36. See also Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 198 ('The
new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and
the law .... The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.").
82. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir.
1985)("[A] showing of subjective bad faith is no longer required to trigger the
sanctions imposed by the rule.").
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mined to have occurred.83 The drafters of the amendments to Rule 11
further indicated that they intended the newly-adopted objective stan-
dard to be "more stringent than the original good-faith formula" such
that "a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation," pre-
sumably resulting in more frequent and more effective invocation of
the Rule.84
How well the amendment of Rule 11 has operated to overcome the
deficiencies perceived to exist under the original rule, and whether
other important interests may have been compromised in the process,
are questions that have been the subject of lively and interesting de-
bate.8 5 However, it would be beyond the scope of this Article to enter
into that fray. Instead, it is only germane for present purposes to ob-
83. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 198. To overcome the natural reluc-
tance of judges to impose sanctions even when a violation of the Rule has oc-
curred, the amendment makes sanctions for failure to comply with the strictures
of Rule 11 mandatory. See infra note 88.
84. See generally Nelken, supra note 33, at 1314-1318; Advisory Committee Note
supra note 33, at 198.
85. Amended Rule 11 has been criticized as, among other things, undermining the
tradition of the adversary system and the sacred principle of open access to the
courts. See Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanc-
tions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987); David J. Webster, Note, Rule 11: Has the
Objective Standard Transgressed the Adversary System?, supra note 38; Judy L.
Woods, Note, Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 11- Is the Stop, Look, and Investi-
gate Requirement a Litigant's Roadblock?, 18 IND. L. REv. 751 (1985). See also
Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1990) [hereinafter
Nelken, Looking for a Middle Ground], arguing that the chilling effect that Rule
11 has had since its amendment in 1983 threatens to permanently alter the char-
acter of civil litigation unless the Rule can be refocused on its original aim of
deterrence. Another commentator has complained that Rule 11 has impacted dis-
proportionately on public interest litigation. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal
Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 331 (1988). Also, be-
cause of the sheer volume of decisions involving Rule 11 (over 1,000 in just the
first five years since the 1983 amendment, see Gregory P. Joseph, The Trouble
with Rule 11, 73 A.B.A. J. 87 (1987)), concern has been expressed that "satellite"
litigation over Rule 11 has actually increased, rather than streamlined, the over-
all volume of federal civil litigation. See Nelken, Looking for a Middle Ground,
supra, at 387-88; Vairo, supra note 79, at 195.
For more favorable assessment of amended Rule 11, see Stephen B. Burbank,
The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1925,1947-54 (1989)(defending Rule 11 from the charge that it has
stifled adversarial zeal or legitimate assertion of doctrine challenging claims); A.
Leo Levin & Sylvan A. Sobel, Achieving Balance on the Developing Law of Sanc-
tions, 36 CATH. L. REV. 587,590-91 (1987)(the new Rule has worked well in deter-
ring frivolous suits); Louis, supra note 32, at 1053-61 (Rule 11 sanctions primarily
have been imposed on meritless cases); William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited,
101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1017 (1988) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Rule 11] (although
critical of the amended Rule on other grounds, noting that there is no evidence
that legitimate advocacy has been chilled by Rule 11). See also Bank of Maui v.
Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1990)(filing of complaint would
not give rise to sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 even when relief sought
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serve a few key details about the current state of the law under Rule
11, as amended, and, ergo, under its bankruptcy counterpart, Rule
9011: 1) pleadings filed without an adequate basis in fact or law are
vulnerable to attack;86 2) Rule 11 applies to litigants and counsel
alike;8 7 3) sanctions under Rule 11 are mandatory once the court de-
termines that a violation has occurred;8 8 4) Rule 11 sanctions are gen-
erally calculated by reference to the costs entailed in responding to an
improper filing;89 and, perhaps most importantly for the discussion to
follow, 5) Rule 11 is no longer primarily concerned with state of mind
or intended to serve merely as a so-called "good faith formula."90
B. Section 303(i)(2)
Section 303(i) and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 are not without common
purpose. In the broadest sense, certainly both are intended to regulate
abusive uses of the federal judicial process. If, however, there was a
complete coincidence of purpose there would be no need for a special
"mini no-abuse" directive in section 303. Moreover, the questions of
what conduct is considered to be abusive and what standards are to be
applied in determining whether such conduct occurred may be an-
was clearly not warranted under existing law since claim was susceptible to good
faith argument for a change of existing law).
86. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 198.
87. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33,
at 200 (the limit on judicial discretion is intended to "focus the court's attention"
on dealing with misuse of the process). Sanctions are also considered mandatory
under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Mortgage Mart, Inc., v. Rechnitze (In re Chisum),
847 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1988). Under both 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) and, for that
matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the court has discretion to award sanctions in the form of
costs and fees. See infra authorities cited in note 92. Of course, the general reluc-
tance of judges to use sanctions at their disposal prompted the inclusion of a
mandatory directive as part of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.
89. Although the Supreme Court has expressly held that Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting
statute (Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2462 (1990)), in most
instances the sanction imposed has been calculated with a view toward the costs
and reasonable fees incurred by the other party in responding to the sanctionable
behavior. See supra note 33. See also Alan E. Untereiner, Note, A Uniform Ap-
proach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 917-919 (recommending a series of
factors or indicia which courts should apply calculating a proper sanction).
90. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 198-99 (standard under amended
rule is more stringent than the original good faith formula); Vairo, supra note 79,
at 195 (sanctions provision of Rule 11 is intended to be broader than the "bad
faith" doctrine). It will be recalled that one of the principal goals achieved by the
1983 amendment of Rule 11 was to replace the requirement that the party seek-
ing to establish a violation prove subjective bad faith with a stricter and more
precise standard of objective reasonableness. See Robert L. Carter, The History
and Purposes of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 4, 6-7 (1985); supra note 32.
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swered very differently depending on the context in which they
arise.91
Obviously, section 303(i) is broader than Bankruptcy Rule 9011 in
the sense that it allows for the awarding of costs and attorneys fees
under subsection (i)(1) without any showing of either bad judgment or
bad purpose.92 Also, as pointed out earlier,93 subsection (i)(2) itself
may be broader than Rule 9011 since decisions interpreting bad faith
91. This is merely to restate the point made earlier that the process of statutory in-
terpretation cannot proceed in a vacuum, devoid of attention to the purposes
sought to be accomplished through adoption of a particular provision of positive
law. The classic formulation of an intentionalist or purposive approach to statu-
tory interpretation is H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958). Taking the view
that the meaning of a statute must be determined by reference to intended pur-
pose derived from the context in which the statute was adopted is not necessarily
inconsistent with the view that, as time passes between enactment and applica-
tion, the judiciary must take an increasingly active role in assigning meaning in
light of current circumstances. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. Ruv. 20 (1988)(distinguishing between "archeological"
and "nautical" approaches to statutory interpretation); See also William N. Es-
kridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987)(statute
should be interpreted in terms of present goals and needs, and not necessarily on
the basis of original or historic intent); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 79 (1987)(the task of the judiciary, like the task of the military
field commander implementing battle orders, is to determine which outcome will
best advance the enterprise launched upon enactment of the statute in question).
As will be discussed presently, infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text, the
objectives, and therefore the type of conduct proscribed, by Bankruptcy Rule
9011 and § 303(i)(2) are quite different. It is for this reason, as well as because of
key differences between the explicit language used in the two provisions that I
contend that they should be governed by different standards.
92. See, eg., Susman v. Schmid (In re Reid), 854 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir. 1988)(use of
the term "may" in § 303(i)(1) indicates that fees and costs do not have to be
awarded in all cases); In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In
re Anderson, 95 B.R. 703, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88
B.R. 706, 711 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687, 693
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Aniburgey, 68 B.R. 768,774 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987).
In In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), the court noted that
some courts consider an award of costs and attorneys fees as mandatory if a peti-
tion is dismissed other than on consent of all parties, but that the authority cited
for that proposition is dubious. But see In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 177
(Bankr. D. Me. 1992)(unsuccessful petitioners should generally expect that fees
and costs will be awarded to the debtor); In re Leach, 102 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1989)(although the award of costs and fees is discretionary, § 303(i)(1) rou-
tinely contemplates their award to the debtor); In re Johnston Hawks Limited, 72
B.R. 361, 365 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987)(costs and fees routinely awarded). On the
other hand, some courts have suggested that while not technically required, bad
faith will ordinarily be a prerequisite to an award of costs and fees under
§ 303(i)(1). See In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 702 (D. Colo. 1984);
In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In
re Allen Rogers & Co., 34 B.R. 631, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
93. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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have defined that concept in terms of what one court has labelled "im-
proper use" as well as "improper purpose."94 Of course, one could also
make the point (as in due course I intend to) that subsection (i)(2) is at
the same time narrower than Rule 9011 because it does not impose the
affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry into both
the facts and the law.95
Ultimately, however, my contention is neither that section
303(i)(2) is broader in scope than Bankruptcy Rule 9011 nor that it is
narrower; my contention is simply that they are different. Further-
more, these differences manifest themselves in different ways. Some
differences are obvious. For example, the court must act under Rule
9011 if a violation occurs; it is not obliged to do so under section
303(i)(2) even when bad faith is found.96 Likewise, there is a rather
significant difference in the consequences that may flow from a viola-
tion of Rule 9011 versus a finding of bad faith in an involuntary filing:.
in the former instance imposition of sanctions 97 and in the latter an
affirmative award of actual damages (presumably subject to proof)
and punitive damages. 98 Finally, Rule 9011 is directed principally at
94. In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405,410-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)("improper pur-
pose" exists where filing of the petition was motivated by ill-will, malice, or a
desire to harass the debtor, whereas an "improper use" test involves using the
Bankruptcy Code as a "substitute for customary collection procedures"). Other
courts have described the different approaches taken to defining bad faith under
§ 303(i)(2) in similar terms. See In re Johnston Hawks Limited, 72 B.R. 361, 366
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1987). However, in citing authority for the "improper use" test,
these courts ignore that, with the exception of In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc.,
13 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), all of these cases were decided in the posture of
a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of good faith, not a motion or counter-
claim for sanctions or damages under § 303(i). See supra note 51 and infra note
253.
95. See infra notes 242-263 and accompanying text.
96. See In re Cedar Falls Hotel Limited Partnership, 102 B.R. 1009,1018 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1989)(while the court has great discretion in deciding what sanction to im-
pose, upon a determination that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 has been violated the
court must impose some sanction against the offending party). See also supra
notes 88 and 92.
97. The district court is granted broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanc-
tion, but, ordinarily, sanctions are measured at least partly by reference to the
costs incurred by the opposing party. See Alan E. Untereiner, Note, A Uniform
Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 89, at 920 (the vast majority of Rule 11
sanctions contain some element of cost-shifting). See also supra note 33.
98. Damages which are either speculative or remote are not recoverable, even though
a finding of bad faith has been made. See In re Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 712
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988)(evidence insufficient to sustain award of compensatory
damages); In re McDonald Trucking Co., 74 B.R. 474,479 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987);
In re Camelot, Inc., 25 B.R. 861, 868 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982), ffl'd, Camelot, Inc.
v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). See also In re International Mobile
Advertising Corp., 117 B.R. 154, 158-59 n. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990)(pointing out
that courts have frequently found only nominal damages were proven under
§ 303(i)(2)), aff'd, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11294 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Cf. Sjostedt v.
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counsel,9 9 whereas damages under section 303(i)(2) may only be as-
sessed against the parties to the petition.100 On the basis of these dif-
ferences alone it might be fairly questioned whether it is rational to
apply the same standards and definitions under both provisions.' 0 '
However, it becomes utter nonsense to do so when an even more basic
and elemental difference between the two enactments is exposed.
Unlike Rule 9011,102 section 303(i)(2) is not primarily about pro-
Salmon (In re Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 316-18 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)(awarding
$100,000 in actual damages, but rejecting most of the debtor's eight million dollar
damage claim as too speculative to permit recovery). Although the purpose for
the provision for actual damages in subparagraph (A) of § 303(i)(2) is obviously to
compensate debtors victimized economically by bad faith filings, the provision in
subparagraph (B) for the award of punitive damages is intended both to deter
similar acts in the future and to punish creditors for affirmative wrongdoing. See
In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc. 46 B.R. 700, 706 (D. Colo. 1984); In re Johnston
Hawks, 72 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987). There has been some confusion
and an illuminating debate over whether the principal function of Rule 31 (and,
therefore, Bankruptcy Rule 9011) is compensation or deterrence and punishment.
See generally Nelken, supra note 33, at 1323-25; Schwarzer, supra note 77, at 201;
Vairo, supra note 79, at 203-04. However, courts and commentators have gradu-
ally come to the conclusion that the deterrent role of the Rule is preeminent. See
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990)(the Rule's central
goal is deterrence); KAssiN, supra note 33, at 29-30 (majority of judges surveyed
indicated that deterrence was the most important function of Rule 11); Alan E.
Untereiner, Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 89, at
907 ("[Mlost judges and commentators agree that deterrence is the Rule's pri-
mary goal.")(citations omitted). Thus, only in a very limited sense is there a di-
rect overlap between the thrust of the two provisions.
99. Unquestionably, Federal Rule 11 and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 apply to counsel and
litigants alike. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 33, at 200 (it may be
appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose sanctions on the attor-
ney, the client, or both); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications En-
ters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 929-31 (1991) (there is no distinction between represented and
unrepresented parties for purposes of Rule 11). However, the amendment of
Rule 11 in 1983 was clearly precipitated by a concern over attorney misconduct.
See id. at 935-36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(purpose of Rule is to control the con-
duct of attorneys and those who practice before the courts). Moreover, except in
cases involving pro se litigants, pleadings and other court papers most often will
be signed only by counsel. In this respect, involuntary petitions are the exception
to the rule. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008 (petitions must be verified by filers).
100. In re International Mobile, 117 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1990)(section
303(i) provides for claims only against petitioners, not against their counsel); In re
Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)(section
303(i) does not provide for an award against the petitioners' attorney); In re
Ramsden, 17 B.R. 59, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)(judgment authorized by
§ 303(i)(2) is directed only against offending petitioners). But see Stock v. Ex-
change Network Corp. (In re Exchange Network Corp.), 92 B.R. 479,480 (D. Colo.
1988) (suggesting that § 303(i)(1) implicitly permits the court to award attorneys
fees against counsel).
101. Of course, this is precisely what the trend in the recent case law has been. See
supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
102. The primary focus of Rule 11 is deterrence. See supra note 26.
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tecting the integrity of court pleadings and papers. Rather, it is pri-
marily about compensating parties who have been financially harmed
by a bad faith filing.Os The perception that there is a heightened dan-
ger that a mechanism for involuntary bankruptcy will be the object of
mischievous and unintended uses may or may not be accurate.1O4 Nev-
ertheless, the purely discretionary provision for redistribution of the
costs of suit in section 303(i)(1), operating in addition to the duty im-
posed by Bankruptcy Rule 9011, provides a powerful disincentive for
creditors considering the undertaking of a filing that does not serve
bankruptcy purposes. 05 On the other hand, even though demonstra-
ble damages are suffered by a debtor who successfully defends against
an involuntary petition, there should be no remedy under section
303(i)(2) just because the petition was without merit. More is re-
quired. Bad faith is required, and, as will be explained, for this pur-
pose bad faith entails malice as well as lack of a colorable basis.106
Correspondingly, since bankruptcy is a collective remedy, if the peti-
103. Doubtless, the provision in § 303(i)(2) providing for the award of punitive dam-
ages is intended to serve as a penalty for wrongful conduct and a deterrent to
future recurrences. See infra note 262. However, the main thrust of § 303(i)(2) is
to reimburse the debtor for past and future economic loss caused by the malicious
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. See H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963, 6280-81; Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). Congress clearly intended to
create a remedy for malicious prosecution in the form of a bad faith filing when it
adopted § 303(i)(2). Also, the provision for punitive damages in subparagraph (B)
of § 303(i)(2) may operate to give the bankruptcy court some flexibility to com-
pensate a debtor for intangible losses that cannot be proved with sufficient cer-
tainty (as to cause or amount) to be included in an award of actual damages under
subparagraph (A).
104. That the perception exists, however, would seem to be beyond contention. For
example, see the statement of Senator Baucus, supra note 14, made in support of
the 1984 Act amendment to § 303.
105. Section 303(i)(1) is broader in scope than Bankruptcy Rule 9011 in two important
respects. First, it explicitly allows the court to redistribute the entire costs of
suit. Recall that sanctions under Rule 11 shift only the cost of a discrete event,
not the entire cost of litigation. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991). See also Cooter & Gel v. Hartmarx Corp.,
110 S. Ct. at 2447 (Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute). Second, there is no re-
quirement under § 303(i)(1) that the court first find a breach of duty before
awarding costs and fees. On the other hand, unlike the situation under Rule 9011
(see supra note 88), an award of costs and fees is not mandatory upon the dismis-
sal of an involuntary petition. See supra note 92.
106. See, e.g., Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. (In re Eric Peterson Constr.
Co.), 951 F.2d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 1991)(the court must have dismissed the peti-
tion before a damage award may be considered under § 303(i)); Miyao v. Kuntz
(In re Sweet Transfer & Storage, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990)(by its
terms, an action under § 303(i) does not arise until the petition has been dis-
missed by the court); Glinka v. Dartmouth Banking Co. (In re Kelton Motors,
Inc.), 121 B.R. 166, 185 (Bankr. D. Vermont 1990)(dismissal of involuntary peti-
tion is a condition precedent to a bad faith action for damages under § 303(i)(2)).
See also infra notes 227 & 268.
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tion has legal merit the question of liability under section 303(i)(2)
should be foreclosed without regard to the petitioning creditors moti-
vations for filing.107
Granting it anthropomorphic qualities for the moment, it is not as
if section 303 is indifferent to the harm caused to the system by frivo-
lous filings alone, or, for that matter, colorable filings undertaken
with an improper motive; it is simply that those concerns are ad-
dressed separately from the statutory provision that incorporates the
substantive law of involuntary bankruptcy. Stated another way,
within the overall structure of the bankruptcy law, section 303(i)(2) is
concerned with what no longer is the dominant consideration under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011; that is, section 303(i)(2) is concerned with sub-
jective bad faith.108 This is not to suggest that petitioning creditors are
or should be immune from good faith filing requirements originating
from other sources. Quite the contrary. Good faith is clearly expected
from everyone who files a bankruptcy petition, creditor and debtor
alike.109 However, by its terms, section 303(i)(2) provides the alleged
debtor with a remedy only in instances of bad faith. Does not lack of
107. Contrast this conclusion with the operation of Rule 11 where the issue of the
legal merits of a party's claim is separate from the question of whether that party
has breached a duty giving rise to sanctions under the Rule. Business Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991)('Rule 11 sanc-
tions are not tied to the outcome of litigation."); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
110 S. Ct. 2447, 2456 (1990)(imposition of Rule 11 sanctions does not signify dis-
trict court's assessment of the legal merits of the sanctioned party's claims or
defenses).
108. That the subjective standard no longer governs Rule 11 is abundantly clear. See
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 932
(1991); supra note 32. For a period of time from the effective date of the Bank-
ruptcy Code on October 1, 1979, until the adoption of the new Bankruptcy Rules
on August 1, 1983 (see supra note 25), the standards under § 303(i)(2) and former
Bankruptcy Rule 911 may have had more in common. However, while the
amendment of Rule 11 (which formed the basis for Bankruptcy Rule 9011) may
have been intended to substitute a more workable "reasonableness" standard for
the subjective bad faith standard which had evolved under the Rule as originally
promulgated, the language in § 303(i)(2) has stayed the same. See Carter, supra
note 70, at 6-7. The condition to entry of judgment is and has always been bad
faith. Despite efforts by some courts to gauge bad faith by reference to objective
considerations, the more sensible construction (particularly given the courts abil-
ity to award costs and fees under § 303(i)(1) free of the bad faith prerequisite) is
to require a showing of deliberate or malicious intent to cause the losses for
which recovery is sought. For example, in the emerging area of lender liability,
courts have recognized that breach of a duty of good faith does not always mean
bad faith is present. At a minimum, bad faith requires arbitrary or malicious
behavior;, conduct committed with specific knowledge that it presents a substan-
tial risk of harm to others. See, eg., Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 635
(Mont. 1987); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986). See also text
accompanying infra notes 135-139 for elaboration on the idea that bad faith does
not mean simply the lack of good faith.
109. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
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good faith automatically entail bad faith? I do not believe so, and that
judgment may have significant consequences in terms of when a peti-
tioning creditor may be assessed damages under section 303(i)(2).
However, to explain why there is an "in-between" that is neither good
faith nor bad requires a brief excursus into the concept of good faith as
it has developed in the larger commercial law arena where bank-
ruptcy rules operate.
V. DIVERGING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF GOOD FAITH
A. Excluder Analysis
There is a rich and provocative literature examining the theoreti-
cal foundations and practical implications of the obligation to act in
good faith, most of it in the general context of contract law and con-
tractual relations." 0 Probably the leading conceptualization of good
faith is still found in Professor Summers' "excluder analysis," which
was first put forward in a 1968 article'1 ' and was later adopted by the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.112 According to
Summers, any attempt to define good faith as an independent, free-
standing concept is not only misguided, but doomed to failure. This is
because, Summers maintains, good faith has no general meaning of its
110. See Eric G. Anderson, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 299 (1988)(drawing a distinction between good faith performance and good
faith enforcement of a contract); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Perform-
ance of a Contract A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497 (1984)
[hereinafter Burton, More on Good Faith]; Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 666 (1963) (distinguishing good faith purchase from good
faith performance); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv.
605 (1981); Phillip Girard, "Good Faith" in Contract Performance: Principle or
Placebo?, 5 SuP. Cr. L. REv. 309 (1983)(exploring whether good faith exists as a
necessary or desirable part of Canadian common law); Mark Snyderman, Com-
ment, What's so Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obliga-
tion in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1335 (1988).
111. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1954) [hereinafter
Summers, Good Faith]. Summers refreshed and updated his analysis in light of
intervening developments some sixteen years later. See Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 810 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith].
112. See Burton, More on Good faith, supra note 110, at 497-99 (the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) largely follows Professor Summers' approach to good faith). Section
205 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) provides: "Every con-
tract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its perform-
ance and its enforcement."
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own; it is a term without substantive content." 3 Instead, good faith is
given meaning only in relation to the various forms of conduct which
courts have identified as constituting bad faith and, in so doing, implic-
itly ruled out of the realm of good faith.14 Thus, to use Summers'
term, good faith is an excluder. It can be given specific meaning, if one
insists on doing so, only by identifying an applicable form of conduct
ruled out as bad faith and then formulating its "opposite.""z5 In turn,
instances of bad faith conduct are determined by criteria that vary
from one context to the next,11 6 and, although Summers never explic-
itly says so, presumably in the same context over time. Therefore, so
far as Summers is concerned, it is no more .possible to assign a positive
definition to bad faith than it is to good faith. The constant and inevi-
table reconfiguring of circumstances renders meaningless any attempt
to list the factual conditions necessary and sufficient to establish good
faith or bad faith in every case.' 1 7
Logically, Summers, whose methodology for defining good faith is
to posit the opposite from various forms of bad faith, would reject the
notion of conduct that falls short of membership in either class. By
113. Summers, Good Faith, supra note 111, at 201 ("It [good faith] is a phrase without
general meaning (or meanings) of its own...").
114. Id. at 200-04. Summers contends: "Good faith, then, takes on specific and variant
meanings by way of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith
which judges decide to prohibit." Id. at 202. Summers derives support for his
excluder analysis from the work of the English linguistic philosopher J. L. Aus-
tin. I&
115. Id. at 200 nn.28-29. Summers uses the example of a judge who, applying the direc-
tive that a public authority must act in good faith in letting bids, concludes that
the defendant acted in bad faith because of a concealed purpose of awarding bids
to a favored bidder. (These are apparently the facts of Heyer Prods. Co. v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct Cl. 1956). It can now be said, Summers continues,
that acting in good faith means letting bids without a preconceived design of who
will be the recipient, but obviously that definition derived from formulating the
opposite of the opprobrious conduct Summers, Good Faith, supra note 111, at
200-01.
116. Summers dismisses as impossible the idea that the "necessary and sufficient" fac-
tual conditions of good faith or bad in every case can be stated or identified in
advance. Id. at 204-06. See also Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra
note 111, at 819.
117. Summers, Good Faith, supra note 111, at 206. ("Nor has there been any attempt
to catalog all the varieties of contractual bad faith, were this possible."). On this
point, Burton is in accord with Summers. See generally Steven J. Burton, Com-
ment on "Empty Ideas": Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rule, 91
YALE L.J. 1136 (1982). It might also be added that even if such a list of criteria
could be composed, its utility would be of transitory value. Inevitable changes
over time in societal values and attitudes would almost certainly affect at the
edges the determination of whether particular conduct is or is not deemed to con-
flict with the general duty of good faith and fair dealing. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981)(suggesting that community standards of
decency, fairness, and reasonableness all play a role in deciding what type of con-
duct will be characterized as involving "bad faith").
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definition, excluder analysis assumes that what is not bad faith must
be, by default, good faith.118 In this respect, the failure to assign a
positive meaning or purpose to good faith (even one concededly sub-
ject to recurrent adaptation and modulation at the hands of the courts
faced with the task of deciding actual cases) exposes a flaw in excluder
analysis. On the other hand, while Summers allows that it is possible
to classify the decided bad faith performance cases into several general
categories,119 his conclusion that it is ultimately impossible to state the
factual conditions that would guarantee membership every time in
one class or another seems right on point.120 Any such knowable, pre-
ordained definition of bad faith, regardless of how well-grounded its
theoretical justification, would be of limited explanatory value to be-
gin with, and even less useful over time.321
B. Giving a Positive Twist to Good Faith
Summers' excluder analysis has been subjected to some criti-
cism, 122 but only recently has that criticism gone to the central prem-
ise of Summers' argument; namely, that good faith itself has no
independent meaning.12 3 That challenge has come from Professor
118. Of course, the converse must be true as well-what is not good faith must be bad
- causing Burton to question whether, when put to the test, excluder analysis
excludes anything at all. Burton, More on Good Faith, supra note 110, at 508 n.
47. For another example of "reverse" excluder analysis, see infra text accompa-
nying note 151.
119. In his initial "good faith" article, Summers provided a partial, non-exclusive list
of cases involving various forms of bad faith conduct. Summers, Good Faith,
supra note 111, at 203. In his later work, he suggests that it is possible under his
analysis to develop a list of factors relevant to good faith performance which can
be used in a number of different performance contexts to rule out forms of bad
faith. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 111, at 833.
120. See supra note 116.
121. Id. See also supra note 117.
122. Principally, this criticism has come from Professor Burton. See Burton, Breach of
Contract and More on Good Faith, supra note 110. See also Steven J. Burton,
Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 67 IowA L. REV. 1 (1981); Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the
Uniform Commercial Code-A New look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1
(1971). In fact Summers spends considerable time in his second good faith article
responding to Burton's approach to good faith. See Summers. The General Duty
of Good Faith, supra note 111, at 825-831.
In contrast to Summers' excluder analysis, Burton employs a cost perspective
analysis to define good faith. He maintains that a party acts in bad faith when
that party uses the discretion reserved to him under the contract to obtain advan-
tages "foregone upon entering into the contract." Burton, Breach of Contract,
supra note 110, at 398, 402. Thus, a party who (based on events occurring after
formation of the contract and the risk of which are allocated under the contract)
determines that there is more to gain through breach than performance acts in
bad faith by failing to fulfill his obligations under the contract. Id. at 378-86.
123. See Burton, More on Good Faith, supra note 110, at 508 ("Preliminarily, let it be
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Patterson who, like Summers, draws on linguistic theory to support an
alternative construction of the good faith principle in the commercial
law.n4
First and foremost, Patterson maintains that, as the normative first
principle of commercial relations, good faith must be afforded sub-
stantive meaning and content of its own. In this way, courts and law-
yers can reason about good faith more broadly than simply in terms of
the narrow category of behavior previously identified in reported deci-
sions from their jurisdictions as rising to the level of bad faith con-
duct.25 Patterson's approach proceeds from the notion that the
meaning of good faith can be best gleaned by considering the purposes
the doctrine serves in legal discourse. Patterson emphasizes the im-
portance of institutional history that can be observed in both judicial
decisions and expressions of legislative intent. Ultimately, however,
he maintains that institutional history must derive from a purposive
rationale of the concept under consideration.126 Thus, contrary to
much that has been offered in the way of legal scholarship in recent
years, 2 7 Patterson rejects any externally-imposed normative view of
clear that both of us fully agree that one cannot state a 'positive definition' of
good faith or bad faith performance.").
124. Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code. A Theory of Good Faith Per-
formance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335 (1988).
125. I& at 350-51, 378-79. See also Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable From the Seventh
Circuit Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 503, 525-29 (1991).
126. Patterson, supra note 124, at 390. In describing the theoretical implications of his
approach from an interpretive point of view, Patterson observes that institutional
history goes beyond legislative intent since it includes purposes not apparent to
the drafters of the statute as well as the changing demands placed on doctrine
over time. Patterson is, understandably, particularly at ease with this approach
under the U.C.C. given the drafters explicit admonition that the Code should be
construed and applied as a "living" document. U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (1990). For
an approach to statutory interpretation that goes a step beyond the post-founda-
tionalist, purposive theory of legislative interpretation offered by Patterson, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practi-
cal Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
127. Some scholars have gone even further by rejecting all forms of normative argu-
ment. See generally Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a
Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991)(discuss-
ing the domination of normative analysis in legal scholarship over the past few
decades, and questioning whether grand, unified normative theories really ac-
complish anything in terms of either meaningfully explaining the law or sharpen-
ing the focus of legal discourse on important issues of social and public policy).
The law and economics explanation and critique of bankruptcy law, supra note
160-171 and accompanying text, offers a working example of this type of analysis,
although the adherents of that school have no corner on the market. For in-
stance, the thesis developed in this Article about bad faith ultimately reflects a
normative judgment about bankruptcy law and policy, although it eschews as in-
consistent with the mosaic quality of bankruptcy the preeminence of any single,
overriding norm. Thus, I believe Delgado's critique of all forms of normativite
argument goes to an unwarranted extreme. One is led to ask, what's left? More-
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the law (which may serve as a basis for critiquing the law but which he
observes can never explain it)128 in favor of a normative view that is
immanent in the actual legal material and discourse under scrutiny. 2 9
However, since prevailing commercial norms, practices, and expecta-
tions can and do change, Patterson acknowledges that the purposive
analysis he uses to reconstruct a theory of good faith can never reveal
an enduring, immutable paradigmatic. 1 30
The recognition that a purposive approach to legal interpretation
must allow for the eventuality of evolution, particularly when dealing
with a doctrine as ubiquitous and dynamic as good faith, does not pre-
vent Patterson from assigning a positive meaning to the concept of
good faith against which particular applications can then be measured.
For purposes of illustration he brings the doctrine of good faith, as
reconceptualized by him, to bear in the context of secured transactions
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.13' Ultimately,
however, Patterson draws his purposive meaning of good faith from
existing textual sources. Principally, he relies on section 205 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts,132 which equates good faith in the
performance and enforcement of contractual obligations with "faith-
fulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justi-
fied expectations of the other party."133 Thus, Patterson can now do
what he claims could not be done under Summers' analysis; he can
speculate in advance and with some measure of certainty as to
over, are not those who urge us to refrain from making normative arguments
advancing a normative position themselves? On the other hand, Patterson's ap-
proach to derive rather than divine the normative seems sound, although the
point is not beyond contention. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815,
817 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution] ("[O]ne cannot derive the nor-
mative from the positive.").
128. Patterson, supra note 124, at 379. See also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement Sentinel of an Evolv-
ing Bankruptcy Policy, 85 N.W. U.L. REV. 919, 964 n. 148 (1991)(questioning the
explanatory prowess of the economic model of bankruptcy law).
129. Patterson, supra note 124, at 379 (the key question to be answered is not does the
theory make sense, but "[d]oes the theory make sense of the data?").
130. Id at 378 ("The meaning of good faith can never be exhausted in any one of its
instances, nor is any particular instance uniquely illustrative or paradig-
matic.")(citations omitted). This is not by any means to say, as Summers would,
that it is impossible to assign a positive meaning to good faith. See supra note 113
and accompanying text. It is simply to recognize that the process of ascribing
meaning cannot occur divorced from the contextual circumstances in which that
meaning is relevant, and the contexts in which the question arises are several and
varied. Any allusion at this point to the legal realist tradition is probably not
accidental.
131. Specifically, Patterson considers the problem of anti-waiver clauses in security
agreements. Patterson, supra note 124, at 394-419.
132. Id at 384-85. See also infra note 139.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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whether or not, among other questions, particular provisions in a se-
curity agreement should be barred under the U.C.C's general require-
ment of good faith in the enforcement of contract rights.134
C. Good Faith Reconsidered
One of Patterson's most basic criticisms of excluder analysis is that
it leads to the conclusion that only cases with extremely similar fact
patterns (presumably those involving conduct earlier "ruled out" as
bad faith) have precedential value.13 5 This precludes courts from be-
ing able to know in advance whether or not a party has comported
itself in good faith, except in those limited situations where the identi-
cal conduct was characterized in an earlier case as constituting bad
faith.136 This leads Patterson to develop his positive conception of
good faith-one that is tied to the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties, and, I suspect, concomitantly, to their exigent commercial needs.
By assigning a positive meaning to good faith, and in particular a
meaning which derives from actual experience, Patterson's conceptu-
alization of good faith allows a possibility for which Summers' analysis
cannot account; namely, conduct which does not sink to the level of
bad faith (ruled out by the judge's use of the term good faith) but
which also does not rise to the standard of good faith (because it fails
to comply with reasonable expectations and prevailing commercial
practices).
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Patterson's general approach
to legal interpretation, 3 7 the value of any conceptualization of good
faith which, like Patterson's, attributes a specific role to the concept
134. Patterson, supra note 124, at 419-425.
135. Id at 350.
136. I&: 'Sut how can courts reason about good faith when good faith cannot be iden-
tified outside the narrow designation provided by case law?"
137. For a sampling of alternative approaches to statutory interpretation, a subject
which has received renewed scholarly attention in recent years, see Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 126 (proposing a practical reasoning model of statutory inter-
pretation); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original intent in Statutory Con-
struction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988)(suggesting that the search for
legislative purpose or intent has become a device used by judges to re-write stat-
utes as they please); Jonathon R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986) (proposing that the process of statutory interpretation be used to
cleanse legislation of the taint resulting from the influence of special interest
motivations in the legislative process); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution), 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 179 (1987)(the task of the judiciary is not dissimilar to the task of
the field commander implementing vague military orders; the exercise is to de-
termine which outcome will best advance the enterprise launched upon enact-
ment of the statute in question); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 407 (1989)(emphasizing the primacy of statu-
tory text in the interpretation process, and calling for adoption of a new set of
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of good faith is that it implicitly carries with it an ideal that the actor's
behavior must conform to a higher standard than the minimum re-
quirement imposed by positive law. Regardless of whether that
higher standard is envisioned in terms of general market expectations,
industry practice and custom, or predominating community values at
large, the point remains the same: good faith entails the exercise of a
right tempered by considerations external to the strict statutory or
contractual provision that confers the right in the first instance. 38
Admittedly, there are a growing number of occasions in the law
where the minimum standard under the applicable enabling provision
has been explicitly raised and brought into conformity with the good
faith standard. For example, it is now widely accepted that every con-
tractual relationship is infused with mutual duties of good faith and
fair dealing in performance and enforcement.139 Doubtless, these
sweeping admonitions have very real implications for the persons held
interpretive norms or canons of construction that promote the goals of the con-
temporary regulatory state).
138. Patterson suggests that good faith entails conformity with the reasonable stan-
dards of the community, but observes that the relevant "community" may differ
depending on the context; in a commercial transaction, for instance, community
might well be considered to refer to the financial community. Patterson, supra
note 124, at 385-87. In other contexts, the community might be much larger. For
example, to the extent good faith has been used as one of several devices designed
to limit the scope of the employment at will doctrine, the relevant community
might extend to the community at large. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1977)(employers' interest in running his business must be bal-
anced against the employees' interest in maintaining his employment and the
public's interest in maintaining a balance between the two). Cf. Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983)(imposing a duty to terminate in
good faith would unduly restrict an employer's discretion in managing the work
force). The court in Brockmeyer did, however, adopt a narrow public policy ex-
ception to the employment at will doctrine. Id& at 840.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Interestingly, the
U.C.C. adopts a subjective test of good faith, "honesty in fact." U.C.C. § 1-203
(1989). However, it adds an objective component for merchants involved in con-
tracts for the sale of goods. U.C.C. § 1-203(1)(b)(1989). By its terms, however, the
duty of good faith attendant to the performance and enforcement of contracts
does not extend to the pre-contract negotiation stage of the relationship. This
points to greater tolerance for insincere motive and deviation from reasonable
expectations in the contract formation process than after the parties cross the
threshold of contractual liability, even though the harm resulting from such be-
havior may be no less real than the harm flowing from the actual breach of an
express or implied contractual obligation. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133
N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), is the classic example of such a case. This has led some
courts to recognize an obligation to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., Channel
Home Centers, Division of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir.
1986). See also Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 673 (1969)(offering a variation on the duty to bargain in good faith theme).
Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no general duty of good faith similar to
the U.C.C., for citation to various provisions of the Code which incorporate a good
faith requirement, see supra note 22.
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to these standards in actual transactions. They do not, however, alter
or diminish in any way the point that a necessary corollary of enrich-
ing the good faith concept with positive meaning is the creation of a
gulf between ordinary and good faith performances.
D. The Good Faith Filing Requirement
By judicially-imposed mandate, bankruptcy filings also must be un-
dertaken in good faith.140 Failure to do so can result in dismissal.
This implied good faith filing requirement applies equally to involun-
tary as well as voluntary cases.141 I fully endorse the view that good
faith in this context means consistency with prevailing bankruptcy
policy.142 However, if, as I have argued, bad faith is not always the
mirror opposite of good faith, then neither can the converse proposi-
tion be true in every instance. Further, even if the term "bad faith"
inevitably is used to refer to conduct which falls short of the implied
good faith filing requirement,143 it does not automatically follow that
140. See Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989); Little Creek Dev. Co. v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1986). See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128. While the
impetus for implying a good faith filing requirement originated in the context of
reorganization cases, courts have recognized lack of good faith as a valid basis for
dismissal of Chapter 7 cases as well. See Industrial Ins. Servs. v. Zick (In re Zick),
931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991).
141. As pointed out earlier, Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47
B.R. 903 (D.N.D. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1083 (1986), was actually such a case. See supra note 47. Other examples include:
In re Eberhardt Moving & Storage, Ltd. 120 B.R. 121 (Bankr. N.D. 1990); In re
Kass, 114 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Winn, 49 B.R. 237 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985)(sole purpose of filing was to circumvent state court ruling). Cf. In re
1020 Warburton Avenue Realty Corp., 127 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991)(debtor's challenge on bad faith grounds refused); In re Caucus Distribs., 106
B.R. 890, 922-24 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)(concluding that the petitioner did not act
with ulterior subjective motive sufficient to constitute bad faith).
In some cases the "bad faith" purporting to justify dismissal may be on the
part of the debtor or one of its equity participants rather than on the part of a
creditor. See In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd., 78 B.R. 738 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)(in-
voluntary filing against a joint venture by a joint venture partner challenged by
lessor, claiming that the filing was motivated solely by the desire to avoid the
effect of a state court order terminating the lease); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 B.R.
549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980)(filing collusively arranged by the debtor).
142. To say that good faith is the instrumentality used by the courts to advance the
goals of the bankruptcy process is not to suggest that bankruptcy policy is static
or immutable. Quite the contrary, in fact. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra
note 128, at 962-66.
143. In the English language '%ad" is regarded as the antonym of "good." Therefore,
it is understandable, if not inevitable, that judges in their decisions, perhaps even-
tually tiring of saying "lack of good faith," will refer to the filing as having been
undertaken in "bad faith." See infra note 237 and accompanying text. In a sense
the usage is perfectly correct. After all, "bad" is the opposite of "good," so it is
hard to be altogether critical. Moreover, in some cases the filing will have been in
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the same term, when used and applied in a different context, must
have the same meaning.44
While some courts have pointed to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 as form-
ing a basis for implying a good faith filing requirement,145 several
bankruptcy courts have held that the findings which may support dis-
missal for failure to satisfy the implied good faith filing requirement
do not a fortiori compel the conclusion that sanctions are called for
under Bankruptcy Rule 9011.146 This reinforces the notion that Bank-
subjective bad faith as well as inappropriate for bankruptcy relief. It is unfortu-
nate, nevertheless, that there is not another immediately obvious term to de-
scribe the opposite of good faith ("without faith" or "no faith" which come to
mind only demonstrate the difficulty and perhaps hopelessness of the task).
Thus, forced to work within the limits of language, we must concede the point
and accept that a filing which fails to conform to the implied good faith filing
command is a "bad faith filing." However, just because bad faith as used in this
context may connote one meaning, i.e., lack of conformity with bankruptcy pur-
pose, nothing prevents it from having a narrower meaning in a different context
when policy considerations dictate. See infra note 147.
144. The rejection of a purely unitary theory of doctrine dates back to the Realist
Movement and the works of Karl Llewellyn. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Real-
ism About Realists-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1237,
1240-41 (1931)(describing as a common trait among realist legal thinkers "It]he
belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations into narrower
categories than has been the practice in the past."). See also GRANT GILMoRE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 82-83 (1977)(referring to the technique of treating
the same term or concept differently in different contexts as "narrow issue think-
ing"); WiLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEwELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 97,
137 (1973)(discussing Llewelyn's distrust of abstract legal concepts and his tech-
nique of narrow issue thinking to recognize different functions performed by the
same general concept in different contexts). It also bears noting that the good
faith filing requirement does not directly flow from the body of the Code itself.
Thus, to assign "bad faith" a different meaning under § 303(i)(2) than the mean-
ing ascribed to the same term when it is casually used to refer to filings not com-
plying with the implied good faith standard produces no inconsistency in the
application of Code terms; not that I believe consistency is absolutely mandated
intra-code any more than it is inter-code. See Ponoroff, supra note 19, at 353-64
(suggesting alternative constructions of the term "bona fide dispute" in § 303(b)
and (h)(1)). See also Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992)(ascribing different
meaning to the same phrase when used in different subsections of § 506 of the
code).
145. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 1989)("Rule 9011 nec-
essarily implies that all bankruptcy pleadings, including Chapter 11 petitions,
must be filed in good faith.").
146. See, e.g., In re HBA East, Inc., 101 B.R. 411, 417-18 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)(re-
jecting the contention that the court's finding of bad faith in filing afortio-ri com-
pels the conclusion that Rule 9011 has been violated); In re Park Place Assocs.,
118 B.R. 613, 618 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)(dismissal on bad faith grounds does not in
itself compel imposition of sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011). See also In re
Cedar Falls Hotel Properties Ltd. Partnership, 102 Bankr. 1009, 1017 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1989)(rejecting as inappropriate a per se rule imposing sanctions pursu-
ant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 on the ground that the petition was filed in bad
faith).
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ruptcy Rule 9011 addresses itself to concerns other than filings want-
ing in good faith or purely bad faith filings.147
Given the concurrent existence of an implied good faith filing re-
quirement and mandatory sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 for
filings undertaken without reasonable inquiry into the facts and law,
the question can squarely be raised, what discrete role is left for sec-
tion 303(i)(2)? One view would be that if the involuntary petition is
dismissed for either want of good faith or lack of colorable grounds,
section 303(i)(2) compounds the petitioning creditors' misery by expos-
ing them to the possibility of further chastisement in the form of ac-
tual and even punitive damages. This is in addition, of course, to the
award of costs and fees.148 This is the view which, by incorporating
the standards developed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, several bank-
ruptcy courts have effectively adopted.149 Moreover, to the extent
that improper motive is expanded to encompass uses not sanctioned by
the Bankruptcy Code,150 it is also a view that tacitly adopts a perverse
form of reverse excluder analysis, defining bad faith as conduct which
does not satisfy the standard of good faith required as a condition to
file.151
The principal shortcoming of this view is that it results in a defini-
tion of bad faith which encapsulates conduct undertaken without
either an intent to harm or an objectionable ulterior motive. Such a
scopic interpretation goes beyond even the ambitious aims of the stat-
ute, which are first and foremost to protect debtors from consciously
147. For example, in In re Southern Calif. Sound Sys., Inc. 69 B.R. 893, 901 n.2 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1987), the court observed that the appellation "bad faith filing" when
used in reference to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is probably a "misnomer" since it im-
plies malice, whereas, in most instances, the basis of the violation will have been
invocation of the bankruptcy process for a non-sanctioned purpose.
148. Costs and fees might be imposed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, § 303(i)(1), or
both.
149. See authorities cited supra note 61.
150. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
151. Bad faith conduct becomes, by inference, conduct which has been ruled out as not
good faith. Of course, this is little different than applying excluder analysis and
saying that it is the bad faith which singles the case out for early termination,
and, thus, good faith is simply not bad faith. It is this potential for endless circu-
larity of argument that perhaps leads Burton to question: "doesn't the point be-
come a hot potato that each concept passes to its opposite ad infinitum?"
Burton, More on Good Faith, supra note 110, at 508 n.47. Burton, however, even-
tually falls prey to the same assumption that "not-good faith" means bad faith,
questioning only whether bad faith might have meaning in a way that good faith
does not. Id The point, I believe, is that "not-good faith" has meaning in a way
that bad faith does. not; it is a broader concept, not a synonymous concept. If
necessary because of the limitations of language and grammar, I also see no par-
ticular fault in using the term "bad faith" to refer to the absence of good faith in
some contexts, provided that one is careful to distinguish from one case to the
next and from one context to another. See supra note 143.
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overreaching creditors152 and, only secondarily, to preserve the integ-
rity of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.5 3 In either instance, credi-
tor conduct calling for consideration of damages under section
303(i)(2) should be limited to conduct determined to have been under-
taken with the deliberate and malicious intention of harming the
debtor.I54 Moreover, this determination occurs, if at all, after dismis-
sal of the petition on the merits. Any more expansive application of
the bad faith rule in section 303(i)(2) can only serve to deter creditors
from seeking relief in bankruptcy. While this may cause no harm to
the individual debtor qua debtor, it potentially frustrates the general
bankruptcy objective of equality of distribution among similarly posi-
tioned creditors. Further, in the case of a business debtor, the in ter-
152. The legislative history emphasizes the harm to the debtor which just the filing of
an involuntary bankruptcy petition can cause, and, therefore, the need to provide
compensation through section 303(i) in appropriate circumstances.
Subsection 303(i) provides for costs, attorneys fees, and damages in cer-
tain circumstances. The bonding requirement [of § 303(e)] will discour-
age frivolous petitions as well as spiteful petitions based on a desire to
embarrass the debtor (who may be a competitor of a petitioning creditor)
or to put the debtor out of business without good cause. An involuntary
petition may put a debtor out of business even if it is without foundation
and is later dismissed.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963,
6279; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5819. See also Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1983)(subject to proper proof as to causation, debtor could recover operational
losses as well as expenses upon a showing of bad faith); Salmon v. Sjostedt (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)(by adopting § 303(i) Congress
clearly created a remedy for malicious prosecution in the form of a bad faith fil-
ing of an involuntary petition). Of course, the provision in § 303(i)(2)(B) for puni-
tive damages is aimed at accomplishing other objectives. See Camelot, Inc. v.
Hayden, 30 B.R. 409 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)(punitive damages serve to deter repetitive
conduct, punish the wrongdoer, and deter similar conduct by others).
153. Unquestionably, the two issues are related. A filing undertaken primarily for the
purpose of harassing or putting the debtor out of business is an abuse of the judi-
cial process. However, there is a difference in emphasis and focus. The implied
good faith filing requirement is directed at testing the consistency of the filer's
motivations with bankruptcy purposes. The concern is for misuse of process and
harm to the system at large. Section 303(i)(2), by comparison, is intended to re-
tard the temptation to make malicious use of the involuntary bankruptcy rem-
edy, the mere invocation of which alone holds the potential to cause the debtor
enormous harm. See supra note 152.
154. A filing undertaken with ulterior intent to cause harm to the debtor may well
constitute an abuse of process also, if the claim for relief is colorable on its face.
If, however, the petition is without cause as well, the integrity of the process is
preserved by the system's rejection of the claim for relief on its merits. In that
event, the only interest left to be vindicated is the debtor's interest in being com-
pensated for the direct and consequential losses caused by the petitioner's wrong-
ful conduct. Because dismissal of the petition is a condition precedent to an
action for damages under § 303(i)(2), I submit that it is in this second mode that
§ 303(i)(2) is relevant and that, therefore, bad faith should be conceptualized ac-
cordingly. See infra text accompanying notes 293-295.
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rorem effect of an overly-broad definition of bad faith may be harmful
not only to those creditors who arrive late to the feeding frenzy that
characterizes state grab law, but equally to all the other parties with
an interest in the debtor as a going concern. This may include, among
others, customers, employees, retirees, and the community at large.I55
VI. BAD FAITH AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY: A QUIXOTIC
QUEST FOR GUIDANCE
A. Overview
As earlier discussed, the problems with the current understandings
and applications of the bad faith provision in section 303(i)(2) stem not
155. Philosophically, I subscribe to the view that bankruptcy law, at least in its mod-
em incarnation, has come to affect a broader range of societal interests than debt-
ors and creditors in the traditional sense. See generally Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1987). Post-Reform Act amendments
to the Code to protect the interests of union employees and retirees under Chap-
ter 11 exemplifies this trend. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988)(added to the Code by
§ 541(a) of the 1984 Act to require debtors-in-possession to negotiate modifica-
tions of their labor contracts in good faith before petitioning the court for rejec-
tion); 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988)(added to the Code by § 2 of the Retiree Benefits
Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334,102 Stat. 610). Once reor-
ganization through the bankruptcy forum became an acceptable alternative for
large, publicly-held companies (if not the alternative of choice) it became impossi-
ble to relegate the impact of bankruptcy rules and the scope of bankruptcy policy
to creditors alone. For an illuminating empirical study of large company filings
under the Code, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Compa-
nies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990). The failure of a large commercial enterprise
means loss of jobs on a mass scale, elimination of support for charitable and civic
organizations, and loss of revenue from property and other taxes assessed at the
local or regional level. While the initial negative impact of a Chapter 11 filing on
the community may be no less catastrophic, the prospects for rehabilitation and
eventual return to financial viability through the reorganization process offer
hope to the community. If reorganization is appropriate, but current manage-
ment of the debtor is unwilling for personal, political, or other reasons to seek
relief while the chances for a successful reorganization remain high, it is more
than loss of value for creditors that is threatened. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD.
277, 279 (1991)(for most corporate managers Chapter 11 is something to be
avoided). This reveals, in part, why there is reason to consider expanding stand-
ing to initiate an involuntary case to parties other than claimholders. See infra
notes 201-204 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even if the line remains
drawn at creditors, it is important that at least some group be empowered with
the ability to seize the initiative away from the debtor and its management, and
that the meaningful exercise of this power not be negated by making the cost of
filing too high. Yet, by raising the stakes for prospective petitioning creditors
beyond the level where most players are willing to enter the game, this is pre-
cisely what the courts have done. Thus, there is a price to be paid for a broad




only from the ready propensity of courts to copy the analysis under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011, but also from the expanded definition accorded
to the improper motive aspect of the analysis. That is to say, some
courts, including the district court in Basin Electric,156 have found bad
faith to exist by reference to both an improper purpose and the pur-
suit of a proper purpose in an improper forum.157 From this defini-
tion, other courts have suggested that entry of judgment under section
303(i)(2) may be appropriate if it is determined that the petitioning
creditors are using the involuntary bankruptcy process as a "substitute
for customary collection procedures."5 8
Although I generally support purposive interpretation of positive
legal rules, including in this context, I doubt whether it is sound to
analyze the bad faith question in involuntary cases in relation to the
most basal goals of the bankruptcy system. A more prosaic but
equally important perspective for analysis might focus instead on the
purposes for a bad faith rule in the specific context of involuntary fil-
ings.159 To show why this is so, and to be able to distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate uses of involuntary bankruptcy should
one accept the broad construction of bad faith, it becomes necessary at
this point to examine briefly the purposes of the bankruptcy process.
B. Bankruptcy Policy: Competing Theories
1. Economic Theory
Of late, there has been a renewed scholarly interest in bankruptcy
theory and policy. This has generated an interesting and increasingly
spirited debate about bankruptcy purposes.160 Writing from a mainly
156. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 903 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986).
157. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1989); In re
Tarasi & Tighe, 88 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Johnston Hawks
Limited, 72 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987).
159. One of the reasons for this is that courts have come to rely on their own good
faith filing requirement to test particular filings against evolving bankruptcy pur-
poses. See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, infra notes 181-183
and accompanying text. Therefore, it is not necessary to call on the bad faith
proscription in § 303(i)(2) to pull double duty: determining both the appropriate-
ness of the case for bankruptcy relief, and the propriety of the petitioning credi-
tors' motives for filing. The proliferation of various tests of bad faith is, I believe,
a product of the failure to make this critical distinction. The effect has been to
confuse the question of whether the case should go forward with the very differ-
ent question of whether petitioners in an action previously dismissed should be
held accountable in damages for having improperly invoked the legal process.
See infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
160. The most lively, and perhaps most pointed, example of this on-going discourse
can still be found in Professors Warren and Baird's version of "duelling articles".
Warren, supra note 155; Baird, supra note 127. For an earlier exchange of related
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economics-based perspective on the law, a group of scholars, ably led
by Professor Baird and Dean Jackson, have developed perhaps the
first truly systematic, comprehensive theory of bankruptcy.'16 Baird
and Jackson argue that bankruptcy law exists solely to serve a single
function: to solve the "common pool" problem that occurs when a
debtor's assets are insufficient to satisfy the collective demands of the
creditors who must seek to satisfy their claims from that pool of as-
views directed to the law of secured financing, see Homer Kripke, Law and Eco-
nomics, Measuring the Economic Effiwiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of
Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (1983); Thomas H. Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vac-
uum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
987 (1983).
161. Throughout, I refer to Baird and Jackson in a single breath, perhaps unfairly
ignoring their individual contributions and (particularly of late) even minor
points of difference in emphasis or approach. Still, much of their work has been
collaborative and each acknowledges his general agreement with the other on
major assumptions and views regarding the nature and scope of bankruptcy pol-
icy. See, ag., Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 127, at 815-16 (wherein Baird
refers to the theory of bankruptcy developed jointly by Jackson and him); Vern
Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 713, 826 (1985)(describing the views of Baird as not "substantially dissimilar
from those of Jackson). Their collaborative works include: Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute
Priority Rule (In Honor of Walter J. Blum), 55 U. CM L. REv. 738 (1988); Doug-
las Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper Do-
main, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A
Comment on Adequate protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm.
L. REV. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Diverse Ownership Interests];
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bank-
ruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984). Also deserving of mention for his contribu-
tions to the field is Professor Eisenberg. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy
Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953 (1981).
Jackson's thinking about bankruptcy policy is reflected in his book THE LOGIC
AND L mrs OF BANKRUPTCY POLICY (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND
LIZrs] which is a distillation of much of his earlier work on bankruptcy. For an
even more recent work, and a slight deviation from course, see Thomas H. Jack-
son & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989)[hereinafter Jack-
son & Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy], expanding on the creditors' bargain
model developed earlier by Jackson as a heuristic device for allegorizing the
bankruptcy process in its idealized form and criticizing provisions of current
bankruptcy law which fail to conform to the model. See generally Thomas H.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson, Creditors'Bargain]. See also infra
note 195 and accompanying text. Baird develops a similar bargain metaphor of
bankruptcy in Douglas G. Baird, A World Without bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMp. PRows. 173 (1987). Baird's other individual works include: Douglas G.
Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorgan-




sets.162 For Baird and Jackson, the business of the bankruptcy system
is limited to efficient debt collection in the face of a common pool
problem and it is against this distinct purpose that the current provi-
sions of substantive bankruptcy law are to be judged.'6 3 They view
bankruptcy as creating the conditions under which the self-interested
impulses of individual creditors, which if left uncontrolled would
place them in costly competition with one another for limited re-
sources, can be forcibly channeled into a coordinated and orderly liqui-
dation of the debtor's assets.'64 Of course, such a liquidation can
usually be counted on to also bring the highest and best price for those
assets.165 Thus, when operating properly, the bankruptcy system
functions to maximize asset values. As a consequence, bankruptcy in-
creases overall economic outcomes for the pool claimants as a group.
As can be seen, for Baird and Jackson, bankruptcy can be ex-
plained as a mechanism for collectivizing the decisions regarding the
deployment of the debtor's assets so that it can be said, in contrast to
162. The common pool problem is described in JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra
note 161, at 10-19. See also Jackson, Creditors'Bargain, supra note 161, at 864 n.
34, wherein Jackson analogizes the bankruptcy process to a form of statutory
unitization arrangement among numerous owners with drilling rights in the
same oil reservoir.
163. The "first principle" of bankruptcy, Jackson informs us, is to serve as a debt col-
lection device targeted to the common pool problem. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIM-
rrs, supra note 161, at 2. Judged by this single-minded explanation of proper
bankruptcy purpose, Baird and Jackson find lacking much of the bankruptcy law
as now codified. For example, Jackson's normative view of bankruptcy law has
caused him to question whether there is any independent justification for the
corporate reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code now embodied in
Chapter 11. 1&. at 209-224. See also Baird, Corporate Reorganization, supra note
161, at 138-47. Baird suggests that the premise underlying Chapter 11 may be
unsound and that going concern sales of assets can be accomplished under the
existing structure of Chapter 7. The principal benefit of reorganization proceed-
ings can thereby be obtained without suffering the concomitant delay, expense,
and possibilities for error in valuation inherent in Chapter 11. Id. In a more
recent work, however, Baird appears to recognize that in the case of closely held
firms bankruptcy does not solve a collective action problem as much as enforce
the condition for negotiation between the debtor and its principal senior lender.
Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STuD. 311 (1991).
164. See id. at 131 ("Bankruptcy law prevents a costly and destructive race to the
firm's assets according to the priority scheme that the parties agreed would be
used in the event that such a day of reckoning should come about.")(citation
omitted). See also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 39-43 (2d ed. 1990)(describing the need to solve
the common pool problem as the justification for bankruptcy).
165. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 161, at 22-23 (explaining how by forc-
ing multiple claimants to behave in the same manner as a sole owner of assets,
Bankruptcy ensures that those assets will be put to the use or uses which maxi-
mizes economic return). See also Baird & Jackson, Diverse Ownership Interests,
supra note 161, at 104-09 (bankruptcy creates the conditions under which the best
use of the common pool can be identified and exploited).
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the wasteful results produced by the first-come-first-served approach
of state collection schemes, that the assets of the common pool were
deployed with optimal efficiency.166 The goal is to increase the wealth
of the creditor body by increasing the aggregate value of the pool
available for distribution.1 67 It is not as if nothing else matters neces-
sarily, it is just that those other things are not the concern of the bank-
ruptcy law.'66 This requires that bankruptcy rules be relegated to the
realm of procedure. Any reordering of substantive state law entitle-
ments would create incentives for those parties advantaged by a differ-
ent distributional rule in bankruptcy to make strategic use of the
bankruptcy process and sub-optimal deployment decisions. 69
166. This is, according to Jackson, the principal role of bankruptcy law. JACKSON,
LOGIC AND LmIrrs, supra note 161, at 3,13. See also Thomas H. Jackson, Translat-
ing Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 74-75
(1985) (bankruptcy law exists to forestall the suboptimal outcomes likely to occur
whenever insolvency coexists with diverse ownership); Jackson & Scott, supra
note 161, at 158-60 (bankruptcy law implements the general objective of maximiz-
ing group welfare by regulating the conflicts among different groups having sepa-
rate claims against the debtor's assets and income).
167. In almost utilitarian fashion, the good of the one is subsumed to the interests of
the group as a whole. Yet, the increase in value derived from the optimal deploy-
ment of the aggregate pool of assets should mean an increase in the wealth of the
group without a corresponding decrease in the wealth of individual members. In
actuality this is not true, of course, since the diligent (or just lucky) creditors who
would have been first to arrive at the state law feeding trough are likely to fare
worse in bankruptcy than if left to their own devices. However, if one envisions
an ez ante bargain among creditors where a value must be placed on the risk of
arriving late, then theoretically all creditors are better off. This is the basic
premise of Jackson's creditors' bargain model. See supra note 161.
168. See eg., Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 127, at 824. ("I would reject as gro-
tesque any set of rules that used heartless notions of economic efficiency as the
sole standard by which to measure the rights of these people [retirees]. But I do
not think any of this has much to do with a normative discussion about bank-
ruptcy policy").
169. The notion that bankruptcy law should concern itself with the asset deployment
question and not the distributional question is central to Baird and Jackson's the-
ory of bankruptcy as originally developed. They insist that priorities and entitle-
ments in bankruptcy must parallel priorities and entitlements under state law.
This follows from the belief that maximization of asset values delimits the scope
of bankruptcy policy. Were bankruptcy law to reorder state law entitlements the
process would become the target of strategic filings aimed at capitalizing on redis-
tributive advantages in bankruptcy. This interferes with bankruptcy's historic
function as a superior and more efficient debt collection device, since there is no
guarantee that a filing initiated by a creditor interested only in maximizing his
own "take" is in the interest of the creditor group as a whole. Thus, Baird and
Jackson maintain that bankruptcy law should alter substantive non-bankruptcy
rules of entitlement only when to do so preserves value in the aggregate pool of
assets for the benefit of all persons who have rights in those assets. See Baird &
Jackson, Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 161, at 100-01. See also, JACK-
SON, LOGIC AND Lm=srs, supra note 161, at 21-27 (establishment of new entitle-
ments conflicts with the collectivization goal); Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of
Bankruptcy, supra note 161, at 156 n.2, wherein the authors, in describing the
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In sum, according to the economic explanation, the sole function of
bankruptcy law is debt collection; the object is to do so in a manner
designed to maximize the value of the pool of assets from which col-
lection may be had; value is increased by reducing the costs of collec-
tion; and costs are reduced and efficient deployment is achieved by
collectivizing the deployment decision. If all of this occurs, Jackson's
hypothetical creditors' bargain is implemented in fact.17 0 It is against
the backdrop of this normative account of bankruptcy purpose that
basic premise of Jackson's original model, state that to ensure that distributional
concerns do not interfere with the central goal of collectivizing the deployment of
assets, distinctions in the treatment of individual claimants under state and fed-
eral law must be minimized. However, because he was influenced by Scott's
"common disaster" explanation for some business failures, Jackson temporizes
the rigidity of his view that optimal deployment of assets demands preservation
of pre-bankruptcy entitlements in most instances. See infrma note 170. Baird, in
turn, emphasizes the costs associated with the forum shopping, which results
from the availability of multiple avenues of enforcement in which different sub-
stantive rules apply. Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 127, at 824-28.
170. An amalgam of finance and game theories, the creditors' bargain model was origi-
nally developed by Jackson in Creditors'Bargain, supra note 161. Jackson uses
the concept of a hypothetical agreement among creditors for two purposes. First,
to explain how a properly constructed law of bankruptcy implements the central
normative function of optimizing group welfare, and also as a paradigmatic ideal
against which existing bankruptcy law rules can be tested to determine the de-
gree to which they emulate the bargain and, therefore, advance Jacksons "first
principle" of bankruptcy. See supra note 163. By assuming an agreement among
creditors in advance of any default, insolvency or individual action against the
debtor, the creditors' bargain model purports to explain how rational, self-inter-
ested creditors might agree to act in concert to ensure the largest aggregate recov-
ery from the common pool. Naturally, it depends on leaving existing state law
rights and priorities undisturbed. Otherwise, the incentive to enter into a collec-
tivizing agreement could be undermined by creditors' reluctance to subject them-
selves to a system where their existing state law entitlement might be accorded a
lesser status. Of course, the model can only exist in hypothesis since it is unlikely
that circumstances might ever align themselves to provide the occasion for credi-
tors to bargain in fact over liquidation of the common pool. See JACKSON, LOGIC
AND LIMITS, supra note 161, at 15. Moreover, the model assumes that creditors
are by and large fungible insofar as temperament, disposition to bargain, collec-
tion effectiveness, and risk assessment are concerned. Professor Carlson has
pointed out with some conviction the unrealistic nature of this assumption.
David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH L. REV. 1341, 1349
(1987)(reviewing JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 161).
In Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy, supra note 161, Jackson
softens his view somewhat as to whether it is appropriate for bankruptcy to have
separate distributional goals. He does so apparently in the face of persistent and
undeniable redistributional impulses at work in bankruptcy. I&r at 163. Drawing
on Scott's conceptual model of business failures caused by common risks, as con-
trasted with risks that can be controlled by individual creditors, the authors ex-
pand the original bargain model by including distributional as well as
maximization goals within its ambit. Specifically, they suggest that all partici-
pants would agree in the ex ante bargain to share the risks of business failure
attributable to certain "common disasters" in order to minimize the overall risk
of actual insolvency. By adding a common disaster element to the bargain model,
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the economic theorists would interpret and apply existing bankruptcy
doctrine.171
2. Alternative Explanations for the Role of Bankruptcy
Baird and Jackson's economic theory has its share of critics. Some
commentators have challenged Baird and Jackson's economic analysis
on its own terms. 7 2 The more serious criticism, however, takes ex-
ception to the core assumption of economic theory that the sole pur-
pose of bankruptcy is efficient debt collection in response to a common
pool problem.173 For example, in direct rejoinder to the economic ex-
the authors conclude that the model better explains the various distributional
effects commonly observed in bankruptcy. Id. at 157, 173-74.
171. As a heuristic model for modern bankruptcy law, the creditors' bargain explana-
tion would seem to leave something to be desired. See infra note 195 and accom-
panying text. In fairness, however, the economic account of bankruptcy clearly
started out as a strictly normative theory of bankruptcy. See Baird & Jackson,
Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 161, at 99-100 ("[W]e suggest that bank-
ruptcy law at its core should be designed to keep individual actions against assets
... from interfering with the use of those assets favored by investors as a
group."). Nevertheless, more recently, Jackson seems to have shifted gears from
the prescriptive to the descriptive. In Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 161, at 158 n.5, the authors state that their objective is to "en-
hance the explanatory power of the original model," albeit for the purpose of a
providing a richer normative theory. This apparent contradiction is discussed in
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, at 964 n. 148. See also Theodore Eisen-
berg, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy". Bankruptcy and Bargain-
ing, 75 VA. L. Rnv. 205, 206-08 (1989)(generally praising Jackson's and Scott's
contribution to difficult questions of bankruptcy theory, but also pointing out
that, ultimately, "hypothetical bargains struck by hypothetical actors cannot
hope to capture the full range of human interaction").
172. See, ag., James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of failure, 88 MIcH. L. REV.
2097, 2108-13, 2143-45 (1990), wherein the author questions certain basic assump-
tions underlying Baird and Jackson's justification for a collective debt collection
process, and suggests that leaving control of the distribution of the debtor's assets
to the debtor may, in fact, be more likely to produce more efficient distribution
than collectivized debt collection. See also Theodore Eisenberg, supra note 161;
Theodore Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itsef, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 1519 (1987)(reviewing JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS supra note 161)(gener-
ally praising the contribution to the field made by Jackson's theory, but caution-
ing of a possible overemphasis on preserving state law rights and a corresponding
failure to adequately place bankruptcy law within the larger social and commer-
cial contexts). For an example of a important study which examines one aspect
of bankruptcy law - preferences - from the larger perspective of the historical
development of the commercial law, see Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality,
the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1986).
173. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 170 (questioning Jackson's philosophical and meth-
odological assumptions); Countryman, supra note 161, at 823-27 (describing the
law and economics approach to preference law as "unhelpful"); LoPucki & Whit-
ford, supra note 155, at 179-82 (Baird's view of strict adherence to the absolute
priority rule in bankruptcy does not accurately describe the distibutional patterns
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planation of bankruptcy, Professor Warren, in her now-famous debate
with Baird,174 describes her initial point of departure as stemming
from a fundamentally different view of the purpose served by the
bankruptcy law.175 While ultimately advancing an alternative policy
justification for a bankruptcy law and system, Warren acknowledges
that debt collectivizing is a useful way of examining some bankruptcy
problems.176 She argues, however, that at its core, bankruptcy oper-
ates to sift through and parcel out the consequences of multiple de-
faults occasioned by the debtor's imminent financial collapse.177 Thus,
unlike the drama played out in individual debtor-creditor disputes
under state law, bankruptcy law addresses the wide range of interests
that are likely to be affected by the economic desiccation of a debtor
enterprise, including those not cognizable under state law such as fu-
ture tort claimants. 7 8 To fairly allocate the losses resulting from firm
failure among the many victims of that failure, bankruptcy cannot,
according to Warren, be indifferent to distributional considerations.179
in actual cases); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Values: A Ju-
risprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991)(discussed infra notes
185-193 and accompanying text); Ray Warner, Book Review, 20 URB. LAWYER 489,
493 (1988)(reviewing JACKSON, LoGIc AND LITmIs, supra note 161)(accusing Jack-
son of internal inconsistencies); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis
of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227,251 n. 14 (1989)(criticizing Jackson's
preoccupation with state law results for interfering with his analysis of the prob-
lem of executory contracts in bankruptcy).
174. Warren, supra note 155; Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 127. Just as much of
Baird's work has been co-authored with Jackson, Warren's view of Bankruptcy is
the product of collaborative work done with Professor Westbrook, a fact Warren
readily acknowledges. Warren, supra note 155, at 776 n.2.
175. Warren contends that while Baird "has developed a coherent, unified view of
bankruptcy that revolves around a single economic construct," her own view of
bankruptcy encompasses a number of competing and sometimes conflicting val-
ues no one of which is dominant by definition. Warren, supra note 155, at 777.
176. Id. at 800. Warren specifically acknowledges the utility of collectivism in explain-
ing why, upon the debtor's financial collapse, the bankruptcy system is a superior,
lower-cost alternative to individual state law collection actions.
177. Id at 781, 785-89. In direct contrast with Baird, Warren emphasizes the distribu-
tional goals of the bankruptcy system separate and distinct from state law. Baird
refers to Warren's approach to bankruptcy policy as a "traditional view". Baird,
Loss Distribution, supra note 127, at 816. Use of that term is somewhat ironic
given Baird and Jackson's elevation of bankruptcy's historic or so-called "original
function" - collectivized debt collection - to the dominant if not sole concern of
the bankruptcy law. JACKSON, LOGic AND LImrrs supra note 161, at 5.
178. See Warren, supra note 155, at 786 (contrasting the distributional design of the
Bankruptcy Code with the more simple distributional scheme imposed under
state law). Warren continues that "the state law system is not well-suited to...
[the] circumstances [of a debtor's collapse] .. .because it necessarily must con-
sider too broad a range of possible debtor-creditor relationships and follow collec-
tion principles inconsistent with those raised in the circumstances of complete
collapse." Id at 783.
179. See id. at 790-93, for a partial list of features which Warren offers as useful in
establishing distributional priorities in bankruptcy.
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This necessarily causes Warren to reject on normative grounds any
explanation of bankruptcy that is driven exclusively by pursuit of a
single value, be it economic rationality or, presumably, anything
else.180
Building on this notion of bankruptcy as an integrated system for
distributing the consequences of firm failure among a diverse group of
actors, Professor Knippenberg and I have urged the traditional view a
step further by suggesting that the purposes of bankruptcy are not
only several and varied, but that they are also in a continuous state of
change.18 1 This perspective rejects as unrealistic the presence of a
"formally elegant, unified system" of bankruptcy. Instead, it postu-
lates that the contours of bankruptcy policy, particularly in relation to
bankruptcy reorganizations, are defined and evolve functionally in
measured response to the open-ended purposes which the bankruptcy
process must answer to at any given time.18 2 Thus, we describe the
modern role of bankruptcy as entailing more than debt collection in
the narrow sense. We see bankruptcy as having developed into a prob-
lem-solving institution; one to which large commercial interests are
increasingly turning to seek solutions to social and economic problems
that are not adequately addressed elsewhere. 8 3
Also owing a debt to Warren and perhaps the realist tradition as
well,18 4 Professor Korobkin has offered a thought-provoking response
to Baird's challengeS5 to provide an alternative account of why a dis-
tinct bankruptcy law exists at all.186 After detailing what he perceives
to be the failings of the economic account of the distinctness of bank-
180. IcL at 778. While Warren accuses Baird of inconsistency in his theoretical position
(id. at 803), she admits the absence of any single, unified theory to explain her
own views of bankruptcy. Id at 811-12.
181. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, at 962-966.
182. I at 961-62.
183. Id. at 963, 968.
184. See infra note 190.
185. Baird's challenge is contained in Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 127, at 824:
'"The challenge facing anyone who wants to write about bankruptcy policy is to
explain why a distinct bankruptcy law exists at all."
186. Korobkin, supra note 173. In this work, the author notes that Baird's challenge
can be read as invoking two questions: what values should bankruptcy law pro-
mote and why should there be a distinct system of bankruptcy at all? After dis-
tinguishing between the two questions, Korobkin concludes that it is the second
question to which a response is in order. I&. at 720 n. 11. He perceives Warren's
work, and the work of most others who have quibbled with economic theory, as
addressing only the first question. Id. While it is not entirely clear to me that the
two issues are truly separable from one another, recognition that the search for
bankruptcy purposes may proceed apart from the development of a justification
for bankruptcy as a distinct legal institution is an important insight. That such a
justification must be advanced and defended by anyone who wants to write about
the subject, however, is another thing altogether.
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ruptcy,18 7 Korobkin holds out in its stead what he terms a "value-
based account" of bankruptcy. Unlike the economic account, this ex-
planation ambitiously attempts to address the moral, political, per-
sonal, and social aspects and consequences of financial distress. 188
Korobkin maintains that the debtor, particularly in the reorganization
context, should not be considered as merely a pool of assets to be man-
aged with a view toward obtaining the highest net return.18 9 Rather,
he sees the bankruptcy estate "as an evolving and dynamic enterprise,
capable of having diverse aims." 190 The bankruptcy system is unique
among legal systems by providing the forum where these diverse aims
and values of the participants in financial distress can be debated and
eventually synthesized into a coherent view of what it is that the reha-
bilitated enterprise shall exist to do in the future.191 In contrast to
187. 1I at 732-39. In particular, Korobkin is dismayed by the economic account's re-
jection of the Code's provisions for corporate reorganizations (11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1174 (1988)) as inconsistent with the normative central principle of maximing
the overall economic return from the common pool. Id at 740-44. He concludes
that: "In reality, the economic account demonstrates only that its own economic
model is incapable of recognizing noneconomic values essential to a vindicating
explanation of corporate reorganization." Mr at 740. For Korobkin, a "vindicat-
ing explanation" is one that contributes to justifying what it explains, as con-
trasted with an "undermining explanation" which, as the name suggests, does
just the opposite. Id at 722.
188. Id at 761-772. Korobkin's conceptualization of bankruptcy as facilitating expres-
sion and recognition of diverse values bears some striking similarities to Warren
who earlier stated: "I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor's
multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different
actors." Warren, supra note 155, at 777. On the other hand, Korobkin distin-
guishes his views from Warren's based upon differing concepts of the bankruptcy
estate. See infra note 190.
189. Korobkin, supra note 173, at 769 ("Viewing the estate solely as an economic ob-
ject excludes the dynamic character of the estate as it functions in bankruptcy
discourse.").
190. 1& at 722, 768-74. Korobkin claims that once the estate is viewed as a dynamic
and evolving enterprise, the fundamental question for bankruptcy discourse
shifts from "what to do with the estate," to "what the estate shall exist to do," a
much more complex and involved inquiry. Id at 772. Of course, this view has
relevance primarily in the context of reorganization proceedings, and it is over
the concept of rehabilitation in bankruptcy that Korobkin has his sharpest disa-
greement with the economic account. Id at 772-74. Korobkin views bankruptcy
rules as being addressed to the array of choices faced by the participants of the
debtor enterprise in attempting to ameliorate the chaos of financial distress. This
suggests a jurisprudence of bankruptcy that shares many of the common assump-
tions underlying realist legal thought. See KARL NICKERSON LLEWELLYN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE; REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE; 55-60 (1962).
191. Korobkin, supra note 173, at 774. One is tempted to say that perhaps the differ-
ence between this view and that of the economic theorists is that in the former
case negotiation and agreement occurs ex post financial collapse, whereas in the
latter the bargain is struck ex ante. Of course, the effect of that seemingly minor
distinction has enormous consequence for the substance of bankruptcy rules, as
does the determination of who is extended an invitation to the bargaining table.
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Jackson, who analogizes a bankruptcy reorganization to'a "sale" of as-
sets not particularly different in method or purpose than a liquida-
tion,192 Korobkin points to the development of the law of corporate
reorganizations in modem bankruptcy as a basis for arguing that the
better metaphor is one that recognizes the dynamic potential of the
troubled but still viable debtor enterprise.193
C. The Relationship Between Bankruptcy Policy, Involuntary
Bankruptcy and Bad Faith
1. The Limits of Economic Analysis
The role of bankruptcy as a mandatory system for coordinating the
collection efforts of multiple creditors where the well is simply not
deep enough to quench the thirst of all who are entitled to draw a
drink from it can hardly be questioned. Along with the "fresh start"
policy, most routine consumer bankruptcies are wholly explicable in
these terms.194 However, that debt collectivizing to maximize effi-
cient asset deployment is the oldest and perhaps still most frequently
invoked function of bankruptcy does not automatically justify raising
it to the level of a normative central premise. Moreover, if intended as
a descriptive model, the explanatory prowess of the model is rather
limited.19 5
Notwithstanding these perceived limitations, if one accepts the eco-
192. JACKSON, LoGic AND LIMs, supra note 161, at 210-13.
193. Korobkin, supra note 173, at 755 ('"The central metaphor is not the sale of the
pool, but the reinvention of the enterprise.").
194. Make no mistake, this includes a goodly number of cases. For the fiscal year
ended June 30, 1990, only 64,688 (8.92%) of the 725,484 total bankruptcy filings
were business cases. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF
THE DIREcrOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Table F2, 240
(1990). On the other hand, the increased role and importance of bankruptcy law
since 1979 as a tool of business planning and a tactic in business litigation can
hardly be denied or ignored. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bank-
ruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflections on Some Recent
Cases, 71 IowA L. REv. 199 (1985). For a revealing empirical study of the experi-
ence of large publicly held companies under Chapter 11 of the Code, see LoPucki
and Whitford, supra note 155.
195. The debt collectivizing explanation of bankruptcy cannot, for example, easily jus-
tify the provisions for corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Code or
the extraordinary powers given to the trustee in bankruptcy to upset various pre-
bankruptcy transfers. Equally, the Supreme Court's decision in United Say. As-
soc. of Tx. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1987), is an explicit
rejection of Baird and Jackson's position that bankruptcy policy demands that
secured creditors not be denied lost opportunity costs. Jackson has seemingly
come to recognize these limitations in the explanatory power of the model and, in
collaboration with Professor Scott, has responded by expanding the original cred-
itors' bargain model in order to incorporate those redistributional concerns in
bankruptcy law which seem to be here to stay. Jackson & Scott, supra note 161.
See also supra note 169.
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nomic explanation of bankruptcy policy and desires to interpret the
bad faith injunction of section 303(i)(2) according to its precepts, the
equation becomes an alluringly easy one. If the court determines that
the petitioning creditors invoked the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in
response to a problem other than a common pool problem, they have
acted in bad faith. Does such a construction make sense? I do not
believe even Baird and Jackson would go so far, although they pre-
sumably would agree that the filing was not undertaken in good
faith.196 First, to define bad faith for section 303(i)(2) purposes in
terms of whether a common pool problem existed at the time of filing
would belie the language of the statute as written.197 Second, and
equally troubling, the inability to force a proceeding in advance of bal-
ance sheet insolvency would effectively mark a return to the unhappy
state of affairs that existed under the Bankruptcy Act.'9 8 Third, this
approach arguably would divorce bad faith almost entirely from con-
siderations of subjective motivation.199 Although the difficulties asso-
ciated with proving subjective motive are perhaps no less formidable
than the burden of establishing the existence of a common pool prob-
lem,20 0 to allow a definition of bad faith broad enough to capture even
196. See JACKSON, LOGIc AND LamITS, supra note 161, at 196 ("Good faith is simply a
label for those cases in which a bankruptcy proceeding is appropriate."). See also
Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr., Note, Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Code.-
Treating the Symptom, Not the Cause, 52 U. CHi L. REv. 795 (1985)(contending
that full recognition of state law entitlements would eliminate many good faith
challenges).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)(1988) adopts an equity insolvency test for determining when
an order for relief may enter involuntarily. Thus, under the statute, a debtor that
is balance sheet solvent (i.e., no common pool), may still be forced into bank-
ruptcy. See generally SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 6, at § 5.07[2][a].
198. See BANKRUPTCY COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 188-89 (describing the ne-
cessity under the Act of having to prove insolvency in the bankruptcy (balance
sheet) sense as one of the stumbling blocks to an effective process of involuntary
bankruptcy); MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 7, at 55 (People commonly lose their
credit standing by failure to pay their debts. The commercial world has little
time or inclination to argue about valuations shown on a balance sheet and, in
most instances, the sort of evidence adduced upon the trial of an issue of insol-
vency when a debtor resists adjudication in bankruptcy is not available.) (citation
omitted).
199. I believe bad faith naturally connotes bad motive or malicious intent. See infra
note 252. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that linking bad faith to a com-
mon pool problem eliminates motive as a consideration in the analysis. Neverthe-
less, when bad faith is conceived in terms of lack of conformity with fundamental
bankruptcy purpose, which most of us seem to agree is the test of good faith in
filing, there is a natural tendency to let the appropriateness of the case for bank-
ruptcy relief resolve definitively the question of bad faith. This is dangerous, I
submit, because whether or not a case is proper for bankruptcy is only casually
and fortuitously related to whether or not the case was filed in subjective bad
faith. See infra text accompanying notes 216-230.
200. For discussion of the difficulties associated with proving subjective intention, and
the necessity of reasoning by inference from objective conduct, see Carolin Corp.
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the fellow who acts with a good heart and an empty head seems intui-
tively unjust.
2. The Consequences and Limits of the Alternative Explanations
Greater appreciation for what has been offered as an expanded role
of bankruptcy in modern commercial life could have significant impli-
cations for the law of involuntary bankruptcy generally, as well as for
the particular question of when petitioning creditors might be re-
garded as having acted in bad faith. For example, under present law,
an involuntary petition can only be filed by creditors of the alleged
debtor who meet the standing requirements set forth in section
303(b).201 In the case of an involuntary liquidation this seems a sensi-
ble place to draw the line. It is also quite reasonable to limit standing
to creditors if one accepts Jackson's view of a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion as simply a hybrid form of sale.202 However, if bankruptcy pur-
poses, particularly in the context of large reorganizations, are more
numerous and multifaceted than efficient debt collection, then there
is no more logical reason to restrict access to the machinery of invol-
untary bankruptcy to creditors than there is to restrict bankruptcy to
the common pool problem.203 Theoretically, anyone with a direct and
v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1989). The practical and technical difficulties
of proving balance sheet insolvency have already been mentioned. See supra note
198. See also Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, at 935 n.53. In addition to
complex issues of valuation, often the relevant information necessary to establish
insolvency is uniquely known to the party whose conduct is in question. Measur-
ing bad faith under § 303(i)(2) by reference to the existence of a common pool
problem would, therefore, give the debtor a decided advantage.
201. Specifically, the petitioning creditors must be the holders of non-contingent
claims against the debtor which are not the subject of bona fide dispute and the
aggregate value of which is $5,000 more than the value of any property given to
secure such claims. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)-(2)(1988). An involuntary petition may
also be filed by one, more, but less than all of the partners of a general partner-
ship, as well as by the foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding
regarding the alleged debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(3)-(4)(1988).
202. Jackson imagines that the only difference between a reorganization and a liquida-
tion is that in a reorganization the firm's assets are sold to the creditors them-
selves rather than to a third party. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LamITs, supra note 161,
at 211. If this is correct, and bankruptcy has no role in solving the broader conse-
quences of business failure, then there is no reason to extend standing beyond the
traditional definition of a creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5),(10)(Supp. 1 1990). For
a more complex view of the role of Chapter 11 from the law and economics per-
spective, see Baird & Picker, supra note 163 (proposing that in the case of the
closely held firm, bankruptcy rules function to enforce the bargain between the
debtor and usually one dominant senior lender, and to ensure that this agreement
does not compromise the rights of third parties).
203. There are any number of practical reasons for limiting standing to initiate an
involuntary case to creditors, ranging from bankruptcy's historic role as a debt
collection process to concerns over opening the floodgates to a rash of disruptive
and costly lawsuits over whether sufficient grounds for involuntary relief exist.
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continuing interest in the future of the debtor enterprise might ration-
ally be granted standing to file an involuntary case when the viability
of the debtor enterprise is threatened.204
While acceptance of the alternative explanations or accounts of
bankruptcy could thus signal profound changes in the substantive law
of involuntary bankruptcy, regrettably they offer no more workable
foundation for analyzing and developing standards to judge bad faith
under section 303(i)(2) than does economic theory.205 If one continues
Similar concerns have been offered for limiting, for example, the scope of share-
holder rights to inspect corporate records. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPO-
RATE LAw, 96-105 (1986). Moreover, according the holders of equity interests in a
corporate entity the power to compel a bankruptcy proceeding would run con-
trary to the basic principle of separation of ownership and management central to
the operation of the corporation under state law.
On the other hand, it is particularly in the case of corporate debtors that an
expansion of the standing rules is most easily justified. It is more than just credi-
tors that are prejudiced by an existing management's reluctance, often for per-
sonal reasons, to seek shelter in Chapter 11 while there is still hope to save the
debtor. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 155 for an economic analysis of the effec-
tiveness of corporate managers as representatives of owners in a bankruptcy sce-
nario. Arguably, the rule of absolute priority in Chapter 11 makes it more
imperative to equity interest holders than creditors that a proceeding be initiated
earlier rather than later or not at all. It is also difficult to justify a principled
distinction for § 303(b) purposes between debenture holders and preferred stock
interests. In the final analysis, any reconsideration of the standing limitations for
involuntary bankruptcy must take the form of a careful, detailed proposal for
statutory reform, taking into account the impact of any such proposals on both
the operation of other Code provisions and the administration of the bankruptcy
system. All in all, a daunting but intriguing task, and one clearly beyond the
scope of the present work.
204. See supra note 203. At least one commentator has recognized that the circum-
stances warranting involuntary bankruptcy may be different when reorganiza-
tion would yield more than liquidation. McCoid, supra note 24. Likewise, the
rules regarding standing might differ depending on whether the petitioners
sought relief under Chapter 7 or 11. However, because of the natural tendency
such a distinction would create for non-creditor petitioners to file under Chapter
11 regardless of the prospects for rehabilitation, coupled with the complexities of
a reorganization as contrasted with liquidation, any such proposal might also have
to include a threshold requirement that the petitioners make some showing of
the debtor's ability to successfully reorganize as an additional condition to entry
of an order for relief. Cf. In re Amburgey, 68 B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1987)("The Court has difficulty coercing compliance with the provisions of Chap-
ter 11 from debtors who have sought relief ... voluntarily. This Court shudders
to contemplate the difficulty it would encounter with a reluctant Chapter 11
debtor.").
205. Conversely, the acceptance of one theory of bankruptcy over another carries
enormous implications for defining the contours of a good faith filing require-
ment. Compare JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 161, at 195 (good faith is
an indirect means of screening cases which were filed for purposes other than
solving a common pool problem) with Ponoroff and Knippenberg, supra note 128,
at 971-73 (good faith serves as the instrumentality which bankruptcy courts have
adopted to control the evolution of bankruptcy purposes and policy).
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to subscribe to the theory that a bad faith filing for section 303(i)(2)
purposes is a filing that is inconsistent with bankruptcy purposes, the
fact that those purposes are manifold and changeable, rather than
amenable to a simple litmus paper test, certainly makes it no easier to
detect and describe bad faith. Furthermore, even a case irrefutably
out of place in the bankruptcy forum, for example, a case involving
only a single, minor default adequately addressed by state collection
procedures, does not inescapably establish the presence of bad faith.2 06
This is due to the fact that the appropriateness of a case for bank-
ruptcy relief is relevant only circumstantially to the question of bad
faith. Accordingly, such cases may serve as examples of bad faith, but
they can offer no comprehensive explanation for the proper role
played by a bad faith interdiction in the law of involuntary bank-
ruptcy. That is to say, having an unclouded view of bankruptcy policy
is a necessary but not alone sufficient basis for formulating effective
standards for applying the bad faith provision in involuntary cases.
This point, which is pivotal in the argument to follow, is best illus-
trated by calling attention directly to the conditions and events that
create the justification for involuntary bankruptcy.
VII. THE OCCASION FOR INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
Recognizing a more complex and elaborate role for bankruptcy
than debt collection alone admittedly entails increased risk of impru-
dent or spurious filings, voluntary as well as involuntary. It is tempt-
ing but ultimately fallacious, however, to presuppose that the bad
faith provision in section 303(i) is the primary vehicle to control that
risk in involuntary cases. In the final analysis, control must be estab-
lished by carefully circumscribing the conditions justifying a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, particularly when the proceeding is initiated
without the debtor's assent. Mindful of, but plainly not resistant to
peering beyond, the orthodox debt collection function of bankruptcy,
Professor McCoid has attempted to do just that by examining what he
terms the occasion for involuntary bankruptcy.207 His analysis, pre-
206. This is not to suggest by any means that all single-default situations are inappro-
priate for bankruptcy. See, ag., In re Cordova, 34 B.R. 70, 71-72 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1983)(where business could be sold more efficiently in bankruptcy, single creditor
involuntary case was not improper); In re 7H Land & Cattle Co., 6 B.R. 29, 32-33
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1980)(a single creditor may get relief if a special need for bank-
ruptcy can be shown).
207. McCoid, supra note 24. In determining when involuntary bankruptcy is appropri-
ate, McCoid begins with the proposition that "from a theoretical perspective, it is
well to consider the essence of bankruptcy." Id at 213. He then refers to Profes-
sor Radin's classic description of bankruptcy as a" 'method by which all the cred-
itors were compelled to accept some arrangement or some disposition of their
claims against the bankrupt's property, whether they all agreed to it or not'." Id
(citing Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1940)).
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cisely because of its insightfulness, provides a useful opportunity to
illustrate what I consider to be the inexpedience of an approach that
conceives of the bad faith proscription as performing this function.
After a thorough review of the history of involuntary bankruptcy
in the United States, McCoid decides that the time for involuntary
bankruptcy occurs when bankruptcy's essential purpose, settlement of
claims between debtor and creditor and among creditors, requires the
mandatory joinder of all parties in a single proceeding.208 Reasoning
by analogy, he observes that mandatory joinder is required when the
conditions enumerated in Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are satisfied.209 McCoid concludes that those conditions are satis-
fied when the debtor is balance sheet insolvent, since that is the point
at which a fair and ratable distribution of the debtor's assets is
threatened.210
Under section 303, however, petitioning creditors are entitled to an
order for relief when the debtor is shown to be insolvent in the equity
sense of generally not paying current obligations as they become
due.211 Since the path from equity insolvency to balance sheet insol-
vency is neither inexorable nor inevitable, McCoid concludes that a
demonstration of balance sheet solvency ought to be a defense for a
consumer debtor faced with an involuntary Chapter 7 petition.212
208. McCoid, supra note 24, at 214.
209. Joinder is required under FED. R. Civ. P. 19 when: 1) the court is unable to pro-
vide complete relief to those already parties; 2) the interests of an absentee may
be prejudiced by the proceeding;, or 3) the interest of the absent party creates a
risk of a double or multiple liability to a party. Id.
210. McCoid, supra note 24, at 215-16. McCoid observes that "[t]he case of a limited
fund inadequate to satisfy fully all claims against it is a paradigm of a mandatory
joinder situation which encompasses bankruptcy." Id. at 215 (citation omitted)
Quite obviously this describes the common pool problem, which no one would
deny is an archetype bankruptcy problem. The real point of contention is
whether it is the only problem with which bankruptcy as an institution is or
should be concerned. See supra notes 175-183 and accompanying text. McCoid
apparently thinks not. See infra note 213.
211. The Code adopts a modified equity insolvency test for involuntary bankruptcy. It
focuses on whether the debtor is actually satisfying current obligations as they
become due, regardless of ability to do so. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)(1988). The origi-
nal House version of § 303(h)(1) had specified "inability" to pay as the crucial
factor, while the Senate version of this section contemplated that either inability
or actual failure of the debtor to pay a major portion of its debts as they came due
might serve as grounds for relief. The language of § 303(h)(1) as enacted repre-
sents a compromise between the two. See 124 CONG. REc. 33,992-93 (1978)(state-
ment of Sen. DeConcini) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6510. See generally
Comment, The Generally Not Paying Standard, 33 MERCER L. REv. 903, 904-06
(1982).
212. McCoid, supra note 24, at 215. To use McCoid's terms, if a debtor is balance sheet
solvent there is no need for mandatory joinder since the threat to creditors which
presents the occasion for bankruptcy is interference with a ratable distribution of
assets. Id. at 217-18.
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On the other hand, when considering a business debtor for whom
reorganization is available as an alternative to liquidation, McCoid
parts company with the dogma of recent economic theory by sug-
gesting that the different policy considerations underlying reorganiza-
tion may dictate a different analysis.213 Specifically, where
reorganization of the debtor as a going concern would ultimately yield
more for creditors than liquidation, the threat which presents the oc-
casion for involuntary bankruptcy is the piecemeal dismemberment of
the debtor. This is so because individual creditor collection activities
run the risk of depriving the debtor of essential assets necessary to
continuation of its business and, therefore, a successful reorganiza-
tion.2 14 Obviously, this threat arises as soon as individual collection
efforts are undertaken by unpaid creditors, regardless of the solvency
of the debtor on a balance sheet basis. Thus, McCoid's analysis indi-
cates that where reorganization is the preferred outcome, equity insol-
vency alone can be the occasion for initiation of an involuntary
proceeding.215
VIII. TOWARD A NEW STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
BAD FAITH
A. The Broad Purposive Approach: Promises Unfulfilled
If we are to identify bad faith in involuntary filings in terms of
compatibility with the ultimate objectives of involuntary bankruptcy,
then McCoid's analysis offers some very workable guidelines for as-
certaining when an involuntary petition constitutes an improper use
of bankruptcy process and, therefore, bad faith.216 The obvious prob-
lem with doing so, which is reflective of the problem more generally
213. Id. at 216-17. An involuntary petition may be filed under Chapter 7 or 11. 11
U.S.C. § 303(a)(1988). McCoid observes that, unlike a liquidation case, a success-
ful reorganization is likely to benefit the debtor or its shareholders as well as
creditors. McCoid, supra note 24, at 216-17.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 217-18. By contrast, McCoid argues that where liquidation is the appropri-
ate outcome, the test for business debtors should be no different than for con-
sumer debtors since the threat which calls for the onset of involuntary
bankruptcy is interference with ratable distribution of the debtor's assets. Thus,
in any case where liquidation would be preferred over reorganization, McCoid
proposes that equity insolvency should be viewed merely as creating a rebuttable
presumption of balance sheet insolvency, thereby obviating difficult issues of
proof for the petitioners, but leaving the door open to the debtor to avoid bank-
ruptcy by establishing the existence of net assets in excess of liabilities.
216. In many respects, the test would be the same as the test suggested by economic
theory: an involuntary filing is only appropriate to solve a common pool problem.
See, e.g., supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text. On the other hand, McCoid
parts company with Baird and Jackson in recognizing uses and rehabilitative
goals of the reorganization provisions of the Code other than to effect a different
kind of sale but a sale nonetheless of the debtor's assets.
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with an overarching purposive interpretation of the bad faith prohibi-
tion in section 303, is that the answer to the bad faith inquiry becomes
dictated automatically by the determination of the merits of the peti-
tion. For example, if the purpose for involuntary bankruptcy filings is
to ensure the ratable distribution of limited assets, then a filing
against a solvent debtor would constitute an improper use of the pro-
cess almost without regard to motive or intent. In other words, if bad
faith is determined with reference to whether the case presents a
proper occasion for bankruptcy, the resolution of the merits of the pe-
titioners' entitlement to relief disposes simultaneously of the no
longer separate question of bad faith.217 Yet, the consequence of a
finding of bad faith is not merely dismissal, as would be the result of a
determination that the filing was not undertaken in good faith,218 but
a judgment for actual and punitive damages. Thus, if unsanctioned
use of process is alone the bellwether of bad faith under section
303(i)(2), creditors contemplating the filing of a bankruptcy petition
truly face a daunting "all or nothing" proposition.
Often overlooked in the discussion of bad faith in the context of
involuntary cases is that, unlike voluntary filings where the order for
relief is automatic and there are virtually no eligibility standards regu-
lating who is able to seek and obtain relief,2 1 9 section 303 contains de-
tailed rules governing the circumstances under which a petition may
be granted.220 Moreover, if controverted, the question of whether ade-
quate grounds for relief have been presented by creditors with stand-
ing to invoke the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is established by
217. This point is not unique to McCoid's analysis of the circumstances warranting
bankruptcy. Rather, it is a necessary concomitant of tying the question of bad
faith under § 303(i)(2) to the broader question of sanctioned bankruptcy pur-
poses. Thus, the redundancy cannot be avoided regardless of the theory of bank-
ruptcy to which one subscribes. The answer, then, lies in developing a new
theory of bad faith; one that is limited in formulation to the concerns underlying
§ 303(i)(2) and is neatly tailored to respond to those concerns alone.
218. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
219. The Bankruptcy Code's eligibility standards for voluntary bankruptcy relief are
contained in 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). Any person, with the exception of railroads,
foreign and domestic banking institutions, insurance companies and credit unions
are eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1988). Eligibility to
file under Chapter 11 is the same as under Chapter 7 except for the inclusion of
railroads and the exclusion of stock and commodity brokers. 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(d)(1988). Conspicuous by its absence from the Bankruptcy Code is any re-
quirement that the debtor be insolvent in either the equity or the balance sheet
sense as a condition to the right to seek voluntary relief. See generally In re The
Bible Speaks, 65 B.R. 415,424-26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). The commencement of a
case for voluntary relief constitutes the order for relief; unlike involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceedings, there is no provision for an adversary adjudication of
whether proper grounds for relief exist. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
220. Not only does § 303(h) require proof at trial of specific grounds for relief before
an order for relief may enter, but the persons who may invoke the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction is tightly restricted by § 303(b). See supra note 15.
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means of a full-blown adversary confrontation.221 Accordingly, there
is an ample basis and a suitable mechanism for disposing straight away
of petitions that do not meet the conditions delineated in the statute.
In the case of contested petitions, then, protection against misuse
of process is already controlled mainly by limiting access to relief to
those situations that, at least from an objective perspective, are conso-
nant with designed purpose. It is the absence of similar statutory stan-
dards disciplining voluntary proceedings2 22 that has impelled the
judiciary to call upon good faith as a means of striking off those filings
which are either inappropriate for bankruptcy or entail misuse of the
system.223 Correspondingly, since the judicially-created good faith fil-
ing requirement applies equally to involuntary cases, 224 there is even
less reason to think of bad faith in the same terms, particularly when
the effect of doing so is to expose the petitioning creditors to open-
ended liability for consequential losses resulting from what might
amount to nothing more than lack of objective good faith.225
The structure of section 303 itself also negates an approach that
defines bad faith solely in relation to an objective assessment of the
221. See, e.g., 1i U.S.C. § 303(d)(1988); FED. P& BANKR. P. 1011(b)-(c), 1013, 1018,
7012(a). See generally SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 6, § 5.12.
222. See supra note 219.
223. See aupr notes 140-142 and accompanying text. Stated another way, "good faith"
has been pressed into service by the courts as a mechanism for testing the appro-
priateness of individual bankruptcy filings, particularly in Chapter 11 where the
stakes for interested parties, the potential for misuse, and the commitment of
judicial resources which must be devoted to the proceeding are all far greater
than under Chapter 7. In involuntary cases, while the good faith requirement
still pertains, this function is largely performed by the inquiry into the petition-
ing creditors' ability to establish the existence of the conditions which, according
to the statute, must co-exist before an order for relief can enter. 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(h)(1988).
224. See supra note 141. However, that an involuntary filing was dismissed for failure
to satisfy the threshold good faith requirement does not conclusively establish
bad faith under § 303(i)(2). This postulate, which at first blush seems to defy
logic, is not immediately obvious, or at least to me at one poiht in time it was not
so obvious. See infra note 225.
225. This statement is in partial response to my own earlier, and in retrospect all too
casual, statement that there would seem to be no reason to interpret bad faith
under § 303(i)(2) differently from the threshold good faith filing requirement.
See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, at 942 n.68. Not only are the im-
plied good faith filing requirement and the bad faith provision of § 303(i)(2) mea-
sured at different times, see infra note 227, they measure different things. It is
the latter distinction which I neglected to make in my earlier discussion, and I
attribute that failure to having succumbed to the intuitive assumption that "not-
good faith" means bad faith, and to an oversight by not more narrowly catego-
rizing discrete legal questions and the corresponding cases addressing those ques-
tions. See supra notes 143-44. For an example of a case implying that the good
faith in filing and bad faith under § 303(i)(2) should not be measured using differ-
ent standards, see In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 181 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992).
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appropriateness of the case for bankruptcy relief.2 26 The prefatory
language to section 303(i)(2) provides that it is upon dismissal (other
than on consent of all parties) of the involuntary petition that the
court may consider the entry of judgment against any petitioner that
filed in bad faith. This phrasing clearly denotes that consideration of
the issue of damages for bad faith in filing occurs only after the merits
of the petition have been adjudicated favorably to the alleged
debtor.227 Thus, the question of whether the case involves a proper
invocation of bankruptcy jurisdiction and should go forward, to which
the implied good faith filing requirement is directed,228 is separate
from and prior to the question of bad faith under section 303(i)(2).
Moreover, as stressed earlier, a finding of lack of good faith sufficient
226. As I have stated - although the point cannot be too often made - it is not that
the inappropriateness of a case for bankruptcy can never be an indication of bad
faith or that the two do not frequently co-exist; it is that something more than
inappropriateness is needed to establish bad faith and that additional constituent
is misuse undertaken with intent to harm the debtor. If an improper use of the
bankruptcy process does not alone establish an improper purpose, see supra notes
52 & 54, then the converse must be true as well. See also In re Trina Assocs., 128
B.R. 858, 868, 873 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)(even though petitioner's purpose for
invoking bankruptcy was not an appropriate one, judgment would not be entered
under § 303(i) where it appeared that the petitioner acted with an honest intent
to effectuate a reorganization of the debtor).
227. See, e.g., Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. (In re Eric Peterson Constr.
Co.), 951 F.2d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 1991)(damage award under § 303(i)(2) is con-
tingent on prior dismissal of the petition); Miyao v. Kuntz (In re Sweet Transfer
& Storage, Inc.), 896 F. 2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990)(any claim for damages under
§ 303(i)(2) is premature until dismissal of the petition); Susman v. Schmid (In re
Reid), 854 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir. 1988)(district court may only award fees if it
dismisses the involuntary petition); Glinka v. Dartmouth Banking Co. (In re Kel-
ton Motors, Inc.), 121 B.R. 166,185-86 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990)(citing the "plain mean-
ing" of the statute). In this sense there is a definite connection between § 303(i)
and a common law claim for malicious prosecution. This relationship is explored
in more depth infra text accompanying notes 273-307.
Ordinarily, the bankruptcy court will retain jurisdiction after dismissal of the
petition in order to hear and rule on the debtor's application for judgment under
§ 303(i). See, e.g., In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 643 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Anderson, 95 B.R. 703, 704 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). See also infra note 302.
Under appropriate circumstances, the court may even reopen the case to consider
the question of relief under § 303(i). CZf. Carp v. Inbar (In re Carp), No. 91-11212-
z, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7558 (D. Mass. 1991)(court would refuse to reopen when
the alleged debtor's request for costs, fees, and damages was not timely made). Of
course, § 303(i) does not apply if the dismissal was with the consent of all parties,
including the debtor. See In re International Mobile Advertising Corp., 117 B.R.
154, 157 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, No. 90-6349, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11294
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
228. E.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693,698 (4th Cir. 1989)(an implied good faith
filing requirement is necessary to protect the jurisdictional integrity of the bank-
ruptcy courts). There appears to be general agreement on the relationship be-
tween the good faith filing standard and fundamental bankruptcy purposes, even
though the question of what are bankruptcy purposes is far from settled. See
supra notes 196 & 205.
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to justify dismissal does not alone establish the presence of bad faith,
although it may be relevant to the determination of bad faith.
Finally, the language of section 303(i)(2) plainly contemplates that
one or more, but less than all, the signatories to the same petition may
be determined to have acted in bad faith.229 It is difficult to see how
this might be so if bad faith is imagined in terms of discordance be-
tween the debtor's circumstances and the basic policy aims of the
bankruptcy system. This is because such a vision of bad faith ignores
the petitioning creditors' state of mind; it focuses instead on what are
essentially objectively determined attributes relating to the state of
the debtor's business and financial affairs, such as solvency, need for
rehabilitation, and ability to manage novel business problems through
use of conventional, non-bankruptcy legal institutions. Those attrib-
utes, however, do not vacillate from creditor to creditor. Thus, in this
respect as well, a definition of bad faith expressed in terms of im-
proper use as opposed to improper purpose runs counter to the explicit
directives of the statute.23 0
B. Implications for the Bad Faith Cases
Elimination of proper purpose cases from the definition of bad
faith would have significant consequences for existing decisional law
in the area. For example, recall that in Basin EectriC2 3l the district
court concluded that the petitioning creditor's only purpose in filing
the case was to put itself in a more advantageous position with respect
to a private contract dispute with the debtor, and that this purpose was
inconsistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.232 On the
basis of this conclusion, the court ordered the petition dismissed.
Plainly the outcome of the case can be explained in terms of the peti-
tioner's failure to satisfy an implied good faith filing requirement.2 33
229. See In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 704 (D. Colo. 1984)
230. It also adds nothing to the analysis, (as the threshold good faith filing require-
ment already regulates the access portal into bankruptcy) other than to expose
creditors to liability for potentially large damage awards. This in and of itself is
quite extraordinary in a legal system which goes to some pains not to punish par-
ties who seek redress under its regime even when those claims are rejected for
lack of merit. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
231. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 903 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1984), ffl'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986).
232. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
233. The case was before the district court on appeal from the bankruptcy court's de-
nial of the debtor's motion to dismiss made after the close of the petitioner's pres-
entation of its evidence at trial. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing
Co., 97 B.R. 903, 906 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984). Thus, the question of bad faith under
§ 303(i)(2) was neither before the district court nor could it have been since it was
not yet ripe. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. In effect, bad faith, or
more accurately put, lack of good faith in filing, was the basis on which the court
determined that the single petitioning creditor's case should be dismissed without
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Because I agree that the good faith requirement serves as the vehi-
cle which courts use to test and advance the basic purposes of the
bankruptcy process,23 4 it would be difficult to criticize the court in Ba-
sin Electric in terms of its application of the good faith filing concept.
However, the case has had certain unfortunate consequences for the
law of involuntary bankruptcy. As discussed earlier,2 35 the decision
has served as authority on which other courts have relied in analyzing
entitlement to relief under section 303(i). Doubtlessly operating on
the premise that a lack of good faith sufficient to justify dismissal con-
clusively establishes the presence of bad faith, these courts have ruled
that judgment may be entered under section 303(i)(2) when the credi-
tors' actions entail use of the bankruptcy process for non-bankruptcy
purposes.236
giving the creditor an opportunity to obtain the joinder of additional creditors as
otherwise allowed under FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b). Basin Elec. Power Coop. v.
Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 903, 908 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984). Had the question
of damages under § 303(i)(2) been before the court, it might well have found for
the debtor as well since the court had found that the petitioning creditor knew
that the debtor had twelve or more creditors and apparently filed with the ulte-
rior motive of preserving its right to retain funds improperly drawn on a letter of
credit supplied by the debtor. Id. at 905-06. There is nothing, however, in the
court's holding that demands a showing of intent or malice as a requirement of
dismissal on "bad faith" grounds. This is quite normal and correct since examina-
tion of good faith in filing tests the circumstances of the filing against the "legisla-
tive purposes of the Bankruptcy Code," and those purposes may be exceeded
innocently as easily as they may be deliberately circumvented, and certainly
without intent to harm the debtor. Id. at 909.
Notably, since the court in Basin Electric concluded that a bankruptcy admin-
istration would not be in the best interests of the debtor or the debtor's other
creditors, id. at 908, the court might also have justified dismissal of the petition on
the basis of the abstention doctrine codified in 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1). See, eg., In
re Trina Assocs., 128 B.R. 858 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc.,
108 B.R. 86, 90-92 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). In that event, damages under
§ 303(i)(2) would not be awardable to the alleged debtor regardless of the peti-
tioner's lack of good faith. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6820 (dismissal under § 305(a)(1) does not give
rise to a damage claim under § 303(i)).
234. See supra note 225.
235. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989); In re McDonald Trucking Co., 76 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). See
also In re Johnston Hawks Limited, 72 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987)("bad
faith" exists for purposes of § 303(i)(2) when the creditors' actions constitute an
improper use of the Bankruptcy Code as a substitute for customary collection
procedures). Other courts have relegated the holding in Basin Electric - that
"bad faith" in filing may form the basis for immediate dismissal in a single credi-
tor case - to cases involving like circumstances. See, e.g., In re LaRoche, 131 B.R.
253 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Centennial Ins. Assocs., 119 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1990); In re Eberhardt Moving & Storage, Ltd., 120 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990);
In re Kass, 114 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Elsub Corp, 70 B.R. 797
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1987).
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These courts have generally failed to discern, however, that the
court in Basin Electric was not applying the provisions of section
303(i). Rather, the district court in Basin Electric used the term "bad
faith" to refer to conduct which failed to comply with the implied good
faith filing directive. That "bad faith" as used in section 303(i)(2) has a
rather different meaning altogether should be clear by this point.237
Therefore, the present disorder in the case law over the bad faith issue
can be perhaps most reasonably explained as the product of a semanti-
cal misunderstanding. Although Basin Electric can be read on its face
as standing for the proposition that the use of involuntary bankruptcy
as a substitute for customary collection procedures constitutes an im-
proper use of involuntary bankruptcy, it is only by the most attenu-
ated reasoning that it also can be considered authority for the view
that the same conduct necessarily constitutes bad faith for section
303(i)(2) purposes.238 Regrettably, subsequent cases have not always
made or appreciated the subtle but important distinction between the
meaning of "bad faith" when used to express the antithesis of good
faith, and "bad faith" as incorporated expressly into the body of sec-
237. As I see it, the problem is largely terminological in origin. See supra note 225. I
am also aware of the general maxim of statutory interpretation that the same
words used in the same statute should be taken to have the same meaning. See,
eg., Washington Metro Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925,935-36 (1984),
cited in Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1183 n.17. However, there is no express statutory provision
enjoining '%ad faith" filings; the requirement has been supplied by the courts.
Moreover, if one also accepts the postulate that good faith and bad faith are not
always two hemispheres of the same moon, then furnishing a differing interpre-
tation to the implied good faith filing command does not run afoul of the basic
canon of construction. But see Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409, 411 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983) (subscribing to the bankruptcy court's definition of bad faith as being
the opposite of good faith).
238. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. For that matter, neither do the other
authorities sometimes cited for the same proposition provide any greater support.
See, eg., Bankers Trust Co. BT Serv. Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772
F.2d 397, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1985)(use of bankruptcy as a forum for the trial and
collection of an isolated disputed claim is grounds for dismissal, but the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorneys fees); In re Allen
Rogers & Co., 34 B.R. 631,632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)(debtor abandoned claim for
damages under § 303(i)(2)). In fact, perhaps the only authority aptly cited for the
proposition that an improper use of bankruptcy may form the basis for a damage
claim under § 303(i)(2) is In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99, 100 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981), a brief memorandum opinion devoid of either any precedential or
purposive rationale for its holding. By contrast, in In re Caucus Distribs., Inc. 106
B.R. 890, 928-30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), the court dismissed the involuntary peti-
tion because, as in Basin Electric, it had been filed by a single petitioning creditor
with knowledge that the debtor had in excess of twelve creditors. However, the
court also concluded that no bad faith was involved because the petitioner's only
motivation for filing was its belief that bankruptcy represented the best forum in
which to resolve the debtor's legal and financial difficulties. Id.
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:209
tion 303(i).239
Defining bad faith in terms of the proper scope or function of the
bankruptcy process unrelated to the lawfulness of the petitioning
creditors' underlying purpose for filing is troublesome on several
counts. Principally, however, it is unrealistic and unreasonable in the
sense that it holds creditors answerable in damages for acting pre-
cisely in the manner that one would fully expect a creditor to behave.
The fact that creditors, in lieu of resort to state collection procedures,
sometimes file an involuntary bankruptcy petition motivated by the
desire to see their debts paid should hardly come as a surprise to any-
one. What other healthy impulses realistically could be expected to
motivate creditors to spend the time and incur the expense of an invol-
untary proceeding?240 While equitable distribution and efficient de-
ployment of assets may be aims of the system, it is nonsense to
239. For example, in In re TCI Limited, 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge Easter-
brook, faced with an appeal of an award of fees under Federal Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927, stated that although" 'bad faith' sounds like a subjective inquiry...
[it] has an objective meaning as well as a subjective one." Id at 445. I disagree.
Judge Easterbrook goes on to say that "[s]ubjective bad faith or malice is impor-
tant only when the suit is objectively colorable." Id Quite so; this is an abuse of
process in the classical sense. See infra notes 282-286 and accompanying text.
But, what then is "objective bad faith"? The answer can only be that so-called
objective bad faith exists in the case of a filing which, judged by objective stan-
dards and criteria, was not reasonably undertaken: presumably, the product of a
failure to make an adequate pre-filing inquiry into the facts and law. But why is
that "bad faith" in any flavor? The answer is, it is not. That is why in reformu-
lating Rule 11 in 1983, the drafters of the amendment explicitly elected to aban-
don the bad faith test in favor of a standard of objective reasonableness. See
supra note 81. The failure to make a reasonable investigation into the facts and
law does not presumptively indicate bad faith. See In re Crown Sportswear, Inc.,
575 F.2d 991, 993-94 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Godroy Wholesale Co., 37 B.R. 496, 500
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
The term "bad faith" manifestly implies some malevolent or sinister motive.
Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409, 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); see infra note 252.
Thus, the use of the term objective bad faith is not only internally contradictory,
but it unfortunately perpetuates the confusion over the differing uses of the good
faith concept in bankruptcy and throughout the legal lexicon. The disorderliness
is partly a product of broader applications of the good faith doctrine to circum-
stances where conduct is measured by reference to objective factors; the implied
good faith filing requirement offering the most obvious example. See, e.g., In re
Park Place Assoc., 115 B.R. 940, 946-47 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1989); see infra note 251.
This fact, coupled with the instinctive tendency to refer to filings failing the good
faith test as "bad faith filings," see supra notes 143 & 247 underscores the impor-
tance of both narrower groupings of cases and issues, and recognizing a distinc-
tion in fact between "not-good faith" and bad faith. See supra notes 138 & 151 and
accompanying text.
240. There are, of course, other impulses besides a desire to put the debtor out of busi-
ness or satisfy a personal grudge that might account for a filing, such as to pres-
sure the debtor into payment of a legitimately disputed debt, but that could
hardly be called a healthy or constructive motive either. Moreover, the addition
of the "subject to bona fide dispute" language in § 303(b) & (h)(1), see supra notes
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suppose that the individual creditor who must sign and file the peti-
tion would ever be motivated by those considerations except to the
extent they happened to have an impact on recovery of that creditor's
personal claim. For example, the creditor who files an involuntary
petition after learning of a large preferential transfer of the debtor's
assets may be described as caring about distributional equality among
similar situated creditors; but that creditor cares only because its per-
sonal net recovery has been suddenly threatened. The creditor who
receives the preference never cares about equality of distribution; nor,
in fairness, can we criticize that creditor for failing to care. In sum,
creditors care about getting paid, everything else is secondary.
Because of this reality, to state that a creditor has brought an invol-
untary case as a substitute for customary collection procedures, or has
filed in order to secure an advantage in an individual dispute with the
debtor, is to do little more than restate the obvious. In some instances
the statutory grounds for relief will be present and the case will go
forward and in others not, but none of that has much to do with bad
faith. That question arises, if at all, only after it is determined that the
debtor's situation did not present a proper occasion for involuntary
bankruptcy. In fact, the case law is devoid of a single example of a
meritorious petition being dismissed because, although the debtor was
generally not paying its debts as they came due, the petitioning credi-
tors were motivated by an improper desire to have their individual
claims paid.24 Similiarly, the fact that a petition is dismissed because
of inadequate grounds to support it does not mean the petition was
filed in bad faith. In short, whether the creditors' actions constitute
an inappropriate use of bankruptcy process is relevant to the question
of whether an order for relief will enter and, because the statute re-
quires no additional showing, perhaps the question of sanctions under
section 303(i)(1) as well. By contrast, bad faith sufficient to support a
judgment under section 303(i)(2) requires something more. Misuse of
the process may begin but it does not end the analysis. Since the addi-
tional considerations involved in measuring bad faith coincide in part
with certain conduct also proscribed by Bankruptcy Rule 9011, it is
15 & 16, protects the debtor in such circumstances providing that the debtor is
otherwise meeting its current obligations on a timely basis.
241. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Midwest Processing Co., 47 B.R. 903 (D.N.D. 1984),
I ff'd, 769 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986), may be as
close to an example of such a case as exists. However, in that decision, the district
court, having concluded that the jurisdictional prerequisites for involuntary
bankruptcy had not been satisfied, never reached the issue of the merits of the
petition. Id. at 911. Under Federal Rule 11, by contrast, the question of the mer-
its of the pleading is distinct from the question of whether a violation of the rule
has occurred. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters.,
111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991)(imposition of Rule 11 sanctions does not depend on the
outcome of litigation); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928,
932 (7th Cir. 1989); infra note 244.
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timely now to revisit the relationship between those two provisions to
formulate a new definition of bad faith.
C. Rule 11 Standards Revisited
1. The Duty to Make Reasonable Inquiry
Recall that the major impetus behind the 1983 amendment of Rule
11 was to fashion a more effective tool for controlling abusive litiga-
tion tactics by "objectivizing" the test for determining when a viola-
tion of Rule 11 (and its bankruptcy counterpart in the form of Rule
9011) would be deemed to occur.242 The signatories to all court docu-
ments, counsel and litigants alike, are required to form a reasonable
belief that the pleading or other paper is well-grounded in fact and
that it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument to change
the law. By all accounts, the amendment has succeeded beyond even
the dreams of its most optimistic supporters. The number of Rule 11
cases is legion and most of those cases involve the reasonableness of
counsel's conduct in filing the challenged pleading.243
It is most often when a claim is plausible or the suit has objective
merit that the second branch of Rule 11 becomes operative.244 Mali-
cious intent or subjective bad faith in filing, if proven, may establish a
violation of Rule 11 and constitute the basis for sanctions even when
242. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
243. One commentator reported that as of December 1987, the district and circuit
courts had already reported nearly 700 Rule 11 cases. See Vairo, supra note 79, at
199. Another commentator noted that in 1988 alone, just four circuits accounted
for yet another 75 decisions. Nelken, Looking for a Middle Ground, supra note
85, at 383. See also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir.
1986)(the large number of reported Rule 11 decisions can only represent a frac-
tion of the number of actual instances in which sanctions have been imposed
under the authority of the recent Rule amendments). Nelken observes, however,
that the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 is rarely invoked, and she recom-
mends its repeal. Nelken, Looking for a Middle Ground, supra Note 85 at 406-07.
While comparable empirical data has not been collected for Bankruptcy Rule
9011, an even casual review of an assortment of bankruptcy cases indicates that
litigation under Rule 9011 is proportionately no less frequent nor materially dif-
ferent in focus than under Rule 11. See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank of Az. v. Needler
(In re Grantham Bros.), 922 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1991). Of course, some observers
believe that amended rule 11, and perhaps its bankruptcy counterpart as well,
may be working too well in terms of generating an enormous volume of satellite
litigation and deterring the bringing of honest as well as "marginal yet potentially
meritorious claims or defenses." See Schwarzer, Rule 11, supra note 85, at 1015.
244. If the claim is factually or legally frivolous, it separately violates the first prong of
Rule 11. See in fra notes 265-66 and accompanying text. Cf. In re TCI, Ltd., 769
F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985)("Subjective bad faith or malice is important only
when the suit is objectively colorable."). But see Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990)(a non-frivolous complaint initiating an
action, as opposed to other pleadings and court papers, cannot be filed for an im-
proper purpose).
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the paper is supported by the facts and warranted by existing law.245
This scenario reflects a classic formulation of the tort of abuse of pro-
cess, entailing the application of process justified in itself for an end
other than that it was designed to accomplish.246 Thus, the same con-
duct may lead to both sanctions under Rule 11 and independently
form the basis as well for substantive liability in tort.247 In any event,
whether the violation of Rule 11 occurs in the mode of a frivolous fil-
ing or an improperly motivated filing, the harm to the system is the
same; both types of behavior, albeit in different ways, contribute to the
clog of spurious federal litigation that has bottlenecked the system.
Plainly, creditors who file an involuntary petition that fails to sat-
isfy either tributary of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 are subject to sanctions
under the Rule.248 In fact, examples abound.249 It is quite another
thing, however, to conclude that all such filings involve bad faith. As
noted, several courts have acknowledged, for example, that the stan-
dards for dismissing a case pursuant to the implied good faith filing
requirement are different from the standards for imposing sanctions
under the improper purpose prong of Rule 9011.250 This is because
"good faith" has come to be judged by reference to objective standards
and objective considerations,251 whereas an improper purpose con-
245. See supra note 244. On the other hand, some courts and commentators have
taken the position that the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 should also be
judged under an objective standard. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
246. In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985); Wolf v. Kupetz (In re Wolf &
Vine, Inc.), 118 Bankr. 761, 770 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); infra note 282 and accom-
panying text.
247. In an involuntary case, this does not necessarily establish bad faith for § 303(i)(2)
purposes, particularly if the duty breached was a duty owed to the legal system
rather than a duty owed to one's adversary. That the same conduct may often
constitute a simultaneous violation of both obligations does not dictate that the
breach of the one constitutes inevitably a breach of the other. See infra notes
255-259 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., In re Cedar Falls Hotel Limited Partnership, 102 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1989). Unlike most pleadings in ordinary civil litigation, an involuntary pe-
tition must be individually signed by the petitioners. See Official Form No. 5, 11
U.S.C. app. (1988). The effect of those signatures under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is
now clear. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Ill S. Ct.
922 (1991), discussed supra note 29-40 and accompanying text.
249. See, eg., In re Omega Trust, 110 B.R. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), and authorities
cited therein; Byrne, supra note 25; see also supra notes 27 & 28 and accompany-
ing text. Of course, most of these examples involve cases in which the sanctioned
party failed to act with reasonable care as required by the first part of Rule 9011
and a creditor's failure to conduct a proper investigation in advance of filing an
involuntary petition does not as a matter of law signify bad faith under
§ 303(i)(2). See In re Godroy Wholesale Co., 37 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1984).
250. See supra note 146.
251. This is true in spite of the ordinary sense of good faith as implying honest inten-
tion. In the context of the good faith filing requirement, "good faith" has come to
be equated, for the most part, with adherence to sanctioned uses of the Bank-
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notes the existence of ill will or malice; i.e., subjective bad faith.252
ruptcy Code. See, e.g., Carteret Sav. Bank v. Nastasi-White, Inc. (In re East-West
Assocs.), 106 B.R. 767, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(good faith evidenced by objective as-
sessment of debtor's reasonable prospects for a successful reorganization); In re
Park Place Assocs., 115 B.R. 940, 945 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)("Good faith or the
lack thereof is determined by objective standards and not the subjective intent of
the debtor."); In re HBA East, Inc., 87 B.R. 248, 259 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1988)(debtor's purpose for filing was not appropriate for bankruptcy). Of course,
an objective approach to good faith is not without precedent. See U.C.C. § 2-
103(1)(b)(1990)(in contracts for the sale of goods, as between merchants, good
faith means observance of reasonable commercial standards as well as honesty in
fact).
To be certain, discussions about and concerns over subjective motive have not
been ignored in many courts' analysis of the implied good faith filing require-
ment. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 701 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1989)(dis-
missal for lack of good faith in filing requires a showing of both objective futility
and subjective bad faith; however, bad faith may be established by inference from
evidence of objective futility). Still, just as good faith has been rejected as the
basis for determining whether purposes of Rule 11 have impinged upon (see
supra text accompanying note 84), a good heart but empty head typically will not
shield a bankruptcy filing from dismissal if it is objectively hopeless. While im-
properly motivated filings may (and often do) also run afoul of the good faith
filing requirement, it is critical not to lose sight of the primary function which
such a requirement serves and the operative facts which trigger its application.
These concerns, I contend, are fundamentally different from the considerations
which define the role of the bad faith restriction in involuntary bankruptcy cases.
See infra note 252.
252. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986)(suggesting that in
the context of the inherent equitable power of the court to award attorneys fees,
"bad faith" be restrictively interpreted to refer to actions entirely without color
and taken for plainly improper purposes). Speaking in reference to the courts
power to dismiss Chapter 11 filings for cause, including a lack of good faith under
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1988), the court in In re Southern Calif. Sound Sys, Inc., 69
B.R. 893, 901 n. 2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987), observed that the appellation '%ad faith
filing" is arguably a misnomer because in most instances where a case is dis-
missed on that basis it will be because the filing was undertaken for a purpose
other than one sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, the gradual devel-
opment over the past decade of a bad faith tort for willful breach of contract or as
an analogue to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been predi-
cated on the realization that existing contract law remedies were not adequate to
compensate victims of certain kinds of misconduct in the contractual relationship.
See generally Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The
Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1986); John
Monaghan, Note, Extending the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial
Contracts, 65 B.U.L. REv. 355 (1985). By definition, tort remedies are designed to
protect the interests in being free from various forms of harm. W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, 665-67 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter PROSSER & KEETON]. Thus, tort damages are likely to be more generous
since, unlike contract damages, they are not limited to the actual or tacit agree-
ment of the parties. Id. This has led one court, in a cogent decision by Judge
Kozinski, to express serious reservations over the "tortification" of contract law.
OKI America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
While the tort-contract distinction in this area has been criticized as unduly
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This is the distinction which is lost in casually referring to filings dis-
missed for want of good faith as "bad faith filings."25 3
Notwithstanding a corresponding lack of similarity in standards
and purposes,25 4 most courts still agree that bad faith under section
303(i)(2) should be measured, at least in part, by the same "objective
and subjective" standards that have developed under Bankruptcy
Rule 9011.255 Because of the Rule's strong emphasis on the objective
component (itself traceable to the unsatisfactory experience under the
pre-1983 version of Federal Rule 11) this deference to Rule 9011
means that a creditor may be convicted of bad faith simply for failing
formalistic, see Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing
Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 733 (1982), extension of tort
remedies for bad faith performance of a contract reflects the unspoken but persis-
tent reality of a gulf between good faith and bad faith, such that the absence of
the former cannot under the same theory and reasoning serve to irrebuttably
establish the presence of the other. The key additional ingredient in bad faith
being malice, willfulness or intent. Of course, it is always possible to define that
ingredient out of bad faith and make it mean something entirely different by just
saying so. See supra note 239. This is why terms like good faith and bad faith
have no absolute, definitive meaning in the abstract. Nevertheless, while each
concept takes on a specific color when brought to bear in a particular legal situa-
tion or relationship, there are certain shared referents which each term calls to
mind. In the case of "bad faith" that commonly understood imperative is some
form of malicious intention.
253. See International Mobile Advertising Corp., No. 90-6349, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11294 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that, although per-
haps hastily undertaken, filing was not made improperly or in bad faith); In re
Southern Calif. Sound Sys., 69 B.R. 893, 901 n.2 (B.R. S.D. Cal. 1987)(discussed
supra note 252). As pointed out earlier, the problem is a semantical one which,
because of its unavoidability in light of the limitations of language, is most effec-
tively controlled by grouping cases narrowly so that the context aspect of the
analysis is not lost. See supra notes 143, 225-226 & 237 and accompanying text.
254. For another perspective on the different linguistic Shadings inherent in the term
bad faith, see KASSIN, supra note 33, at 22-23. See also supra notes 96-103 and
accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. At times, courts applying the stan-
dard to be applied under § 303(i)(2) seem to imply that it is only the second part
of the "improper purpose" prong of Rule 9011 being incorporated into the analy-
sis. See, ag., In re Kearney, 121 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). However,
this distinction has either been ignored by other courts or, in practice, belied by
the courts' actual application of the borrowed standard. See In re Fox Island
Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 968 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)(bad faith should be
measured by the objective and subjective standards required under Bankruptcy
Rule 9011), (citing In re Turner, 80 Bankr. 618, 623 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)). See
also In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 179-80 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)(applying a "com-
bined" test that considers both motivation for, an objective reasonableness in, fil-
ing). In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)(Rule 9011
also requires a reasonable pre-filing investigation); In re McDonald Trucking Co.,
76 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)(test for bad faith under § 303(i)(2) is
analogous to the obligations imposed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011, including both
the level of pre-filing inquiry and the creditor's purpose in filing).
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to exercise due care in bringing an involuntary case. No additional
proof of malice or other improper ulterior motive is required.
The logic and wisdom of holding petitioning creditors to a duty of
reasonable inquiry under section 303(i)(2) are open to serious ques-
tion. To begin with, the bankruptcy courts can hardly be described as
bending under the weight of frivolously filed involuntary petitions.
More to the point, however, arrogation for section 303(i)(2) purposes
of the Rule 9011 standards effectively creates an affirmative cause of
action against a party who, even with the most benign intentions, fails
to make what the court later considers to have been a "reasonable"
pre-filing investigation.256 Moreover, even as to parties represented
by counsel, the duty to form a reasonable belief before filing extends
to the justification for the petition under existing law as well as on the
facts.
To criticize the imposition of a duty of reasonable inquiry under
section 303(i)(2) is not to condone either a creditor's recklessness or
negligence in asserting entitlement to a particular remedy. Unques-
tionably, such disregard for the truth and accuracy of facts asserted or
the existence of proper legal grounds for relief is a factor that will
influence the exercise of the court's discretion under section 303(i)(1),
although the need for such protection in the statute itself was far
more clamorous before promulgation of Rule 9011.257 It is also quite
conceivable that the debtor will, in addition to the expense of defend-
ing the petition, experience some consequential losses attributable to
the pendency of the petition; this in spite of the provisions of the Code
256. What constitutes a "reasonable" inquiry under Rule 11 was addressed by the
court in Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
Cases measuring bad faith for § 303(i) purposes by an objective test include In re
McDonald Trucking Co., 76 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). This view,
which is widely shared in recent decisions under § 303(i)(see supra notes 61, 64 &
255), represents an enormous expansion of the bad faith filing doctrine compared
with earlier decisions. See, eg., In re Godroy Wholesale, Inc., 37 B.R. 496, 500
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
257. At the time § 303(i) was originally enacted, abusive filings were controlled by
former Bankruptcy Rule 911, which, in large measure, paralleled pre-amended
Rule 11. See supra note 25. Thus, "good faith" was available as a defense against
sanctions under the Rule. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Section
303(i)(1), then, served as the exclusive basis until August 1,1983 upon which costs
and attorneys fees might be awarded for a frivolous or careless filing made with-
out reasonable prior inquiry into the facts and law. Adoption of Rule 9011 did not
render § 303(i)(1) entirely redundant, however, since a bankruptcy court is still
able to do under the statute what cannot at least directly be done under the Rule:
shift the entire cost of the litigation to the petitioning creditors. See Cooter &
Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2462-62 (1990); supra notes 89 & 105. Of
course, the court is not obligated to award costs and fees under § 303(i)(1) under
any circumstances. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Consequently, the
two provisions maintain some independence of one another.
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designed to diminish that possibility.258 Nevertheless, it represents an
enormous policy statement, and an equally momentous reorientation
of normative values, to shift the risk of such losses to the petitioning
creditors absent some showing of intent to deliberately harm the
debtor, or cause those losses.259 The ostensible claim that Congress
258. That damages under § 303(i)(2) may include loss of profits and other consequent-
ial damages flowing from business disruption or interruption is quite clear, even
though proof of loss or of a sufficiently certain casual connection between such
losses and the filing can be difficult. See supra notes 12 & 98. Cf. In re K.P.
Enter. 135 B.R. 174, 183 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)(awarding $ 22,810 in quantifiable
damages flowing directly from filing to debtor whose value as a going concern had
not been wounded). The Code's attempt to ameliorate the harmful effects of a
non-meritorious petition are reviewed supra note 69.
259. U.C.C. § 9-507(1)(1990) provides an interesting analogy. That section sets forth
remedies for the debtor in the event of a creditor's violation of the provisions of
part 5 of article 9 of the U.C.C. governing default, repossession and foreclosure of
security interests in personal property. It specifies that if the secured party does
not proceed "in accordance with the provisions of this Part," disposition of the
collateral may be enjoined or, if the collateral has already been disposed, the
debtor may recover any loss caused by the failure to comply with Part Five. In
interpreting and applying this provision most courts have limited aggrieved debt-
ors to the direct damages attributable to the creditor's failure to act in a commer-
cially reasonable manner; eg., the difference between the amount received on
disposition of the collateral and the amount which would have been obtained had
the creditor acted in conformity with the requirements of Part Five. See 2 JAMES
J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27-18, 622 (3d ed.
1988); II GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.2,
1256 (1965)(damages should be measured by value of the collateral at the time of
violation, or in a tort action, measured in the nature of conversion). Even when
the collateral is not consumer goods, some courts go further and deny the secured
creditor any deficiency claim, although the trend is to treat the violation as creat-
ing only a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral was at least
equal to the amount owing in the underlying indebtedness at the time of disposi-
tion. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNi-
FORMT COmERCIAL CODE, § 4.12[4], n. 708 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp No. 2 1991). A few
cases have gone even further and awarded consequential damages in the form of
lost profits, but the leading commentators on the subject express considerable
skepticism as to the wisdom of such an expansive interpretation of the statutory
language. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, at 623.
Plainly, U.C.C. 9-507(1) does not require any showing of bad faith or intent in
order to trigger application of the statutory remedy. The fact that § 303(i)(2) ex-
pressly limits the court's discretion to award damages absent a prior finding of
bad faith provides ample justification for its more tort-like formulation of dam-
ages recoverable for a violation than is generally true under U.C.C. 9-507(1).
However, that justification begins to evaporate when courts apply the Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 standards to test bad faith under § 303(i)(2). Suddenly, petition-
ing creditors become liable for the full range of compensatory damages merely
upon a showing of negligence, an approach rejected for the most part in an analo-
gous state law collection setting. Moreover, since breach of the implied good faith
filing requirement is likewise not dependent on any showing of intent to harm,
cases which use the tests developed in that context engage in an equally unwar-
ranted expansion of the scope of liability. The net effect can only be to drive all
but the boldest creditors out of the bankruptcy business, a result unwarranted
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made this choice when it elected to use the term "bad faith" in section
303(i)(2), years before the amendment to Federal Rule 11 and adop-
tion of Bankruptcy Rule 9011, is highly implausible. It is not only at
odds with the legislative history of section 303,260 but, as a matter of
interpretive technique, it cannot be squared with one of the more basic
principles of statutory construction; namely, that words used by the
legislature be accorded their ordinary, common senses unless ex-
pressly stated otherwise.261 Also, the fact that punitive damages are
authorized under section 303(i)(2), which courts acknowledge are in-
tended to punish opprobrious conduct as well as deter future occur-
rences,262 is further evidence that bad faith means intentional bad
acting, not carelessness. In these circumstances, the sop that judg-
ment is discretionary with the court is of precious little consolation.263
2. The Improper Purpose Prong
It might seem considerably more rational to formulate a test of bad
faith under section 303(i) by borrowing only the standards that govern
not only doctrinally, but on the same policy grounds justifying imposing some
limits on the liability of secured creditors under state law as well.
260. See supra notes 12 & 25 and accompanying text; Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 315-16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
261. See Miller, supra note 227, at 1221 n.131, and authorities therein cited. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has been particularly insistent in its bankruptcy deci-
sions that the language of the Code be adhered to when clear and unambiguous.
See, e.g., Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S.Ct. 527 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.Ct.
2197, 2200 (1991)(where the resolution of a question of federal law turns on a
statute, the Court will look first to the statutory language and, only if that lan-
guage is unclear, to legislative history); United States v. Ron Pair Enters. (In re
Ron Pair Enters.), 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)(plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992)(giving the phrase
"allowed secured claim" a different meaning in different provisions of the same
statute). As earlier discussed, notwithstanding attempts to objectivize the test for
some purposes, the ordinary, common sense meaning of "bad faith" entails bad
motive and intent. See supra note 252.
262. See, e.g., In re K.D. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 183 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992)(the purposes for
awarding punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer, and to deter similar
conduct by both the wrongdoer and others); In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R. 687,
694 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)(punitive damages are generally awarded when there
is proof that the wrongful act was intentionally done); In re McDonald Trucking
Co., 74 B.R. 474, 482 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)(section 303(i) allows for punitive
damages to deter repeat conduct and punish the wrongdoer); In re Johnston
Hawks Limited, 72 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987)(purpose for punitive dam-
ages is to deter similar acts and punish the petitioning creditors for filing in bad
faith).
263. The problem is that as the number of tests or definitions of bad faith multiplies,
the exercise of judicial discretion becomes increasingly less predictable. Thus,
creditors considering an involuntary filing, including those only seeking to maxi-
mize return on debts legitimately incurred and owing, have no "safe harbor" to
protect them from an ex post facto determination that the filing was in bad faith.
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the second prong of Rules 11 and 9011.264 However, even that more
tempered strategy is encumbered by difficulties that can become un-
manageable in developing a consistent definition of bad faith for invol-
untary cases. Although the 1983 amendment was intended largely to
supersede the subjective bad faith standard that had previously pre-
vailed, it did not totally denude Rule 11 of all its subjective constitu-
ents. The signature of an attorney or a party continues to constitute a
certification that the pleading has not been "interposed for any im-
proper purpose." Reasonably, one would expect that this language
would be construed as a limited continuation of the prior subjective
bad faith standard and, for the most part, it has been so regarded.2 65
However, the equation is not quite that simple and its complexities
demonstrate the unprofitability of even this more limited linking of
Rule 9011 and section 303(i)(2).
First, because the dual prohibitions of Rule 11 are joined by a con-
junctive connector, the Rule must be interpreted to allow only lack of
objective reasonableness, or only improper purpose, to separately con-
stitute a violation.266 If this understanding is applied by analogy to
264. In fact, some courts have intimated that it is only the improper purpose element
of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 which should be used to measure bad faith for
§ 303(i)(2) purposes, but there has been no consistency in imposing such a limita-
tion on the definition of bad faith. See supra note 255.
265. See Nelken, supra note 33, at 1320, 1331 (the amended rule adds an "objective
layer to the subjective core of traditionally sanctionable bad faith conduct").
266. Rule 11 sanctions are used to punish parties who file pleadings and other court
papers that either; 1) constitute frivolous filings, or 2) use the judicial process as a
tool of harassment. Valley Nat'l Bank of Az. v. Needler (In re Grantham Bros.),
922 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir 1991); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d
1136,1140 (9th Cir. 1990)(sanctions may be imposed either if the paper is frivolous
or the paper is filed for an improper motive); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental
Bank NA., 880 F.2d 928,931-32 (7th Cir. 1989)(a paper interposed for an improper
purpose is sanctionable whether or not it is supported by the facts and the law,
and without regard to how careful a pre-filing investigation was conducted); (In
re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493,495 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(an attorney is deemed to certify both
her knowledge and belief following reasonable inquiry - and objective standard
- and the absence of an improper motive - a subjective test akin to the pre-1983
bad faith requirement); In re Cedar Falls Hotel Properties Limited Partnership,
102 Bankr. 1009 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989)(even objectively reasonable filing
may give rise to sanctions if the pleading was interposed for an improper pur-
pose). See also supra note 106. In Townsend v. Holmon Consulting Corp., 914
F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990), the court carved out an exception for complaints,
noting that for policy reasons a non-frivolous pleading initiating an action cannot
be filed for an improper purpose. This followed from the court's reasoning that
the standard governing both inquiries is an objective one. Infra note 270. While
the proposition of an "objective" bad faith standard is a dubious one (supra note
239), Nelken, supra note 239, at 1331, has observed that the improper purpose
standard, although unquestionably connoting bad faith, has primarily served to
increase sanctions in a case already found to be without objective factual or legal
merit.
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section 303(i)(2),267 it means that a petitioning creditor could be ex-
posed to a judgment for damages even though an order for relief
against the debtor has been entered on the petition. This presents the
anomaly that a creditor, ostensibly acting on behalf of all creditors,
might be required to pay reputational, loss of business, and even puni-
tive damages (all post-petition, presumably) for initiating a bank-
ruptcy proceeding against an entity whose situation has been deemed
appropriate for bankruptcy relief.268 Perhaps less troubling philo-
sophically, but of even greater practical moment, is that the occur-
rence of this scenario would directly contravene the terms of the
statute itself, a statute which, it will be recalled, makes the question of
damages apposite only after dismissal of the petition.269 For both of
these reasons, and contrary to the prevailing attitude regarding the
operation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011, the analysis of bad faith under
267. As earlier discussed, supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text, this is precisely
the understanding which most courts have recently embraced, although the path
to arrive there entailed certain highly questionable interpretive leaps of faith.
See supra text accompanying note 67.
268. The interpretation of Rule 11 adopted by the court in Townsend, would avoid this
result since presumably a determination that the petition had a colorable basis
would preclude a finding of improper purpose under the second prong of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 irrespective of the petitioners' privately-held intentions. See
supra note 266. The Ninth Circuit in Townsend reached that conclusion, how-
ever, by applying an objective test to both components of Rule 11. In addition to
the fact that this view is not universally shared (see infra note 271) its acceptance
in the context of § 303(i)(2) entails a different kind of pitfall. Although the in-
congruity of having a judgment entered against a petitioning creditor who files a
meritorious petition is side-stepped, it means that bad faith would come to be
defined wholly in terms of whether a reasonable person in the position of the
petitioning creditor would have decided to seek relief under the Code. Therein
lies the rub. While a good heart and an empty head might not be enough to avoid
sanctions under Rule 11, see, e.g., Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.
1986), it should be sufficient to negate a finding of bad faith. See supra note 251-
252 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., In re International Mobile Advertising Corp., No. 90-6349, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11294 (E.D. Pa. 1991)("The statute very clearly provides that a necessary
precondition for recovery of damages pursuant to § 303 is that the petition be
dismissed 'other than on consent of all petitioners and the debtor' "). See also
supra note 227. However, in Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. (In re Eric
Peterson Constr. Co.), 951 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 1991), the court held that
the debtor need not actively oppose dimsissal of the petition in order to preserve
its claim for damages under § 303(i).
It is possible that the dismissal itself might be based on a determination that
the filing was not undertaken in good faith. Hence, one could theoretically envis-
age a petition that, although satisfying the statutory requirements for relief, was
dismissed because of bad motive. As a practical matter, however, unlike the situ-
ation prevailing in the case of voluntary filings, there are no such cases reported
and the existence of an adversary contest for establishing the right to an order for
involuntary relief renders remote the likelihood that such a case might ever arise.
See supra notes 219-225 and accompanying text.
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section 303(i)(2) cannot proceed in isolation from the merits of the
petition.
The other complication involved in borrowing the standards devel-
oped under just the second branch of Federal Rule 11 is that, even
though the Rule continues to speak in terms of "improper purpose,"
some courts and commentators have advocated use of an objective test
of "bad faith" for determining when a violation on this basis has oc-
curred.270 That approach to bad faith, while seemingly at odds with
the natural inferences connoted by the term,27 may have merit as
270. See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
1990)(standard governing both the "improper purpose" and "frivolousness" in-
quiries is an objective one); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d
1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987)(improper purpose determined under an objective stan-
dard); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)(suggesting
that amended Rule 11 picks up where 28 U.S.C. § 1927 leaves off). Judge
Schwarzer has also advocated for an objective standard to determine improper
purpose under Rule 11. See Schwarzer, supra note 77, at 195-96 (courts should
not inquire into subjective intent in order to determine if pleadings were inter-
posed for an improper purpose). See also Schwarzer, Rule 11, supra note 85, at
1018-20,1024 (proposing that the focus of Rule 11 should shift from the merits of
the pleading to the process attendant to its assertion in order to eliminate some of
the deleterious byproducts spawned by the 1983 amendments); Vairo, supra note
79, at 195 (bad faith terminology has no place in Rule 11). Other commentators
recognize that "improper purpose" necessarily implies subjective bad faith. See
Nelken, supra note 33, at 1320; Nelken, Lookingfor a Middle Ground, supra note
85, at 406-07 (arguing that because it entails an inquiry into subjective motivation,
the improper purpose aspect of Rule 11 should be repealed); Rubin, Note, A
"Kajkaesque" Dream, supra note 32, at 1040 (the improper purpose clause is in-
dependent of the reasonable inquiry clause and connotes intention and willful-
ness; thus, it cannot, without further amendment, be subsumed under an
objective standard); Webster, Note, Rule 11: Has the Objective Standard Trans-
gressed the Adversary System? supra note 38, at 314-16 (proposing that an attor-
ney's legal conclusions under the first prong of Rule 11 should also be measured
by a subjective standard).
271. In the abstract, the terms "good faith" and bad faith" evoke notions of subjective
intention. See KASSIN, supra note 33, at 22 (good/bad faith terms imply a search
for improper motives); supra note 252. The drafters of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 11 fully understood this connection and, therefore, abandoned a good faith
standard in favor of an objective assessment of counsel's conduct in filing plead-
ings, motions and other court papers. See Carter, supra note 90, at 6-7. Although
the vestigial remnants of a subjective test were retained in the "improper pur-
pose" element of the Rule, some courts have objectivized both inquiries anyway.
Supra note 270 and cases cited therein. The issue is further confused by the fact
that the analysis of bad faith under § 303(i)(2) has become indirectly intertwined
with the issue of the good faith filing prerequisite as well. Contrary to the con-
struction of "good faith," entailing subjective honesty, generally afforded to the
term in connection with Rule 11 analysis, "good faith" in filing has come to be
measured by conformity with objective criteria and evolving bankruptcy purpose.
Relegated to their respective spheres of operation this difference in approach
presents no particular problem; broad admonitions like good faith, while not
without essential signification, take on specific meaning only in their particular-
ized and varied applications. However, when two variant approaches intersect in
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part of the analysis of whether Rule 11, considering its distinct func-
tion in federal civil practice, has been violated. Clearly, however, the
price for achieving this result is perpetuation of the confusion stem-
ming from the temptation to always conceive of bad faith as the evil
twin of good faith.272
A scheme that attributes no separate or independent meaning to
the concept of bad faith runs the risk of producing harmful results
when simply incorporated without modification into a different con-
text. This is particularly so where the consequences flowing from a
finding of bad faith may entail repercussions far more serious than
reimbursing the cost of resisting an ill-conceived lawsuit. When, as is
the case under section 303(i)(2), the entire risk of business failure may
be shifted to the petitioning creditors, nebulous, unthoughtful defini-
tions of bad faith create the danger of keeping all but the most thrill-
seeking creditors away. With the potential cost this high, no prudent
lawyer can be expected to counsel his or her client to consider invol-
untary bankruptcy as a serious remedial alternative. Simply knowing
that the client's judgment might later, and in the harsh glare of hind-
sight, be tested against a standard of objective reasonableness is
enough to commend discretion over valor.
In the final analysis, therefore, any approach for defining bad faith
for purposes of section 303(i)(2) that simply borrows the law and lore
developed under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is unsatisfactory. The stan-
dards of conduct applied under Rule 9011 carry with them certain bag-
gage unique to the purposes, values, and history of Federal Rule 11.
These concerns are fundamentally different from the considerations
relevant to the bad faith analysis in involuntary bankruptcy. Under
these circumstances, it is easy to understand why, in spite of the lauda-
ble reform efforts undertaken in drafting the Code, involuntary bank-
ruptcy has had such little impact in the overall scheme of debtor-
a third setting, which is precisely what has occurred in the case of § 303(i)(2),
some confusion inevitably results leading to the kind of inconsistency from one
case to the next which has marked the treatment of bad faith in involuntary
cases. This fact underscores the importance of approaching the bad faith inquiry
in involuntary bankruptcy cases discrete from usages of the same and related
terms in other contexts.
272. See supra notes 118 & 138-139 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it is
possible to treat the two concepts as opposites so long as the discussion is limited
to a particular application of one concept or the other. See supra note 271. In a
manner of speaking, albeit in modified form, this is reminiscent of Summers' ex-
cluder analysis. Summers, supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text. Summers
runs into problems, however, when he abandons entirely the effort to assign each
term a general meaning of its own. Once established, these norms serve as a
yardstick for tracking, comparing and keeping distinct the non-uniform standards
that may develop for different purposes to assess whether or not a party's conduct
has satisfied or transgressed, as the case may be, the mandated level of
performance.
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creditor relations and such nominal effect in implementing broader
bankruptcy policy.
Assuming the analysis is to proceed by analogy, Rule 9011 is, for all
the reasons shown, the wrong analogy. In its stead I would suggest
that, because of a greater coincidence in underlying purposes and val-
ues, a better analogical application is found in the common law of ma-
licious prosecution. That relationship, and the attempt to build from it
an alternative standard of bad faith under section 303(i)(2), occupy the
final part of this Article.
IX. BAD FAITH IN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
RECONSIDERED AND REDEFINED
Although something of a misnomer when used in a non-criminal
setting, American courts gradually have come to recognize the applica-
bility of the tort of malicious prosecution in connection with wrongful
civil cases.2 7 3 Traditionally, malicious prosecution had been restricted
to unjustified criminal proceedings. The elements required to be
pleaded and proven were that the action complained of was: 1) com-
menced by or at the direction of the defendant; 2) terminated in favor
of the plaintiff;274 3) brought without probable cause; and 4) initiated
with malice.275
The elements which must be established to support a claim of mali-
cious prosecution in a civil case are generally the same as those re-
quired in the case of a criminal proceeding,276 except in a minority of
273. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 252, at 889 (referring to such actions when civil
in nature as "wrongful civil proceedings").
274. It is the existence of this element that traditionally has prevented a malicious
prosecution claim from being asserted as a counterclaim in the main action. I& at
892-93.
275. See, eg., Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540, 1547 (D. Colo. 1990);
Sheldon Appel Co. v, Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, (Cal. 1989). Proof of "malice"
is generally regarded as requiring a showing not only that the act was deliberate,
but that the defendant intended the harmful result. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.6 at 443 (2d ed. 1986)("Any feeling of hatred, animosity, or
ill will toward the plaintiff, of course, amounts to malice.")(citation omitted);
Seven Elves, Incorporated v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1983)("willful,"
within the meaning of Code § 523(a)(6), means intentional, and "malice" adds the
absence of just cause). For a strict view of the definition of "malicious" in the
context of the dischargeability exception in § 523(a)(6) for debts arising out of
"willful and malicious" injury, see John Deere Credit Serv. v. McLaughlin (In re
McClaughlin), 109 B.R. 14, 16-17 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989). See also PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 252, at 882-83, defining malice in terms of "improper purpose," an
approach which brings into question the wisdom of attempts to define "improper
purpose" under Rule 11 by reference to reasonableness under the circumstances.
See supra note 270.
276. See HARPER, supra note 275, at 457; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674
(1977). There is, however, a minor difference between criminal and civil proceed-
ings relating to the "lack of probable cause" element of the claim for relief. Spe-
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jurisdictions that have imposed one additional element of proof.27 In
these states, the plaintiff must also show some "special damage," in
the form of interference with the plaintiff's person or property, be-
yond the damages that ordinarily would be expected to result from
such litigation.278 Commentators have complained that this additional
requirement renders malicious prosecution virtually useless as a rem-
edy for wrongful civil litigation,27 9 and it has been rejected by the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.28 0 Nevertheless, even in jurisdictions
continuing to adhere to the special damage rule, initiation of an invol-
untary bankruptcy case has been generally recognized as the kind of
interference with business and property sufficient to satisfy the spe-
cial injury requirement. Therefore, in virtually all instances, a debtor
who successfully fends off an involuntary petition would be in position
to bring an action in state court for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages on the ground that the involuntary case had been prosecuted
maliciously.281
The tort of malicious prosecution is frequently confused with an
action for abuse of process. An action for abuse of process is appropri-
ate when lawful process is invoked to attain an end that the process
cifically, something less in the way of a reasonable belief in the merits of the
claim is required in bringing a civil rather than a criminal suit. PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 252, at 893. See ALSO Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675 (1977),
which sets forth either a reasonable belief in the validity of the claim or good
faith reliance on counsel as alternative ways of establishing the existence of prob-
able cause. See also infra note 298 and accompanying text regarding reliance on
the advice of counsel as a defense to liability for malicious prosecution.
277. The number is reputed to be about a third of the states. HARPER, supra note 275,
at 464-65.
278. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 252, at 889-92. See generally Note, Groundless
Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE
L.J. 1218, 1219-20 (1979)(referring to the special damage rule as the "English
Rule"). The so-called English Rule is justified by the need to encourage honest
litigants to seek redress from the judicial system without fear of reprisal. Id. at
1220.
279. See, e.g., HARPER, supra note 275, at 467-68, 474-75.
280. The same elements necessary to establish liability for unjustified criminal pro-
ceedings will support a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil case. Compare RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977)(elements of a claim for wrongful use
of civil proceeding) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (elements of
cause of action for malicious prosecution).
281. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 678)(1977)("Proceedings Alleging
Insanity or Insolvency"); PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 252, at 890 n. 19 (special
injury has been found to exisit in actions which involve interference with busi-
ness or property, or damages differing in kind from the ordinary hardships associ-
ated with defending a lawsuit, including actions for involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings). See also infra note 300.
Under either approach, once the elements of liability have been satisfied, dam-
ages include all costs, expenses, and other losses incurred by reason of the wrong-
ful litigation, including punitive damages. Note, Groundless Litigation, supra
note 278, at 1220 n. 15 & 16; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 681 cmt. a (1977).
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was not meant to allow.28 2 Quite different in proof than malicious
prosecution, abuse of process does not require the plaintiff to establish
that the action was terminated adversely to the defendant, that it was
brought without probable cause, or that the defendant acted with mal-
ice.283 On the other hand, clearly the two actions are related. In fact,
the tort of abuse of process has been described as providing a remedy
for a limited category of cases where, although the defendant's con-
duct is equally unsavory, malicious prosecution fails to provide a rem-
edy.28 4  Moreover, in some cases both actions might lie.285
Nevertheless, there is a subtle but fundamental difference in emphasis
282. See Captran Creditors Trust v. North Am. Title Ins. Agency, Inc. (In re Captran
Creditors Trust), 116 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)("Abuse of process re-
quires use of legal process against another, primarily to accomplish a purpose for
which it was not designed."). An abuse of process fairly can be described as con-
duct which involves an "improper use" of legal process. See, e.g., In re TCI, Ltd.,
769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985)(pursuit of a plausible claim strictly to impose
costs on the other side, instead of because of potential recovery on the claim, is an
abuse of process).
283. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 252, at 897: "Abuse of process differs from
malicious prosecution in that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action...
without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an
end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. See also Coleman v.
Gulf Ins. Group, 718 P.2d 77, 85 (Cal. 1986). To the extent the "improper pur-
pose" component of Rule 11 is alone the basis for imposition of sanctions in a case
involving assertion of non-frivolous claims, it is similarly an illegitimate, as op-
posed to necessarily a malicious or objectively unwarranted, use of process which
justifies the finding the the Rule has been violated. See supra note 247. Thus, the
concepts of improper use and improper purpose, while sometimes distinguished
as such (see supra note 94), are not strictly exclusive of one another. For exam-
ple, Prosser and Keeton note that "the two torts have the common element of an
improper purpose in the use of legal process." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
252, at 898.
284. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 252 at 897, citing Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N.C.
212,132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838), as the leading English case. See also HARPER, supra
note 275, at 499 (noting that the tort of abuse of process was developed to provide
a remedy where the tort of malicious prosecution failed to do so, but cautioning
against an overly-formalistic differentiation between the two actions).
285. The fact that an abuse of process is generally regarded as regulating circum-
stances where the claim asserted is not facially specious or implausible does mean
that an action for abuse of process will not also lie in a case where the claim is
without probable cause. The gravaman of an abuse of process claim is the use of
legitimate process to serve an illegitimate motive. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 252, at 897. Such a misuse of process may well be present in circumstances
which also satisfy the essential elements of malicious prosecution; it is simply
that those elements are not necessary to support an action for abuse of process.
In a similar fashion, an involuntary petition may be assailable under the implied
good faith filing requirement (inappropriate for bankruptcy relief) and also run
afoul of the bad faith restriction in § 303(i)(2)(subjective intention to harm the
debtor). However, the point to be stressed is that the latter does not necessarily




between the two actions in tort which informs the present discourse
on bad faith in involuntary bankruptcy cases.
The crux of the difference between malicious prosecution and
abuse of process involves the existence of proper grounds for justify-
ing the proceeding at issue apart from the question of improper ulte-
rior motive. As the term itself connotes, an abuse of process involves
the misuse of the judicial process. Although the other party may be
and often is harmed as well, the real victim is the system that has been
improperly manipulated to carry out the defendant's corrupt designs.
Thus, in fashioning a remedial response, it is the system that must be
vindicated. Compensation of the adverse party, although frequently
accomplished, is incidental to the basic remedial objective. By con-
trast, in the case of a malicious prosecution, the harm is directly and
intentionally to the other party. Again, the legal process is the instru-
mentality being used to inflict injury on the other party, but this mis-
use of process is incidental to the wrongful end to be attained. Even
more to the point, since the action is, by definition, without probable
cause, the claim will be disposed of in the ordinary course. Therefore,
the concern that forms the raison d'etre for the tort of abuse of pro-
cess, i.e., that the system would unwittingly provide the means by
which the defendant's illicit scheme might be accomplished, simply
does not exist in the paradigmatic malicious prosecution situation.
Bringing this distinction to bear on the present discussion, it can be
said that both Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and the judicially-implied good
faith filing requirement are intended to regulate and control "abuses"
of the bankruptcy process. The history of each is deeply tinged by a
profound concern for the damage done to the integrity of judicial pro-
cess by the wrongful initiation of bankruptcy cases and associated mis-
uses of the process. 286 It is no accident, therefore, that each has come
to be judged primarily by reference to objective standards and criteria.
This also explains why the fact that the offending claim may be color-
able on its face does not end the analysis under either Rule 9011 or the
good faith filing requirement.
The condition that a bankruptcy filing be undertaken in good faith
has been imposed by courts to test individual filings against bank-
ruptcy purposes, quite unrelated to subjective motive.287 Federal Rule
286. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447,2454 (1990)(central pur-
pose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings); Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693,
698 (4th Cir. 1989) (an implied good faith filing requirement is necessary to protect
the jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy courts). See also Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989 (Rule 11 creates a duty to
the legal system as well as to one's adversary, and allows judges to "husband their
scarce energy for the claims of litigants with serious disputes needing resolu-
tion"); Schwarzer, Rule 11, supra note 85, 1020 (proper role of Rule 11 is to deter
litigation abuses, not compensate parties for unnecessary costs incurred).
287. This is true even though, in the abstract, "good faith" and "bad faith" connote
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11 and its bankruptcy counterpart were promulgated to control the
proliferation of groundless filings by requiring reasonable inquiry into
the facts and law.28 8 Even the vestigial remnant of a subjective ele-
ment in Rule 9011,289 while certainly closer in focus and formulation
to the components of a malicious prosecution claim, has been inter-
preted as operating only in those circumstances where a misuse of the
bankruptcy process is manifest. 290 So long as, judged by objective
standards, the case is groundless, the improper purpose prong is inop-
erative or, at best, redundant. On the whole, therefore, the two as-
pects of the Rule operate in the alternative rather than in tandem,
with the first branch the most dominant by far.291
Doubtless, the distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse
of process can be carried to artificial extremes.292 Nevertheless, the
essential points of divergence are informative for the discussion of bad
faith under section 303(i)(2). I wish to suggest that the concept of bad
faith, at least in the context of section 303, should be relegated to cir-
cumstances that would, by and large, independently support a sub-
stantive claim for malicious prosecution. That is, to instances in which
1) there were no reasonable grounds to support the involuntary peti-
tion, thereby resulting in its dismissal; and 2) it is proven by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that a petitioning creditor acted with
issues of subjective motive and intention. See supra notes 251-252. However,
when applied as a prerequisite to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, there seems
to be general agreement that compliance with the standard is judged by objective
criteria. See, e.g., In re Park Place Assocs., 115 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989); supra notes 239 & 251.
288. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
289. See Nelken, supmr note 33, at 1320 (the "improper purpose" language of Rule 11
should be interpreted as retaining a subjective core to the objective certification
requirement of amended Rule 11). But see authorities cited supra note 270 (sug-
gesting that even the improper purpose provision of the Rule should be construed
and enforced by an objective standard).
290. See In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985)(subjective motive becomes
relevant only when the suit is objectively colorable). Nelken, supra note 33, at
1331, observes: "[tihe requirement that a paper not be filed for 'any improper
purpose' applies regardless of the objective factual or legal basis for the claim."
However, Nelken also notes that, as an empirical matter, the improper purpose
standard, though connoting bad faith, "has primarily served to enhance sanctions
for conduct that also failed to meet the objective standard of having a reasonable
basis in fact and law." I&
291. It is unquestionably the reasonable inquiry clause of Rule 11, and Bankruptcy
Rule 9011, which have garnered the lion's share of the courts' attention. See
supra note 243. This is not surprising in light of the relative dormancy of Rule 11
prior to 1983 when establishing a violation required proof of willfulness. See
supra note 73 & 77-79 and accompanying text.
292. See HARPER, supra note 275, at 499-500 (the objectives of the torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process may be frustrated by an artificial exaggeration
of the difference between the two).
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malice toward the debtor in bringing the action.29 3
From a purely practical perspective, there are several aspects of
this "new" test that are noteworthy.294 First, it limits an analysis of
bad faith to only those occasions where the petition has earlier been
adjudicated to be without merit. Second, it allows for judgment on
bad faith grounds against one, more, but less than all the petitioning
creditors depending on subjective state of mind. In both respects, this
comports with the phrasing and the structure of section 303. Finally,
by breaking the connection with Bankruptcy Rule 9011, this proposal
makes it clear that neither lack of reasonable conduct nor improper
motive is alone enough to support a judgment under section 303(i)(2).
Both must be present.
293. Paradoxically, this test bears a much closer resemblance to pre-amended Rule 11
than it does to the current version. For example, in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chro-
matic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991), the Court asserted with
some conviction that the main objective of Rule 11 is to deter groundless filings,
not to create a federal common law of malicious prosecution or reward parties
victimized by litigation. This objective, while certainly important in its own right,
is totally at variance with the objectives of a rule the applicability of which is
explicitly subject to a threshold finding of bad faith. See Sjostedt v. Salmon (In re
Salmon), 128 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)(in adopting § 303(i)(2) "Con-
gress clearly created a remedy for malicious prosecution in the form of a bad faith
filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy").
294. I use the term "new" somewhat loosely here since I fully appreciate that there is
nothing particularly novel or unique in the idea that bad faith implies an inquiry
into subjective motivation and intention. See supra note 252. What is perhaps
new is the introduction of a subjective test into the analysis of bad faith under
§ 303(i)(2), but even that approach is not without some precedent. See supra note
44 and accompanying text. Still, while the bouquet may be hauntingly familiar, I
do not believe this is entirely a case of old wine in new bottles. No decision to
date has clearly and completely made the link between the elements of malicious
prosecution and § 303(i)(2), including, in particular, the requirement that the pe-
tition be found to have been filed both without probable cause to believe that
proper grounds for relief exist and with malevolent intent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674, 675 (1977). If anything, the case law in recent years
has moved further and further away from the point in seemingly relentless pur-
suit of the ill-advised marriage between the bad faith question in involuntary
cases and Bankruptcy Rule 9011. See supra notes 61-64, & 255 and accompanying
text. In In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 183-84 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992), the court
adopted the position that bad faith under § 303(i)(2) for the purpose of award and
compensatory damages can be established solely on the basis that the petition was
not well-grounded in fact, but that an award of punitive damages requires a fur-
ther showing of vengeful and malicious conduct. While there is some appeal to
drawing such a distinction based on the language of § 303(i)(2), I do not believe
such construction is required. Moreover, given the structure of the overall statu-
tory scheme and relevant policy considerations, I think one better view is to insist
upon malice as a condition to recovery of any damages. This leaves the decision
of whether punitive damages are called for to turn on the bankruptcy court's
separate assessment of the need for further relief based on the overall equities of
the situation. The situations of the parties, the need to send a deterrence
message, and the amount of other damages and fees awarded all must be taken
into account.
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From a policy standpoint, I would submit that this approach is also
sensible in that it only makes a creditor's ulterior motive relevant
when the process has been misapplied.295 Thus, the spiteful initiation
of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding would not constitute bad
faith for purposes of section 303(i)(2), even though the petitioning
creditors' motives were somewhat less than pure, provided the peti-
tion was filed with meticulous regard for all procedural niceties and
against a debtor that had generally not been paying its current obliga-
tions. 296 Correspondingly, absent further proof of malevolent intent,
dismissal of a petition filed without an adequate pre-filing inquiry, or
merely as a substitute for alternative collection procedures, would not
presumptively establish bad faith for section 303(i)(2) purposes.
On the other hand, when the claim for involuntary relief is without
foundation and a petitioning creditor is determined to have acted with
a premeditated design to inflict economic injury on the alleged debtor,
the court might well exercise its discretion to enter judgment under
section 303(i)(2). The burden of proving that the petition was filed to
accomplish an unlawful ulterior consequential objective would remain
on the debtor.297 Of course, the absence of probable cause to support
295. This is quite the opposite of Rule 11 where the improper purpose question is, for
the most part, judged independently from the factual or legal merits of the chal-
lenged pleading. See supra note 290.
296. In this respect, I concur with the logic of the view expressed by the Ninth Circuit
in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136,1140 (9th Cir. 1990), that
it would be "counterproductive" to penalize the assertion of non-frivolous sub-
stantive claims under the improper purpose component of Rule 11. Similarly, if
the conditions justifying an involuntary bankruptcy are present, the petitioners'
motives for filing should be of no moment. Entry of an order for relief benefits
other creditors and parties with an interest in the debtor to the same extent as
the petitioning creditors once the case in chief is commenced. The claims of the
petitioners receive no special treatment or favored status in the ensuing bank-
ruptcy administration. There is a difference, however, between Townsend and
the approach to § 303(i)(2) I advocate here. In Townsend the court directed that
insofar as complaints initiating lawsuits are concerned the inquiry into "improper
purpose" is subsumed in the "frivolousness" inquiry. By contrast, in involuntary
bankruptcy cases the question of damages for bad faith in filing does not arise
unless and until the petition is adjudicated on the merits in the alleged debtor's
favor. In other words, it must have been filed without proper grounds or cause,
but need not have been "frivolous" as a condition to entry of judgment under
§ 303(i). Another problem is that, to date, few courts have even recognized a dis-
tinction between complaints and other pleadings and paper for Rule 11 purposes,
let alone acquiesced in the relationship between the two parts of the Rule sug-
gested by Townsend when the pleading in question involves a complaint.
297. It is clear that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit bears the burden of
proving the essential elements of the claim for relief. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTs § 681A (1977); Weiszman v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540,
1547 (D. Colo. 1990)(in a malicious prosecution action the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff). In determining whether or not an involuntary petition was filed in
bad faith, courts have always, regardless of the standard used to measure bad
faith, required the debtor to overcome the presumption of good faith which at-
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the petition would effectively be established by the prior dismissal of
the petition before the question of damages under section 303(i)(2)
even arises. However, since the culminating question of bad faith con-
duct would turn on proof of the presence of malicious intention to
cause harm to the debtor beyond the ordinary hardship associated
with routine debt collection activities, reliance on advice of counsel
would not automatically serve as a defense to liability.298 Moreover,
tends the filing. See supra authorities cited at note 58. This contrasts, for exam-
ple, with the applicable procedure involving preliminary motions to dismiss
reorganization petitions allegedly filed in bad faith where the courts have taken
the view that once a prima facie showing of lack of good faith has been made, the
burden shifts to the filing party to show that continuation of the proceeding
would not constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., In
re Meyers Way Dev., 116 B.R. 239, 244-45 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990); In re N.R.
Guaranteed Retirement, Inc., 112 B.R. 263, 276 (Bankr. N.D. M11. 990), aff'd, 119
B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). Moreover, both proceedings for sanctions under
Rule 11 and the good faith filing issue may be raised on the court's own initiative
as well as on motion of the opposing party. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 33, at 200 ("Ihe detection and punishment of a violation of [Rule
11's] signing requirement ... is part of the court's responsibility for securing the
system's effective operation."); Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986)(court
may raise good faith filing issue sua sponte).
298. The authorities agree that in a malicious prosection action, the advice of counsel,
sought and received in good faith, should negate a finding of malice based on lack
of probable cause to maintain the earlier suit. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 252, at 894; HARPER ET AL., supra note 275, at 449-51; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 675 (1977). However, where the proceedings are inspired
solely by the desire to cause harm to the other party, advice of counsel is no de-
fense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 669 cmt. h (1977). Correspondingly,
where the client's motive is unknown to counsel, courts have uniformly shielded
counsel from joint liability for malicious prosecution. See David W. Pollack,
Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process,
44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619, 637 n. 96 (1977).
In its review of varying approaches employed by the courts in defining bad
faith under § 303(i)(2), the court in In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989) recognized this distinction. Id at 412: "[A]dvice of counsel can ex-
cuse an improper-use bad faith but it cannot excuse improper-purpose bad faith."
Although the terms "improper use" and "improper purpose" are not quite as bi-
partite as the court in Better Care suggests (supra note 94), neither would it be
inaccurate in the main to equate and improper use bad faith with a misuse or
misapplication of judicial process, and an improper purpose bad faith with a mali-
cious prosection. The more basic problem with the decision in Better Care, how-
ever, is that by denying the availability of this defense to petitioners in an
"improper-purpose" case the court implies that colorable as well as non-colorable
petitions may form the basis of a damage award under § 303(i)(2), a result I con-
sider antithetical to both the letter and the spirit of the statute.
Reliance on counsel has also been rejected as a basis for relieving a party who
fails to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry into the facts and law from expo-
sure to sanctions under Rule 11. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 930-32 (1991); supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Thus, cases which evaluate bad faith under § 303(i)(2) using the standards devel-
oped under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 have held that the petitioners cannot avoid bad
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just as the desire to secure payment of a debt legitimately due and
owing could itself never be an unlawful objective, without regard to
the appropriateness of the case for bankruptcy, neither should the de-
sire to obtain satisfaction of what turns out to be a validly disputed
claim constitute bad faith if it cannot also be proven that the petition-
ing creditor acted with an improper ulterior motive.299
It is well-established that the remedies set forth in section 303(i)(2)
do not preempt a subsequent state court action for malicious prosecu-
tion.300 The continued availability of traditional forms of relief for
wrongful civil litigation does not, however, obviate either the need or
the desirability of having a "federal" law of malicious prosecution in
the limited context of involuntary bankruptcy filings.01 Incorpora-
tion into section 303(i) of specific remedial responses to malicious fil-
ings overcomes several impediments faced by an aggrieved debtor
relegated to its rights under state law. To begin with, even though a
determination of bad faith must await dismissal of the petition, section
303(i)(2) allows the debtor's charge of malicious prosecution to be
raised, tried, and adjudicated in the same action.3 02 Also, because of
faith liability based on the allegation that they acted with the advice of counsel
See, e.g., In re Turner, 80 B.R. 618, 624 (Bankr. D. Mass 1987). See also In re
Ramsden. 17 B.R. 59 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)(awarding damages under § 303(i)(2)
even though counsel admitted his failure to consult the Bankruptcy Code before
filing). These decisions, while likely correct on the weight to be accorded to reli-
ance on counsel, ignore the effect that legal advice might have on the basic issue
of whether the petitioning creditors' purpose for filing was proper. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 676 cmt. c (1977)(suggesting that belief in the suitabil-
ity of a particular case for modification of existing precedent might be sufficient
to negate a finding of improper purpose).
299. This would not in any way relieve the petitioning creditors from imposition of
sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or judgments for fees and costs under
§ 303(i)(1) if it turned out that the petition was patently without substance.
300. See Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir.
1988)(it would be inconsistent with the overall scheme of the Code to find that
§ 303(i)(2) was an exclusive remedy for claims based on wrongful initiation of an
involuntary petition); In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405,416 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989). However, from a practical perspective, a state court action might not be
the most efficacious way of obtaining satisfactory relief. See infra note 302-303
and accompanying text. See also Susman v. Schmid (In re Reid), 854 F.2d 156,162
(7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that § 303(i) has preempted the judiciaries equitable
power to redistribute attorneys fees in involuntary cases).
301. It is clear that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 offers no realistic alternative. See Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S.Ct. 922,934 (1991)(Rule
11 does not create a federal law of malicious prosecution). But see Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. CL 2447, 2463 (1990)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(accusing
the majority, by its holding that Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed against a party
who voluntarily withdraws its pleading, of creating a federal law of malicious
prosecution in violation of the limitations established by the Rules Enabling Act).
302. Ordinarily, a claim for judgment under § 303(i) is raised by motion or application
of the debtor and the court will retain jurisdiction over the case following dismis-
sal of the petition in order to rule on the debtor's request. See, e.g., Miyao v.
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the provisions of section 303(i)(1), it permits the bankruptcy court to
effectively reimburse the debtor's cost of establishing bad faith in ad-
dition to the cost of defending the petition. Ordinarily, the costs of a
malicious prosecution action itself, as opposed to the costs incurred in
defending the earlier action, are not compensable as part of the judg-
ment in favor of a successful plaintiff.3 03
Another justification for conceptualizing of section 303(i)(2) as a
federal cause of action for malicious prosecution is that, in those juris-
dictions that still adhere to the "special damage" requirement, 04 it
eliminates any limitations that might otherwise be imposed on recov-
ery of reputational and other forms of damage not directly attributa-
ble to the loss or detention of the debtor's property.3 05 Further,
because the petitioning creditors are already present and have con-
sented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over them, section
303(i)(2) circumvents the potential service or joinder problems that
might be encountered in a state court action.3 06
Kuntz (In re Sweet Transfer & Storage, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1990);
In re Fox Island Square Partnership, 106 B.R. 962, 965 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1989); In
re McDonald Trucking Co., 74 B.R. 474,476-77 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); supra note
227. Technically, a prayer for damages under § 303(i) cannot be raised by coun-
terclaim in the debtor's answer since FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(d) limits the allega-
tions that may be raised in the debtor's answer to matters asserted for the
purpose of defeating the petition. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, courts have
been lenient in permitting a claim under § 303(i) to be asserted by any reasonable
means. E.g., In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 701 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1984)(prayer for damages raised by counterclaim); In re Laclede Cab Co., 76 B.R.
687 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)(answer requested dismissal of petition together with
an award of actual and punitive damages and attorneys fees and costs under
§ 303(i)).
303. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 252, at 888; Note, Groundless Litigation,
supra note 278, at 1220 n. 15 ("No case has held that the expense of the malicious
prosecution action itself is recoverable.").
304. See supra text accompanying note 278.
305. One of the problems under the former Bankruptcy Act was that damages recov-
erable upon the dismissal of an involuntary petition were limited to losses attrib-
utable to the seizure or detention of the debtor's property. Bankruptcy Act § 69b,
discussed supra note 12.
306. The bankruptcy court's decision in Emerald City Records, Inc. v. First Media
Corp. (In re Emerald City records, Inc.), 9 B.R. 319 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) illus-
trates the problem in reverse. In that case, the petitioning creditors removed a
state court action for malicious use of process to the bankruptcy court which had
earlier dismissed their petition but retained jurisdiction to hear and decide the
debtor's motion for damages under § 303(i). The debtor sought remand to the
state court of its common law claim on jurisdictional grounds. Although the
bankruptcy court concluded that it had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the debtor's claim, it nevertheless remanded the matter because the
state court action involved at least four parties who had not been parties to the
trial on the involuntary bankruptcy petition. I& at 321. Citing equitable consid-
erations, the court reasoned that the rights of the non-parties should not be tied
to the determination of a bankruptcy remedy in which such parties had no part.
Id
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On a more intangible but still very real level, there is an additional
factor that augurs in favor of this formulation of the bad faith provi-
sion. The relatively easy availability of a self-contained remedy for
malicious prosecution may be sufficiently appealing so as to overcome
the psychological inertia that, deprived of such an alternative, might
be enough to discourage an aggrieved debtor from going to the trouble
to file a subsequent action in state court for the improper prosecution
of an involuntary bankruptcy case.3 07 Correspondingly, because the
bad faith claim is heard by the same judge who heard the merits of the
petition, the delay, expense, and related inefficiencies associated with
a new action in a different court are all eliminated. Particularly in a
complicated case, this may translate into dramatic savings in terms of
cost and time.
As can be seen, adoption of this proposal for defining the nature
and scope of the bad faith proscription in section 303(i)(2) would not
operate to obstruct the path to relief for the debtor victimized by an
ill-founded and hostile bankruptcy filing. Because of the potentially
devastating consequences that the filing of the petition alone can have
on the debtor's business and financial affairs, the reasons for doing so
are clear and just. On the other hand, when the petition is supported
by proper grounds as detailed in the statute, or the petitioning credi-
tors cannot be shown to have acted other than for the purpose of com-
pelling payment of their debts, no issue of liability for damages under
section 303(i)(2) should arise. The risk of having to endure a suit that
turns out to be without merit is a natural incident of a system which
not only permits but affirmatively prizes free and open access to jus-
tice under law. This policy applies no less to bankruptcy than any
other form of relief for which the machinery of justice might be in-
voked. Thus, this proposal to conceive of bad faith under section
307. While concerns over the increasing misuse and overuse of the litigation process
by our "litigation-crazed" society are regularly, earnestly, and sometimes even
loudly voiced (see supra note 79 and accompanying text), in reality, the prospect
of becoming a party to a lawsuit remains a daunting and intimidating one for
most people. Enough so, in fact, as to dissuade individuals in many instances to
"turn the other cheek" on plainly meritorious claims. Even business parties, per-
haps less cowed at the prospect of litigation in general, still have to consider the
cost, dislocations, and preoccupation of executive time as well as the risk of an
adverse result in deciding whether to pursue or abandon a claim. Whatever the
reason, I think it is less likely that a claim will be brought, irrespective of its
merits, if to do so entails summoning the economic resources and mental energy
involved in starting from scratch as opposed to filing a simple application in an
existing proceeding in which the debtor is not only already embroiled but has
already proved successful. I acknowledge that this is largely an impression on my
part and that there is no empirical evidence, at least of which I am aware, to
support this proposition. However, based on my own experience and common
sense observations about human nature, I am nevertheless convinced it is true.
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303(i)(2) as a remedy for the malicious misuse of process is also a pro-
posal to limit its application commensurately.
To suggest, as I have, that a logical corollary of a democratic legal
system must be that recourse to judicial process, even when unwar-
ranted, cannot itself become the basis for a cognizable cause of action
is not to belittle or underplay very real concerns that have been ex-
pressed from time to time over the assertion of frivolous claims and
employment of objectionable litigation practices. I simply wish to
point out that those concerns are either already adequately addressed
through existing cost-distribution mechanisms such as Rule 11,308 or,
if not adequately addressed, must be controlled by the development of
new deterrents designed to respond to the particular exigencies at is-
sue.
3 0 9 In the case of involuntary bankruptcy in particular, the provi-
308. Other examples include 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988)(supra note 73); FED. R. APP. P. 38
(authorizing the award of just damages and up to double costs for a frivolous
appeal); and the inherent equitable power of the courts to require a non-prevail-
ing party to pay its adversary's costs of defense when the losing party has acted
vexatiously or in bad faith. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975). See also "Equal Access to Justice Act," Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980), (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28
U.S.C. § 68 (1988))(permitting prevailing parties to obtain award of attorneys fees
and other expenses against the United States in certain administrative proceed-
ings and judicial actions).
309. As a matter of documented fact, much of the development of the law in the twen-
tieth century has been in response to perceived inequities in access to the legal
system and the ability of parties with vastly superior information and resources
to exploit their advantage at the expense of others less able to protect and fend
for themselves. Post-World War II enactment of major civil rights, consumer
protection, and other regulatory and social legislation represents perhaps the
most vivid examples of this trend. Closer, however, to a purer commercial law
setting, certainly the basic precepts of contract law, as formulated during the hal-
cyon days of classical liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century, have been radi-
cally altered and transformed as the social and economic assumptions upon which
they were based became more and more strained by the growing complexity and
interdependence of twentieth century society. See generally GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRAcT 95-96 (1974); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE AN-
GLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CoNTRAcT, 217-326 (1990). For discussion of the
pressures of modern society which have spawned more egalitarian theories of so-
cial justice, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need The Welfare State and Theo-
ries of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L REv. 877 (1976).
While regulation of the assertion of spurious and abusive claims is an impor-
tant goal which, justifiably, receives considerable attention from courts, legisla-
tures, commentators, and the popular press, there is another side to the coin.
Any remedy designed to deter improper litigation practices, no matter how care-
fully crafted, will inevitably have some spillover effect on claims which, if filed,
would do no violence to the principles sought to be preserved by the deterrent
measure. It is against the backdrop of a need to ensure that honest claimants will
not fear to seek legal redress from the courts that the adoption and interpretation
of rules aimed at controlling busy dockets or abusive practices must be consid-
ered. See generally Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters.,
111 S. Ct. 922, 935, 943 (1991)(Steven, J., dissenting); Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v.
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sion in section 303(i)(1) for a wholly discretionary award of costs and
attorneys fees without any showing of bad faith provides considerable
protection against creditors who otherwise might haphazardly or
heedlessly gamble on bankruptcy relief.310 However, unless the
debtor can go the next step and show a misuse of the system under-
taken for the specific purpose of causing the debtor direct pecuniary
injury or personal humiliation (be it in the form of loss of business
advantage or opportunity, interference with contractual relationship,
denial of credit, reputational damage, etc.), the mere unsuccessful at-
tempt to use the bankruptcy process for one's own advantage should
not alone be enough to subject the creditor to affirmative liability for
such damages.
The standards of bad faith that have evolved under section
303(i)(2) have raised the stakes too high for honest as well as dishonest
creditors in most cases to run the risk of an involuntary filing;, possibly
even more so for the former than the latter who, as a group, may be
more risk averse. Whether acting out of solicitude for potential vic-
tims of ill-founded filings or a concern for protecting the integrity of
the system, courts have exhibited an unwise tendency to think of the
bad faith provision in section 303 as a broad prophylactic remedy for
cleansing the system of all forms of unwanted behavior. Necessarily,
this has contributed to the devitalization of involuntary proceedings as
a meaningful part of the federal bankruptcy system.3 11 This has hap-
pened in spite of the long history and persistent inclusion in every
American bankruptcy statute of a provision for involuntary filings,3 12
Rascator Maritime S.L, 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986)("To ensure ... that fear
of an award of attorneys' fees against them will not deter persons with colorable
claims from pursuing those claims," the courts have interpreted the bad faith
exception to the "American Rule" on attorneys fees restrictively); supra notes
252 & 308.
310. Although Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is not purely a fee shifting statute in the sense
that the non-prevailing party must pay all costs of suit, no such limitation con-
strains the bankruptcy court's exercise of discretion under § 303(i)(1) following
dismissal of an involuntary petition. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
The only apparent limitation on an award of attorneys fees in an involuntary case
is a requirement of reasonableness. See, e.g., In re Fox Island Square Partnership,
106 B.R. 962, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
311. Also raising the stakes for creditors contemplating an involuntary filing was the
1984 Act's amendment of § 303(b) & (h) to exclude the holders of debts subject to
bona fide dispute from, respectively, the pool of creditors eligible to invoke the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and the calculous of whether the debtor was gen-
erally paying its debts at the time of the filing. See supra notes 15-19 and accom-
panying text. Since the bona fides of a dispute, and sometimes even the existence
of a dispute, cannot always be predicted with certainty in advance of filing, these
changes, particularly when considered in light of the prospect for damages under
§ 303(i) should the petition fail, could be expected to make any prudent creditor
far less than sanguine about seeking relief in bankruptcy, and, in fact, that ap-
pears to be exactly what has happened since 1984. See supra note 20.
312. See supra note 1. See also Ponoroff, supra note 19, at 318 n. 16-19.
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as well as the specific efforts made as part of the adoption of the Re-
form Act to free involuntary bankruptcy from the complexities and
constraints that had accounted for the general lack of interest under
the earlier Bankruptcy Act.3 13
Contrary to popular perception, bankruptcy law and policy are
concerned with more than basic questions of debtor relief and protec-
tion. Bankruptcy is also a creditors' remedy, serving as an alternative
system for debt adjustment and repayment, and as an instrument for
overcoming economic uncertainty and disorder. Furthermore, partic-
ularly in the context of larger business debtors where there is no sin-
gle individual to protect, bankruptcy provides the stage and the script
for a drama in which a myriad of actors, each with a slightly different
interest in the debtor-enterprise and each with a slightly different
view for its future, can at least momentarily take center stage in order
to be heard.3 1 4 It is through the process of a bankruptcy administra-
tion that all of these interests are ordered eventually, compromised if
necessary, and, when the system works, accommodated.31 5
In light of these considerations and the important role federal
bankruptcy law plays in the commercial economy, it would be short-
sighted to suppose that the administration of the debtor's assets in a
bankruptcy proceeding should only occur when the debtor voluntarily
elects to initiate the proceeding. Therefore, strained constructions of
the involuntary bankruptcy statute that, by focusing on other goals of
the system, throw the baby out with the bath water are detrimental
not only to the persons who sign the petition and are directly affected
by unnecessarily expansive interpretations of bad faith, but in the long
run they are harmful as well to the larger social, political, and eco-
nomic order. These concerns. underscore why I believe that "bad
faith," as that term is used in section 303(i)(2), should be defined by
reference to the central tenets of malicious prosecution, and its appli-
313. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
314. For discussion of a similar view about the nature of business reorganizations, see
Korobkin, supra note 173, at 766 ("Bankruptcy law provides a forum in which the
competing and various interests and values accompanying financial distress may
be expressed and sometimes recognized."); Warren, supra note 155, at 777 ("I see
bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to dis-
tribute the consequences among a number of different actors.").
315. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 128, at 966-67, describing the bank-
ruptcy system as providing a forum in which a "broad range of competing con-
cerns and interests can be factored into specific solutions which are unattainable
(or attainable only at the cost of unacceptable delay) under applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law and procedure." Empirical research likewise suggests that the actual
pattern of distributions in large company cases does not follow the doctrinal rule
of absolute priority to which creditors are entitled. See LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 155, at 179-83 (the authors attribute this dissonance to actual post-
filing bargaining resulting in settlement agreements that deviate from the strict
rule of absolute priority).
[Vol. 71:209
BAD FAITH IN BANKRUPTCY
cation limited accordingly, rather than by the more generalized stan-
dards developed in other contexts to control systemic abuses or
misuses of the process.
X. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have attempted to reformulate the test of bad faith
in involuntary bankruptcy along lines analogous to those delineating
the common law tort of malicious prosecution. There is, therefore,
nothing particularly novel or unique in this reconceptualization of bad
faith; in fact, the effort was surely more an exercise in retrenchment
than one of bold, provocative advancement. Was the effort neverthe-
less worthwhile? I think so, for a couple of reasons. For one thing,
the proposal I have put forward in this Article would, if adopted, serve
to clarify the present ambiguity and confusion in the decisional law by
replacing the current array of differing tests of bad faith with a single,
coherent standard.
The need for such a standard is apparent, and not simply as a nor-
mative prescription. Courts have failed to take on with any precision
of thought or analysis the question of what "bad faith" entails within
the structure of Bankruptcy Code section 303, electing instead to defer
to rules and standards developed in other contexts to serve other
needs. For another thing, the narrow definition of bad faith I have
offered for purposes of section 303(i)(2) achieves section 303(i)'s pri-
mary objective-protecting innocent debtors who are paying their
debts from being bludgeoned to death by deliberate manipulation of
the involuntary bankruptcy statute-without compromising other im-
portant interests in the process.
Principal among the positive attributes which flow from explicat-
ing the bad faith issue on its own terms, rather than in terms of the
concerns regulating frivolous filings and the broader good faith doc-
trine in bankruptcy, is the maintenance of some semblance of balance
between the risks and benefits which are the ineluctable components
of any vigorous and vital system for involuntary bankruptcy. The abil-
ity to compel the debtor into bankruptcy is heady stuff. The potential
for unintended consequences and misuse is unquestionably present.
Yet, if the benefits of an alternative federal system of debt collection
exist, they are produced equally whether the filing is voluntary or
involuntary.
While the existence of the bankruptcy discharge can be relied upon
to incent the individual, and particularly the consumer, debtor to con-
sider the bankruptcy alternative when circumstances warrant, the
same cannot be said for corporate and other business debtors.316 It is
316. Corporations and other non-natural debtors do not receive a discharge in Chapter
7. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)(1988). Although the successful confirmation of a Chapter
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especially in these circumstances that involuntary bankruptcy takes
on added importance. It does so, moreover, whether one imagines
bankruptcy solely as a more efficient method of debt collection or as a
system designed to manage and distribute the broader consequences of
business failure.
I have suggested that the bad faith injunction in section 303(i)(2)
should be analyzed on its own terms and considering its own purposes.
To support that conclusion, I have attempted to point out the inherent
limitations and the illogic in either adopting the Bankruptcy Rule 9011
standard or applying the same method of analysis used to determine
good faith in filing. Along the way, I have been led to ruminate
whether other restrictions on the ability to initiate and sustain an in-
voluntary bankruptcy proceeding make sense. In particular, it is not
at all clear that bankruptcy policy requires restricting standing in in-
voluntary cases to creditors alone. Ultimately, however, the answer to
that question, must wait for another day. It calls for far more careful
study than it has been given here and, in fairness, should be put for-
ward in the form of a detailed proposal for amendment of the statute.
Thus, there is still much work to be done.
As perhaps only an initial step, then, I have tried to make the case
in this Article that the current approaches for defining bad faith
under the statute as presently drafted are misdirected. As such, they
have had an unfortunate chilling effect on an important instrument of
debtor/creditor relations. The solution I have offered would not only
eliminate this problem, but would do so by restoring the original bal-
ance that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, blissfully ignorant of a
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or an implied good faith filing requirement, had
in mind when they swept away the dust of disuse that had settled
upon the involuntary bankruptcy remedy. However, consistency with
original intent is not the sole criterion in the process, nor is it the only
objective of statutory interpretation. Therefore, I have also tried to
II plan does result in a broad discharge of all preconfirmation obligations, includ-
ing those categories of debts listed in § 523(a). 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(1988). Nev-
ertheless, although reorganization in bankruptcy has unquestionably become
more mainstream and acceptable for business debtors since the adoption of the
Reform Act than had been the case under the Act, it is wise not to forget that any
kind of bankruptcy still carries with it a stigma which most corporate managers
would prefer to avoid if at all possible. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 155, at
278-80. In their study of large corporate bankruptcies, LoPucki and Whitford
found that forty of forty-three CEOs had lost their jobs by the time the reorgani-
zation plan was confirmed and that of the companies that sought relief under
Chapter 11 over half ended up liquidating at least in part. See id. at 278 n. 3, 280
n. 9, citing from LYNN M. LOPUCKI & WILLIAM C. WHITFORD, PATTERNS IN THE
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION OF LARGE PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES (AUGUST
1990)(materials presented for the Federal Judicial Center Seminar for Bank-
ruptcy Judges). See also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 155 (presenting find-
ings and conclusions from the same study).
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point out why the effort to restore this balance is justified and impor-
tant based on compatibility with present and evolving bankruptcy pol-
icy. Neither concern for controlling the excesses occasionally
encountered in employment of the involuntary bankruptcy remedy,
nor the failure to carefully distinguish among the multiple meanings
of good faith and bad faith, should be allowed to spoil that effort.
